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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the effect of stock market participation on political behavior.
Some observers claim that financial assets—stocks and mutual funds—have a causal effect
on political behavior. The “investor class theory” asserts that as people invest in the stock
market their partisan attachments shift rightward. The “asset effect theory” claims that
financial investments increase political interest and participation. I examine these claims
with longitudinal data from the United States and Great Britain covering a twenty-year
period from the early 1980s through the mid-2000’s. I also examine the effect of financial
asset ownership on political attitudes in the United States during the 2008 stock market
crash. I find no evidence to support the argument that stock market participation has any
causal effect on partisanship, participation, or political attitudes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Until recently, few people played the stock market. At the time of the Great Depression, only
two percent of American adults owned stocks. By the early 1950s, this figure had climbed
to a mere four percent (Harrington 2008). Even as late as the early 1980s, only one-fifth of
American households owned shares of companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges.1 By 2005,
however, one-half of U.S. households and one in three individuals directly or indirectly owned
stock market equities (Investment Company Institute and Securities Industry Association
2005).
This trend was repeated in other parts of the world. Roughly one-half of Swedish house-
holds and a third in the U.K. were invested in stocks and mutual funds at the start of the new
millennium (Guiso et al. 2003). Stockholding increased even in relative laggards such as the
Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany to about 15-25% of households.2 As a result of this
global growth in household stock market participation, more people than ever before became
directly exposed to the vicissitudes of the financial markets. The 2008 financial crisis, the
most serious global economic catastrophe since the Great Depression, affected investors large
and small from Wall Street to Main Street. As governments around the world scrambled to
contain the fallout from one of the worst financial crises in history, their actions were judged
by voters concerned about both their incomes and their stock portfolios.
The most rapid growth in U.S. household stock market participation occurred during the
bull market of the 1990s. The percentage of American adults who owned stocks doubled
1Directly held stocks and stocks owned through mutual funds, both inside and out of retirement accounts.
2In 2000, these six European states held approximately 90% of total financial wealth in the European
Union (Guiso et al. 2003).
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during this decade. It previously had taken a full twenty-five years for a change of this
magnitude to occur—from 10 percent in 1965 to 21 percent in 1990 (Harrington 2008, p.
12). Observers attribute the growth in stock market participation in the United States
since the early 1980s to the lower interest rates paid by bank savings accounts, greater
accessibility and reduced costs of mutual funds, and introduction of “defined-contribution”
retirement plans such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and employer-sponsored
401(k)s (Keister 2005; Nadler 2000a; Guiso et al. 2002; Davis 2009).3
Many new investors doubtless were attracted to the stock market by the remarkable gains
of equities in the 1990s. Between 1994 and 1999 alone the Dow Jones Industrial Average
increased from a low of 3,600 to roughly 11,500—an increase of nearly 220%.4 Tables 1.1
and 1.2 illustrate this dramatic growth in stock ownership in America over the past three
decades. These figures represent a conservative estimate of U.S. stock market participation
as they include household equity investment but not other popular investments such as bonds
or non-stock mutual funds.5 Overall, these data show significant growth in overall equity
investment as well as significant increases across income and racial subgroups.
Equity ownership increased dramatically for white, black and Hispanic households. In
1983, only 4.3% of black households owned stocks; by 2007 roughly 30% of black households
were stockholders. Hispanic stockholding increased more dramatically, rising from 1% in
1983 to 24% in 2007. Moreover, the data show that growth in stock market participation
was not limited to the wealthy or middle class, but also included low-income households.
Women went from making up just under a third of investors in 1990 to fifty percent by
1999 (Harrington 2008). Over three quarters of American voters in 2000 were stock market
investors (Nadler 2000a).
3“Stock market participation” in this specific case refers to investments in a broad range of securities,
including stocks, bonds and mutual funds. Equity ownership refers specifically to direct or indirect stock
ownership.
4It previously had taken a decade (1984-1994) for the Dow to realize an increase of this magnitude.
5An early 2008 survey found that 60% of American households with financial assets held own both stocks
and bonds (Investment Company Institute and Securities Industry Association 2008, p. 8).
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of U.S. households owning stock market equities, 1983
Characteristics All White Black Hispanic Low Income
Average age of household (years) 50.3 50.6 43.1 36 47.1
Average education of household head (years) 13.9 13.9 13.2 12.0 12.9
Median income (thousands of 2007 dollars) 44.9 43.7 49.9 81.2 0.0
Median financial net worth (thousands of 2007 dollars) 34.7 37.4 1.1 -54.0 9.6
Median total net worth (thousands of 2007 dollars) 226.7 236.9 70.7 131.1 44.3
Percent equity owners in population (households) 20.4 23.6 6.8 1.0 4.4
Millions of equity-owning households 17.2 16.2 0.7 0.03 0.74
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1983, weighted data.
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of U.S. households owning stock market equities, 2007
Characteristics All White Black Hispanic Low Income
Average age of household (years) 50.7 52.1 45.1 43.1 55.6
Average education of household head (years) 14.3 14.3 14.4 13.4 13.2
Median income (thousands of 2007 dollars) 56.6 54.5 60.7 64.8 0.0
Median financial net worth (thousands of 2007 dollars) 11.9 24.2 -21.5 -43.2 9.4
Median total net worth (thousands of 2007 dollars) 288.9 310.0 131.0 198.1 119.5
Percent equity owners in population (households) 51.1 57.5 29.8 24.2 13.5
Millions of equity-owning households 59.3 49.3 4.3 2.6 23.2
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 2007, weighted data.
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Expansion of mutual fund offerings and introduction of defined-contribution pension
funds similarly increased stock market participation in Europe. Privatization of public en-
terprises in the 1980s and 1990s, the aging populations of many European states, and Eu-
ropean Union directives on financial integration and liberalization also contributed to this
growth (Guiso et al. 2003). Even countries with relatively lower overall stock market partici-
pation experienced significant growth over this period. Guiso et al. (2005) report that in the
mid-to-late 1990s as many as one-third of Italian households were unaware of the existence
of stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts. In 2000 only 7% of Italian households
directly invested in stocks (Guiso et al. 2003, p. 138).6
Table 1.3 shows the changes in Italian household equity ownership over nearly a 20 year
period. I focus on just the riskiest investments—stocks and stock mutual funds.7 Even
with this narrow focus, equity ownership in Italy between 1987 and 2006 almost doubled
from 5.7% to 9.4%. Moreover, this growth in financial investments was not limited to any
one group. In terms of overall percentage change, stock investment grew most rapidly for
the least educated Italians (from 2.3% to 4.5%). These changes in household portfolios
were repeated elsewhere as stock market participation became much more common across
households throughout the developed world (McCarthy 2004). By the mid-2000s, financial
investments were no longer limited to the well-heeled and highly-educated.
6Total Italian household participation in 2000, including indirect investments in mutual funds, retirement
accounts and other managed assets, was 15%.
7Excludes bonds, bond mutual funds, and money market mutual funds.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of Italian households owning stock market equities, 1987 & 2006
Characteristics 1987 2006
Average age of household (years) 48.6 52.8
Education of household head (%)
Below high school 2.3 4.5
High school 13.1 14.2
College 21.5 23.5
Post-graduate 32.8 36.6
Median income (thousands of euros) 44.3 43.5
Median financial net worth (thousands of euros) 33.7 40.0
Median total net worth (thousands of 2007 dollars) 201.3 347.9
Percent equity owners in population (households) 5.7 9.4
Source: Surveys of Household Income and Wealth, weighted data
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1.1 The puzzle
By the late 1990s, U.S. political analysts began to hypothesize about the political conse-
quences of this dramatic increase in American household stock market participation. In
the United States, the fastest growing group of new investors were young people and lower
middle income families—core Democratic Party constituencies. Surveys appeared to show
that investors were more likely to vote and more likely to lean Republican than non-investors
(Glassman 2001). “Asset ownership was associated with increased G.O.P. affiliation among
voters who were black, single, young, low-income, and female—all significant elements of the
Democratic coalition” (Nadler 2000a, p. 1). Conservative policy analysts began to describe
the growing ranks of stock market participants as a new “investor class” (Glassman 1999;
Nadler 1999).8 On average, these investors had relatively limited portfolios. One-quarter
of household portfolios were less than $5,000; the median household (in terms of income)
had only about $15,000 in financial assets.9 Based on data from a 1999 Rasmussen sur-
vey, however, investor class advocates believed that political behavior began to change with
portfolios as small as $5,000 (Norquist 2004).
Conservative analysts developed the “investor class theory,” claiming that acquisition
of stock market assets has a subsequent effect on their owners’ partisanship, participation,
and political attitudes. Proponents asserted that stock market investments make investors
more conservative in their political views, vote more often, and more likely to support the
Republican Party (Glassman 2001; Nadler 2000a, 2005). These lay theoreticians, however,
were not alone in drawing a connection between financial assets and politics. Scholars
researching asset-based welfare policies in the 1990s also hypothesized about the effects of
assets on political behavior (Sherraden 1991). Although these analysts made no claims
about the effect of asset ownership on partisanship, they did suggest that financial assets
8Credit for this term is attributed by Ponnuru (2004) to Lawrence Kudlow, a former Reagan administra-
tion official and conservative print and television political commentator.
9Zogby (2008) finds relatively small portfolios even among self-identified American investors. Three in
five have portfolios less than $100,000; two in five have less than $50,000.
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have a positive effect on political interest and participation. Schreiner and Sherraden (2006)
suggest “it is possible that the social and political effects of [asset] ownership matter even
more than the individual economic effects” (p. 6).
Political scientists, however, offer different predictions. The partisanship literature finds
that partisan attachments are very sticky and resistant to change. Green et al. (2002) liken
party identification to a form of social identity similar to religious affiliation. Although
a Catholic may not entirely agree with the Pope, it is relatively unlikely she will switch
“parties” to become a Protestant. Likewise, after people reach young adulthood (roughly
thirty years of age) party identification generally persists throughout the rest of their lives.
The economic voting literature finds that personal financial interests have little to no effect
on voting behavior. Much more important are perceptions of national economic conditions
(Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2000). Finally, the self-interest literature finds that personal eco-
nomic welfare generally has little effect on attitudes. Apart from a few notable exceptions,
neither subjective nor objective measures of self-interest appear to have any substantive
effect on political attitudes (Sears and Funk 1991).
1.2 The question
Do financial assets influence political behavior? Does stock market participation affect parti-
sanship, participation and political attitudes? A large literature finds that financial resources
shape political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba
and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Leighley 1995). This literature, however, largely focuses on
current income; we know relatively little about the effect of financial assets on political be-
havior. Income refers to the flow of money (wages, salaries, government transfer payments,
pensions, interest, dividends) over time (Keister 2005; Shapiro 2001). Financial assets such
as stocks and mutual funds are part of the stock of stored-up wealth that is saved from
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income (Sherraden 1991; Nam et al. 2008).10
People generally use income to pay for daily necessities such as shelter, food and clothing.
Assets, however, represent stored up potential that allows their owners to make purchases
(such as education, business property, or a home) which some analysts contend can improve
their social and political status (Nam et al. 2008; Shapiro 2001; Keister 2005). Financial
contributions are one important way that people are able to increase their visibility in the
political process (Miler 2007). People arguably are more likely to make decisions about
contributions based on their stored-up assets rather than current income. This distinction
is important as income is not perfectly correlated with financial wealth (Nam et al. 2008).11
Thus, a purely income-based approach might understate the effect of financial resources
on political behavior. At present, political science knows very little about the relationship
between financial assets and political behavior.
1.3 Motivation
In less than a decade, the investor class theory moved from the pages of conservative political
journals to become the intellectual centerpiece of landmark domestic policy in the White
House. Nadler (2005) describes President George W. Bush as a “disciple” of the investor
class theory. The White House wrapped the investor class theory in the rhetoric of the
“Ownership Society,” which emphasized the individual’s autonomous control of her own
life through ownership of homes, businesses, and financial investments (Avsar 2008; Zogby
2008). Privatization of Social Security was the top domestic issue for President Bush at the
start of his second presidential term in 2005. The Bush plan called for allowing workers to
put a portion of their Social Security retirement contributions into private accounts invested
10Total wealth is the value of financial wealth plus tangible (or “real”) assets such as homes, cars, and
real estate. Net worth is total wealth less total debts (mortgage, credit cards, etc.).
11For example, based on data from the 1994 U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Conley (1999) found
white American families in the top income quintile had a median net worth of $308,000, while African-
American families in the same income bracket had a median net worth of only $114,600.
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in the stock market. Philosophically, the Ownership Society agenda was consistent with
the Republican Party’s goal of reduction of long-term dependence on government programs
(Davis 2009). Apart from the merits of the proposal to address the long-term solvency of this
government entitlement program, however, Social Security privatization also had partisan
motivations.
Among policy changes championed by investor class activists, such as the expansion of
education, retirement and medical savings accounts, privatization of Social Security was
the biggest prize. “Social Security reform is the key goal of an investor-class politics, since
it would bring almost the entire population into the class” (Ponnuru 2004, p. 31). Ken
Mehlman, President Bush’s campaign manager in 2004, claimed that policies enacted under
the ownership society agenda would create a pro-Republican Party constituency similar to
what emerged for the Democratic Party after enactment of New Deal programs (Barnes
2004). “While the New Deal and the Great Society addressed the needs of the nation’s
poor and forgotten through an aggressive welfare state, the Ownership Society promised
liberation for millions through jobs, home ownership, and a stock portfolio” (Zogby 2008,
p. 39). The political calculus was quite simple for conservative activist Grover Norquist.
Social Security privatization would create more stock owners and more stock owners would
mean more Republicans, which would make the Republican Party “a true and permanent
national majority” (Calmes 2005).12
President Bush invoked the investor class in stump speeches to promote his proposal for
Social Security reform in spring 2005: “I believe everybody’s got the capability of being
in the investor class. I believe everybody should be allowed to watch their own assets
grow, not just a few people. I like the idea of somebody opening up their statement on a
quarterly basis and watching their asset base grow. It basically means they’re going to pay
12Republicans were not the only ones who believed in the investor class theory. Former New York attorney
general Eliot Spitzer was a strong investor class proponent and reportedly tried to get John Kerry during
the 2004 presidential campaign to argue that the Democratic Party was the better voice for the investor
class than the Republican Party (Continetti 2005).
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closer attention to the fiscal policy of the government” (Bush 2005). Although President
Bush ultimately was unsuccessful in his efforts to privatize the Social Security program,
the question remains whether the Republican Party’s beliefs about the relationship between
financial assets and political behavior were well-founded. Would Social Security privatization
have created millions of new Republican voters?
1.4 Significance
Although the “Ownership Society” faded with the end of President Bush’s term in office,
the investor class theory lives on. Pollster John Zogby’s surveys routinely include a question
about whether respondents consider themselves as a member of the “Investment Class”
(Zogby 2009). James Pethokoukis, former economics columnist and business editor at U.S.
News and World Report, blogged in October 2008 that “there are at least two pretty effective
ways to turn someone into a Republican: (1) get them married with kids and (2) get them
to invest in the stock market” (Pethokoukis 2008). During the 2008 presidential campaign,
conservative political commentator Lawrence Kudlow exhorted the Republican presidential
candidate to reach out to the investor class (Kudlow 2008). Conservative activist Grover
Norquist’s 2004 proclamation in The Washington Monthly magazine of a $5,000 threshold
for the effect of stock ownership on political behavior gained currency in the mainstream
press. A November 2008 BusinessWeek article on the investor class notes “many pollsters
define [the investor class] as those who have more than $5,000 invested in the stock market”
(Herbst 2008).
Although the proponents of the investor class theory were primarily focused on the
United States, this theory has obvious global implications. If correct, the emergence of
functioning stock markets may be as critical to the development of political and economic
systems as political institutions. “[New] stockholders may acquire not only new financial
instruments (stocks) but also new attitudes towards capitalism, private property, and reforms
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that potentially enhance the value of corporations, liberalise labour markets and improve
the functioning of the financial sector” (Guiso et al. 2003, p. 126).
1.5 Contribution
This dissertation is “an inquiry into the political economy of individual citizens” (Kinder
and Kiewiet 1981, p. 130). Despite the global increase in stock market participation over the
past thirty years, political science knows little about the effect of financial asset ownership
on political behavior. Most efforts to date have focused on macro-level interaction between
markets and politics. This dissertation responds to the exhortation by Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) to “consider asset ownership” in the study of political economy. Economic models
of political behavior are founded on the assumption that self-interest is the prime motivator
of human behavior (Mansbridge 1990). Surprisingly, the overwhelming conclusion of the
self-interest literature is that individual economic concerns have little effect on political
behavior. Prior research on economic self-interest, however, largely focused on the effect
of negative financial circumstances such as unemployment or inflation on political behavior
(Sears and Funk 1991). This dissertation is among the first to investigate the possibility
of “wealth effects” on political attitudes and actions. A large literature emphasizes the
relationship between financial resources and political participation. This study expands the
conceptualization of resources to include financial assets, an important part of household
and individual wealth (Keister 2005).
This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of comparative political behav-
ior by investigating the effect of acquisition of stocks and mutual funds on political behavior
in the United States and Britain. The American and British political systems have a great
deal in common. Both countries share “relatively well-defined incumbents and oppositions,
(approximate) two-party systems, and single-actor (executive) incumbents” (Anderson 2007,
p. 283). Moreover, both political systems have a well-defined left-right ideological dimension
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regarding economic and social policies, so investors can reasonably be expected to be able
to identify which parties are presumed to be more “pro-market.”
This dissertation also seeks to contribute to policy discussions about the non-economic
effects of asset ownership (Sherraden 1991; McKernan and Sherraden 2008). Research to
date on this subjective is inconclusive largely due to challenges in research design. This
dissertation seeks to elevate the level of empirical discourse on this important topic as well as
invite additional research. Finally, this dissertation responds to the argument that political
science needs to pay attention to debates in both academic journals and editorial pages.
This concern is particularly acute in cases in which non-peer reviewed research is used to
justify significant policy issues (Muir 1999). Reviewing the literature on this topic, Kaustia
and Torstila (2008) conclude that “there is virtually no empirical research on the interplay
of political views and investment behavior.” This dissertation begins to fill this void.
1.6 Organization of chapters
This dissertation has the following organization. Chapter 2 reviews the investor class and
asset effect theories and examines the empirical evidence for their respective claims. This
chapter situates these theories in political science literature and develops a theory of port-
folio politics. It concludes with research questions and hypotheses concerning the effect of
financial assets on political behavior. Chapter 3 explains the methodology and research
design used to test a proposed theory of portfolio of politics. Chapters 4 through 6 analyze
the effect of stocks and mutual fund ownership on partisanship, participation, and political
attitudes. Chapter 7 analyzes the effect of financial asset ownership on attitudes in the
United States during the financial crisis of 2008. In each of these chapters I review prior
research on this topic and offer direct empirical tests of the investor class theory. Chapter 8
summarizes these findings and discusses implications for political science, policy and offers
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2
Theory
In this chapter I review the theoretical claims about the effect of financial assets—stocks
and mutual funds—on political behavior. I begin with analysis of the investor class theory,
which argues that as people become investors they vote more frequently and become more
politically conservative. I also review a related proposition, the asset effect theory, which
contends that accumulation of financial assets leads to greater political interest and partic-
ipation. I find insufficient empirical evidence in the literature to support either theory. I
offer an alternative theory of how assets shape political behavior grounded in the literature
on self-interest. I review the limited social science literature on the relationship between
financial assets and political behavior. The chapter concludes with research questions and
hypotheses about the effect of financial assets on partisanship, participation, and political
attitudes.
2.1 Definitions
“Asset” is a very slippery concept (Nam et al. 2008). Sherraden defines assets in terms of
property: a right or claim to concrete or abstract property enforceable by custom, convention,
or law (Sherraden 1991, p. 100). Conversely, Lindblom defines property in terms of assets: a
set of rights to control assets—to refuse use of them to others, to hold them intact, or to use
them up (Lindblom 1977, p. 26). “Asset” frequently is used interchangeably with closely
related concepts such as investments, resources, ownership and wealth. In this dissertation,
I focus on financial assets—stocks and mutual funds. Sherraden (1991) suggests this focus
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on financial assets allows theory to more directly relate to economic theories and provides a
practical focus for policy.
A great deal of government activity and social policy focuses on another type of invest-
ment not addressed in this dissertation—home ownership. The family home represents the
largest financial investment for most households. There are important reasons, however, to
make a distinction between financial and real assets such as owner-occupied housing. Aside
from being an investment, the family home offers shelter and other current services to its
owners (Keister 2005). Thus, the decision to purchase a primary residence arguably is driven
by different motivations than the decision to invest in stocks and mutual funds. Whereas
a home addresses current needs, financial investments require a deliberate decision to delay
current consumption for future goals, such as retirement and college education. Investment
in stocks and mutual funds offers both the promise of gain and the risk of loss.1
Financial assets are fungible and can be used for a wide variety of purposes, such as
campaign contributions. The social and political status gained from wealth arguably stems
from this potential to convert financial assets into political power. Conversely, the economic
value inherent in a house is not as readily obtained. To realize its economic value a house
must first be sold, which requires the abdication of the non-economic benefits of home
ownership.2 A final distinction concerns the life cycle of asset acquisition. People acquire real
and financial assets at different points during their lifetime. The life cycle model of household
portfolios holds that younger households first acquire homes and then later after they’ve
accumulated enough savings invest in stocks and bonds (Keister 2005). This distinction is
further underscored by the fact that younger people tend to participate in politics at lower
1Although housing values fluctuate over time, a reduction in appraisal value does not necessarily reduce
a home’s utility and is only realized if the house is sold.
2Political scientists offer contrary predictions about the effect of specific assets such as real property on
political behavior. Hirschman (1970) and Alt and Gilligan (1994) contend that owners of specific assets
are more likely to become involved politically because of the high cost of moving their investments. Other
scholars, however, contend that owners of non-specific assets, such as stocks and mutual funds, have greater
leverage over the political process due to their ability to harm the economy by moving their investments
(Lindblom 1977; Bates and Lien 1985; Bates 2001; North and Weingast 1989; Boix 2003; Winters 1994).
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levels than other groups (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). “Assets” in this dissertation refer
solely to stocks and mutual funds.
2.2 Investor class theory
The investor class theory emerged in the 1990s from a “cottage industry” of think tanks and
conservative American political journals (O’Sullivan 2000; Continetti 2005). A lay theory of
politics, it is grounded in fundamental beliefs about the role of self-interest to motivate be-
havior. The investor class theory contends that ownership of stocks and mutual funds “[acts]
as an independent variable causing marginal shifts toward conservatism” (Nadler 1999, p.
23). Two mechanisms explain this shift. First, after an individual becomes a stock mar-
ket investor, she needs specialized sources of information to track her financial investments.
Nadler (2000a) cites investor surveys by the NASDAQ stock exchange that show investors
change their sources of information as they accumulate financial assets. Nadler contends
that the conservative editorial pages of popular financial news sources like The Wall Street
Journal or Investor’s Business Daily might shape investors’ political views.3
Second, stock market participation alters economic interests. The financial interests of
new investors change over time to become more oriented towards pro-market and “investor-
friendly” policies that protect their investments (Nadler 2005; Ponnuru 2004). Nadler (1999)
cites a survey that finds 65.7% of investors favor a capital gains tax cut compared to 45.9%
of non-investors. He found higher levels of support for a capital gains cut among investors
across racial, occupational, gender and party lines. Investor class advocates also contend
that as people become more involved in managing their own investments, they become more
wary of government attempts to direct or redistribute their financial assets.
According to the investor class theory, therefore, stock market participation has a causal
effect on partisanship, participation and political attitudes. Proponents claim that own-
3Roberts (1990) argues that investors have incentives to consume both economic and political information
that might affect their economic investments.
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ership of stocks and mutual funds makes investors more conservative and more likely to
lean Republican (Glassman 2001; Nadler 2000a, 2005). Ponnuru (2004) claims that “new
investors were more Republican than they had been before they started investing.” Nadler
(2005) argues that the probability of voting for the Republican party is higher for some-
one who invests in the stock market than someone who does not. Investor class theorists
also claim investors are more likely to vote than non-investors (Nadler 2000a; Glassman
2001; Ponnuru 2004).4 For example, Ponnuru (2004) cites a poll that finds 70% of voters
in the 2000 presidential election owned stock. He also notes that these voters supported
George W. Bush over John Kerry by five points. Finally, the investor class theory claims
that after acquiring new sources of information about his investments, the investor “changes
his opinions on a variety of partisan and policy questions to favor market-based solutions
and their political advocates” (Nadler 2000b). Glassman (1999) asserts investors are more
interested in protecting their assets than non-investors and more opposed to income redis-
tribution. Ponnuru (2004) claims that you can “[change] the mindset of voters by making
them investors.”
Ponnuru hypothesizes that the type of investment affects the degree of impact on political
behavior. Direct investment in stocks has a greater effect on political beliefs than more
passive investments such as mutual funds or bonds. “Owners of individual stocks were more
conservative than people who only owned 401(k)s, who were in turn more conservative than
passive recipients of income from bonds” (Ponnuru 2004, p. 30) Moreover, the size of stock
market investment might make a difference. Conservative activist Grover Norquist claims
that if someone owns just $5,000 in stock they are 18% less likely to be a Democrat and more
likely to be a Republican. Norquist contends this relationship between stock ownership and
Republican party identification exists across major demographic groups—race, gender, age,
and income (Norquist 2004).
4Although not an “investor class theorist,” Davis (2009) also makes the (unsubstantiated) claim that
“shareholders [are] substantially more likely than nonshareholders to vote in elections.”
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Investor class theorists are careful, however, to hedge these strong claims. Norquist (in
Nadler (2000b)) cautions the shareholder effect is not automatic:
When a wage worker enters the investor class through a work-based 401(k)...his
opinions on vouchers, free trade, and entitlement privatization are no likelier to
change overnight than his party affiliation. But as his plan assets grow, so do his
expectations for their performance. He may at first study nothing more than the
plan materials his employer provides. But over time, he actively seeks sources
of information that will maximize his efficiency in his new vocation: that of a
capitalist. It is this pursuit that changes his opinions on a variety of partisan and
policy questions to favor market-based solutions and their political advocates.
The investor class theory fails to indicate when we should expect these changes to occur.
Proponents simply contend that the longer investors are in the market, the more conservative
they will become (Nadler 2000b; Ponnuru 2004).
Regarding the central claim that investments affect party identification, proponents con-
tend they do not argue that all people who become investors will become Republican, but
rather “will be several points more likely to vote Republican” (Nadler 2005). Glassman
(1999) asserts that in political races with increasingly tight margins this difference in the
aggregate can make the difference between a Republican and Democratic victory. Nonethe-
less, the investor class theory overlooks a fundamental characteristic of markets—they go
up and down.5 People might have different reactions to market fluctuations. A theory of
portfolio politics should specify how investors will react politically under conditions of gain
and loss.6
5As American financier J. P. Morgan famously replied when asked by someone what the stock market
would do that day: “It will fluctuate, young man. It will fluctuate.”
6O’Sullivan (2000) muses that a market downturn could affect investor political behavior. “As stocks
fall, there will be a general drift in the investor class away from risk and towards security—a drift likely to
take them in a Democratic direction.”
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2.2.1 Existing evidence
Scant empirical evidence exists to support the claims that financial asset ownership causes
changes in political behavior. The investor class theory is based entirely on cross-tabulations
of cross-sectional surveys. For example, Nadler uses detailed cross-tabulations of investors
and non-investors regarding party identification and attitudes toward a capital gains tax
cut (Nadler 1999, 2000a). Ponnuru (2004) cites a January 1999 Rasmussen Research poll
that finds differences in party identification between investors and non-investors. Male non-
investors with income between $20,000 and $40,000 identified with the Democratic Party by
twelve percentage points. Male investors in the same income range supported the Republican
Party by three percentage points. The same survey showed that one-fifth of black investors
supported the Republican Party versus six percent of black non-investors. Similar type of
empirical evidence is offered in every other study used to support the investor class theory
(Faucheux 1999; Glassman 1999; Nadler 2000b; Deane and Balz 2003; Nadler 2005; Zogby
2009).
There are three obvious problems with this approach. First, single point in time sur-
veys cannot tell us anything about the causal effect of investments on change in behavior.
Unless information is available about political behavior before and after the acquisition of
investments, there is simply no way to determine whether investments shape political be-
havior. Second, these analyses do not account for importance differences between investors
and non-investors that may also be related to differences in partisanship, participation or
attitudes. Age, education, occupation, and income are well-known predictors of political
behavior and stock market participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Leighley 1995; Campbell 2006). We cannot say
definitively whether asset ownership shapes political behavior independent of differences in
these important variables.
Third, we know nothing about the causal relationship between investments and political
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behavior. Politics plausibly may shape investment behavior. Researchers argue that socially
active households are more likely to own stocks (Hong et al. 2004) and that investment
decisions are shaped by neighbor effects (Hong et al. 2005; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner 2007;
Brown et al. 2008). Guiso et al. (2005) found that people with higher levels of general
trust are more likely to buy stocks. Keister (2005) found that households that regularly
participate in religious services accumulate greater levels of assets. This demographic also
constitutes a significant part of the base of the Republican Party.
Continetti found the investor class theory to be “long on assertion and supposition but
short on evidence” (Continetti 2005, p. 29). An October 2003 Washington Post article
on the investor class noted that prominent Democratic pollster Stanley Greenburg found
no evidence of an investor effect on political behavior (Deane and Balz 2003). Based on
the results of numerous polls on this topic, Zogby concluded that “investors aren’t any-
one’s constituency...it’s not politics they care about so much as it’s fairness for workers
and communities” (Zogby 2008, p. 40). Davis concurred, cautioning that investors are not
“doctrinaire devotees of free market policies, and [are] largely indistinguishable from non-
shareholders on a range of attitudinal issues” (Davis 2009, p. 221). Nonetheless, conclusive
empirical evidence regarding the investor class theory requires longitudinal data to identify
behavior before and after the acquisition of financial assets. Moreover, it requires a robust
research design to isolate the effect of financial assets from other variables that also shape
political behavior. Therefore, it remains an open question about whether financial assets
affect political behavior or not.
2.3 Asset effect theory
These observers were not the only ones to hypothesize about financial assets and political
behavior. In the early 1990s, social policy researchers concerned about the effect of chang-
ing U.S. social welfare policies on the poor also began to consider the potential effect of
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assets on behavior. These scholars developed the “asset effect theory,” hypothesizing about
the potential positive, non-economic effects of asset accumulation (Sherraden 1991).7 The
asset effect theory predicts assets affect a broad array of social outcomes—economic sta-
tus, social well-being, civic engagement, child welfare, and health (Lerman and McKernan
2008). “Assets improve economic stability, connect people with a viable, hopeful future;
stimulate development of human and other capital; enable people to focus and specialize;
provide a foundation for risk taking; yield personal, social and political dividends; and en-
hance the welfare of offspring. Simply put, people think and behave differently when they
are accumulating assets” (Sherraden 1991, p. 148).
Sherraden (1991) asserts that assets provide resources and incentives to change political
behavior. The accumulation of assets today leads to expectations of greater assets in the fu-
ture.8 This expectation of improved future economic welfare has a feedback effect on current
social and psychological welfare (Schreiner and Sherraden 2006). “People with assets have
both greater incentives and greater resources to participate in the political process. Wealth
leads to a greater effort to protect property, and ultimately, to greater political participa-
tion...People with assets become politically active in protecting those assets” (Sherraden
1991, p. 165).
Paxton (2001) hypothesizes that asset ownership leads to greater political interest, civic
participation in local community groups and social influence. Assets increase their owner’s
stake in society, elevate the seriousness with which they are regarded by others, and augment
political power through enhanced social status. Lerman and McKernan (2008) hypothesize
that asset ownership increases voting, political interest, and political knowledge. Sherraden
7The asset effect theory appears to have developed completely independent of the investor class theory.
The only apparent connection between these two camps is a September 2000 conference at Washington
University in St. Louis. Richard Nadler, a key investor class theorist, presented a paper (Nadler 2000a) at
this conference organized by Michael Sherraden, who developed the asset effect theory in Sherraden (1991).
8Nadler (1999) similarly argues that financial investments shape the individual’s orientation toward the
future and her preferences over government policies. Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform
argues that “[investment] changes your time horizon, over time it changes your party affiliation, and it also
changes what you read and what you watch on TV” (Deane and Balz 2003).
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suggests “it is possible that the social and political effects of [asset] ownership matter even
more than the individual economic effects” (Schreiner and Sherraden 2006, p. 6). Like the
investor class theory, however, the asset effect theory also fails to consider the conditional
effect of pecuniary gain or loss on political behavior. Moreover, it does not make any
predictions about the time lag required before the purported effects of financial assets on
political behavior take effect.
2.3.1 Existing evidence
Little empirical evidence exists to support the contention that asset ownership affects po-
litical outcomes. Although generally much more rigorous than the investor class literature,
researchers acknowledge the empirical studies in the asset effect literature suffer from their
own methodological shortcomings such as selection biases and omitted variables (Lerman and
McKernan 2008). Moreover, the implications of the asset effect theory are largely untested
with regards to stock market investments. Assets in this literature generally are opera-
tionalized as home ownership or cash savings.9 Presumably, this is driven by the relative
abundance of data on home ownership and cash transfer programs and comparative dearth
of information about stocks and mutual fund ownership. As I argue in section 2.1, how-
ever, people buy homes and financial assets for different reasons. These distinct underlying
motivations potentially have differential impacts on behavior.
Bynner (2001) appears to offer the only direct investigation into the effect of financial
assets on political behavior. This study used data from the National Child Development
Study, a longitudinal survey that tracks from birth to adulthood a group of 16,500 individuals
born in Great Britain during the week of March 3-9, 1958. The surveys administered at
ages 23 and 33 inquired about ownership of savings and investments. (Unfortunately, no
distinction was made between types of investments.) Bynner compared information about
asset ownership at age 23 with information collected at age 33 on various measures of health,
9For example, see Rossi and Weber (1996) and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999).
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parenting, labor market participation, and political behavior.
The survey queried respondents’ level of political interest, political cynicism, and voting
behavior. One interesting feature of the research design of this study is the disaggregation of
the effects of assets on behavior by gender. Bynner (2001) found that financial investment is
a strong predictor of political interest for men, but neither savings nor investments had any
effect on voting or political trust among men. Financial investments similarly had no effect
on women’s voting, but did have a predictive effect on women’s political interest. Moreover,
both savings and investments had a positive effect on political trust for women. Bynner,
however, offered no theoretical explanation for these findings.10
Moreover, this study suffers from serious methodological challenges. The study does
not sufficiently account for the mechanism that explains why some people acquire financial
assets while others do not. This is important because factors that influence the likelihood
of financial asset ownership such as gender, education, and race also shape political behav-
ior. Furthermore, there is a lack of data about political behavior prior to acquisition of
financial assets at age 23. We cannot be certain of the effects of assets on behavior without
some indication of behavior before these assets were acquired. Finally, the research design
fails to clearly isolate the main independent variable of interest—financial asset ownership.
Indeed, Bynner acknowledges the challenges of making valid causal inference based on a
non-experimental study (Bynner 2001, p. 32).
In sum, the empirical evidence is very thin for the asset effect theory regarding political
behavior. This is due to the dearth of good data and limitations of research design used in
the empirical investigations to date. Moreover, these studies fail to address the mechanisms
that affect the likelihood of asset ownership. Scholars acknowledge the dearth of strong
empirical evidence for the theory (Paxton 2001; Bynner 2001; Lerman and McKernan 2008).
“The body of knowledge on asset effects is still in an early stage of development” (Sherraden
10Burns et al. (2001), however, would suggest the possibility of separate processes through which invest-
ments affect the political behavior of men and women.
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and McKernan 2008, p. 212).
In essence, the asset effect theory and the investor class theory make the same argument:
as people acquire assets, they become more involved in the political process to protect
their property. Both theories, however, fail to provide sufficient microfoundations to make
this case. The threads connecting economic self-interest and political behavior are not well
delineated. Moreover, these theories do not engage extant theories of political behavior
in the political science literature. In the following section, I offer an alternative theory of
portfolio politics to bridge this gap.
2.4 A theory of portfolio politics
In this section I develop a theory of how financial asset ownership shapes political behavior.
I argue that stocks and mutual funds shape political behavior through three mechanisms:
1) creation of a vested interest in political actions that may affect economic welfare; 2) re-
duction of the cognitive capacity required to act rationally; and 3) increase in causal clarity
between individual economic well-being and government action. Furthermore, I contend
these mechanisms are mediated by two factors. First, people care more about future returns
than past gains. Second, under specific conditions political behavior is motivated by pecu-
niary losses, but not by financial gains. Finally, I hypothesize about the effects of financial
assets on partisanship, political acts and attitudes.
2.4.1 Vested interest
The central tenet of the investor class and asset effect theories is that political behavior
follows economic self-interest. The key assumption is that investors will develop attitudes
and take actions that protect and enhance (if not maximize) the value of their investments.
Financial assets will affect political behavior, however, only if the individual has a vested
interest, namely the perception of a personal consequence or relevance in their financial
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investments (Crano 1997a). Self-interest is not the same as vested interest. Sears and Funk
(1990a) define self-interest as the short-to-medium term impact of an issue (or candidacy)
on the material well-being of the individual’s own personal life or that of her immediate
family.11 “[People] who would benefit materially from the implementation of a social policy
are expected to have more favorable attitudes of a social policy than are people who would
not” (Miller 1999, p. 1054). Lewin (1991) characterizes self-interest as “[thinking] only of
the consequences [of a given action] for oneself” (page 24). Vested interest, however, involves
a deeper personal connection.
Lau and Heldman (2009) contend that a fundamental challenge of economic models of
political behavior is that self-interest is not always obvious or widely understood. Lewin
(1991) asserts that people sometimes don’t know how to calculate their own self-interest or
simply sometimes make mistakes. In order to have a vested interest in an object it must
be “hedonically relevant,” namely that there are “perceived consequences of the attitude
object for the daily life of the respondent” (Lehman and Crano 2002, p. 101). It is possible
for two people to have identical objective self-interests in an object, but yet diverge in their
subjective interests regarding the same object. Crano (1997a) illustrates this point using
the example of opposition to forced busing in the 1970s. A common proxy for self-interest
regarding school integration was the presence of school-aged children in the household. These
children presumably would be directly affected by forced busing. Not all white parents of
affected school-aged children, however, were necessarily opposed to busing black children to
integrate schools. In fact, it is possible that highly vested parents existed at both extremes
(for and against) regarding racial integration, which would yield contradictory attitudes
toward busing.
I contend that financial assets meet this acid test of vested interest. Money is necessary
both for the “mundane” activities of daily life as well as the special occasions (e.g. emer-
11This definition focuses on the proximal, tangible aspects of well-being that directly affects an individual,
excluding non-material interests to align it with common usage—what’s in it for me? (Sears and Funk 1991,
p. 64).
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gencies, weddings, college). People generally have great incentive to pay attention to issues
that affect their financial livelihood (Lockerbie 2008). Although all investors by definition
are self-interested, however, not every investor necessarily perceives a vested interest in how
politics affects their financial investments. Investors are not homogenous and come to the
stock market with a variety of motives and levels of risk tolerance which may mediate any
effects of financial asset ownership on their political behavior. A direct owner of a specific
security arguably has a greater vested interest in how government actions affect the political
fortunes of the company she’s invested in than does another investor who passively owns
shares in that same company through a mutual fund. Moreover, two investors may both be
invested in the same mutual fund, but may differ in their vested interest in tax policy if one
is invested through a tax-sheltered account and the other through a taxable account.
Thus, it is not enough to simply own financial investments; they have to hold meaning for
the owner. This may be related to the size of investments; the greater the size of the stock
market portfolio, the more vested a person may be in the outcomes. The motivation behind
investment may also play a role in vesting. The more specific the reason for investment,
the more likely someone is to be concerned about external factors that may affect their
economic welfare. For example, a person is likely to have a greater vested interest in assets
saved up for college, retirement or a major purchase than general purpose savings. Relatedly,
the immediacy of need may play a factor. Two people saving for retirement may both be
“vested” in their 401(k) accounts, but likely will vary in intensity of interest in retirement
savings policies depending upon their proximity to retirement age.
Crano and colleagues found that when self-interest and vested interest are properly de-
lineated, the effects of material interests on political behavior are readily apparent (Sivacek
and Crano 1982; Crano 1997a,b; Lehman and Crano 2002). “[T]here should be greater
congruence between policy-relevant attitudes and policy endorsements of highly vested (as
opposed to nonvested) individuals...highly vested attitudes are stronger and therefore more
likely to be expressed through behavior or policy endorsement” (Lehman and Crano 2002,
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p. 103). Highly vested interests shape attitudes toward government employment policy,
national health insurance and forced busing. Unlike theories of self-interest, which assume
a direct effect of material interests on political behavior, vested interest posits a moder-
ated effect on attitudes without prediction of outcomes. Although I use the two terms
interchangeably, all subsequent references to self-interest in this chapter refer to the stricter
variant of vested interest.
2.4.2 Cognitive capacity
The second mechanism through which financial assets shape political behavior is the re-
duction of the cognitive capacity required to make informed judgments about the economy.
Economic models of political behavior assume that voters rationally evaluate the economy
using formal indicators such as economic growth, inflation, and unemployment, as well as
informal proxies like the state of their own personal finances. Voters weigh these objective
and subjective indicators when making decisions whether to punish or reward incumbents
or political parties (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). The literature finds, however, that
people have cognitive limits to their ability to act rationally (Jones 1999). Given the well es-
tablished finding that voters’ political knowledge is generally very low (Gaines et al. 2007),
it is unrealistic to expect them to be any better informed about the economy. Although
Achen (1992) contends people need not be “geniuses or saints” to be rational decision mak-
ers, the simplicity of stock market returns significantly reduces the cognitive requirements
for rational decision making.
Stock market indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and Standard & Poor’s
500 popularly are used as measures of the overall health of the economy. These indices
incorporate future expectations about the direction of the U.S. economy, responding on
a daily basis to a dizzying array of economic information such as economic growth, trade
deficits, inflation, unemployment, consumer sentiment, consumer spending, and productivity.
Lockerbie (2008) argues that people are best informed on issues with direct bearing on their
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financial well-being. As a simple heuristic, there are three possible outcomes of the value of
stock market investments over any period: up, down or no change. Certainly, it is possible
for voters to “systematically misjudge the state of the economy even when it is presented
to them on a silver platter” (Anderson 2007, p. 280). The complexity of information, the
24-hour news cycle and proliferation of financial news sources permit simple movements of
the stock market (up or down) to be interpreted in different and possibly contradictory ways.
If interpretation of information lies between factual beliefs and policy opinions (Gaines et al.
2007), then there are multiple ways that stock investments can affect political behavior even
when the facts are uncontested.
Nonetheless, daily stock market movements and periodic information about stock port-
folio returns provide objective, low-cost and readily accessible information about individual
economic welfare. Investors ostensibly can focus on their own portfolios, the broader market
indices or both. Linn and Nagler (2005) suggest that “stockholders have essentially homoge-
nous preferences: maximize the stock price.” Although Sears (1997) dismisses the idea that
routine economic activity provides useful information for political behavior,12 Popkin et al.
(1976) make the opposite case:
Voters do, however, acquire much political information in the course of their daily
lives. Such information then helps voters to form political opinions and make
decisions. It is not surprising that voters make use of such “free” information and
feel most comfortable dealing with political choices in terms of these “mundane”
life experiences, and there is no need to ignore such “gut” voting as a subject of
serious analysis...Usable political information is acquired in the process of making
individual economic decisions; housewives learn about inflation of retail prices,
homebuyers find out the trends in mortgage loan interest rates, and owners of
12Sears (1997) contends “political choices are typically so distal from daily life” and that “the mundane,
concrete, proximal world of private life, of electricity bills and trips to the grocery store, routinely offers
choices engaging simple self-interest calculations: Which store is closer? Which box of dishwasher detergent
is less expensive?” (page 495).
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stocks follow the Dow-Jones averages [emphasis added]. On the basis of this
information, voters can gauge the economy, and apply this [sic] data when they
vote...it is the amount of “free” daily life information and individual need to
know—motivation rather than just education level—which explains how informed
about issues voters will be (Popkin et al. 1976, p. 788).
Financial asset ownership shapes political behavior in part by economizing the cognitive
capacity required to apply informed appraisals of the economy to political judgments. In-
vestors do not need to know exactly the actions or outcomes of alternative political choices.
They simply need to probabilistically determine which alternative is likely better for their
stock portfolio (Lockerbie 2008).
2.4.3 Causal clarity
The third mechanism through which financial assets shape political behavior is what I call
“causal clarity,” namely the ability to draw clear connections between one’s personal finances
and the larger political process. The core assumption of economic models of political behavior
is that voters reward the government if the economy is doing well, but punish the government
if the economy is doing poorly. The logic is straight-forward. Voters first attribute success
or failure to the incumbent responsible for managing the economy. The incumbent can be
a president, prime minister, or legislature. Second, voters observe and interpret economic
conditions. Voters can reflect on their own personal financial conditions, national economic
conditions, or both. Finally, voters reward or punish incumbents with their votes (Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Voters can assign blame or praise to a single national figure like
a president or prime minister, or to a collective group like a legislature or political party.
In order for vested interest to shape political behavior, however, individuals must be able
to draw a connection between their personal economic well-being and government actions
(Feldman 1982; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Sears and Funk 1990a). This a high bar to clear,
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however, as people generally find it difficult to relate their personal financial circumstances to
specific actions of the government. This explains why scholars repeatedly find no relationship
between personal finances and political behavior (Feldman 1982, 1984; Sears and Funk 1990a,
1991; Lau and Heldman 2009). The literature, however, provides evidence that increased
causal clarity can shape political behavior. For example, multiple studies consistently found
that heavy tax burdens shape political attitudes and that people attribute responsibility for
taxes to government action (Sears and Funk 1991).
The relevant question, therefore, is whether investors can attribute portfolio performance
to government policy (Feldman 1982, 1984; Brody and Sniderman 1977). Popkin and col-
leagues illustrate this connection by contrasting the specific interests of farmers with the less
focused interests of laborers. Farmers have a great deal of information about farming issues
in relation to their business and can directly relate these concerns to specific government
policies such as subsidies, import tariffs, or water runoff. Laborers, on the other hand, are
not in the business of routine collection of economic information and thus are more likely to
use party label as an informational shortcut (Popkin et al. 1976, p. 791).
The stock market solves this information problem by providing a simple heuristic about
the effect of government actions on stock market portfolios. The market responds to proposed
government policies and realized outcomes (e.g. inflation, growth, etc.) on a daily basis.
Moreover, financial news media facilitate this connection by routinely drawing connections
between market changes and government actions. Financial assets provide causal clarity
regarding the relationship between personal economic welfare and the political process.13
Thus far, I’ve argued that financial assets shape political behavior by creating a clear
motivation for political interest, reducing the cognitive capacity required to make rational
decisions, and simplifying the relationship between economic well-being and the political
13Reporting on stock market investments is distinct from the general disconnection between information
generated by mass media and individual self-interest cited by Sears and Funk (1991): “in political life
information about the self may generally not be very accessible, because the mass media are our primary
sources of information, and their focus is on national and collective affairs rather than on matters directly
relevant to our own lives” (page 9).
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process. In the next two subsections, I propose two mediating factors—future orientation of
decision making and asymmetrical impact of financial loss and gain.
2.4.4 Future orientation
People require information to make political decisions. I argue that the stock market struc-
turally shapes investors’ perspectives so that they are prospective rather than retrospective.
Economic models of political behavior contend that voters use measures such as economic
growth, unemployment and inflation to make judgments about the state of the economy
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Due to the time needed to
collect and revise these data, these types of summary statistics are better measures of where
the economy has been rather than where it is going. Thus, these types of indicators leave
room for debate about whether rational decision makers look forward or backwards as they
use economic information to make political decisions.14
By contrast, the structure of the stock market compels investors to be forward looking,
focusing on future gains rather than past returns. Daily stock market prices and indices
like the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Standard and Poor’s 500 report the market’s
expectations about future sales, earnings and profits. Investors commonly use the price-to-
earnings (P/E) ratio to determine the relative costs of stocks. The P/E ratio is forward
looking, and reflects the number of years of future earnings required to pay back today’s
purchase price. Companies that forecast lower than expected future earnings generally are
not rewarded for their candor, but rather see their share prices pummeled by the market.
This does not mean that people are not influenced by previous performance. Despite
14Key (1966) argues people are retrospective and make rational decisions based on information from the
past. Downs (1957) and MacKuen et al. (1992), however, argue that people are prospective, basing decisions
on likely future benefits. Achen contends that past outcomes are useful only the extent that they can be
used to predict future payoffs (Achen 1992). Other scholars maintain that voters are both retrospective
and prospective in evaluations of future welfare under alternative political choices (Fiorina 1981; Kuklinski
and West 1981; Lockerbie 2008). Although Fiorina (1981) is widely associated with the retrospective camp,
his retrospective argument most squarely concerns party identification. With respect to voting behavior,
however, Fiorina finds that future expectations weigh more heavily than retrospective evaluations (p. 197).
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the common refrain that “past performance is no indication of future returns,” investors
routinely buy into yesterday’s high-flying stocks and mutual funds in an attempt to chase
higher returns. Nonetheless, investor orientation is inherently prospective. Prior returns are
“sunk”; there is nothing that the investor can do to change these results. She can only try to
shape tomorrow’s prospective returns by making decisions based on expectations of future
gains or losses. Further, the investor is likely to care more about the immediate future.
People tend to heavily discount the future (hyperbolic discounting), placing greater value on
near-future returns than expected gains far out into distance (Thaler 1981; Laibson 1997).
This suggests that any effect of concerns about stock market portfolios on political behavior
should manifest in the near term.
2.4.5 Asymmetry of loss and gain
A key behavioral assumption of the self-interest literature is that people act to avoid pain
and secure pleasure (Mansbridge 1990; Sears and Funk 1990a, 1991). These assumptions
appear to be supported by science. The human brain is more stimulated by the anticipation
of a financial gain than the actual realization of the gain itself (Zweig 2007). Brain scans
reveal that the part of the brain stimulated by the prospect of making money is the same
region activated by sexual pleasure and drug use (Critchley et al. 2001; Kuhnen and Knutson
2005; Knutson et al. 2005). Financial losses, however, have the opposite effect, stimulating
the region in the brain that evaluates negative emotions like pain, disgust and guilt (Zweig
2007). People’s responses to loss and gain literally are hard wired in their brains (Loewenstein
2006).
Experimental findings support the biological evidence that people react differently to
gains and losses. Psychologists report the impact of a financial loss is felt more heavily than
an equivalent financial gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).15 Furthermore, the evidence
15Experiments, however, find diminishing sensitivity to loss and gain (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). The
effect of movement (gain or loss) between $0 and $100 is greater than movement between $1,000 and $1,100.
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suggests (at least in the American case) that investors will attribute positive returns to
their own investment prowess, but shirk blame for their losses (Feldman 1982). In the
event of losses, however, investors will not automatically blame the government for their
portfolio balances (Sniderman and Brody 1977; Sigelman and Tsai 1981; Sears and Funk
1990a). This is explained in part by the finding that people routinely “edit” outcomes to
subjectively maximize their welfare, i.e. make themselves feel happier. If an investor loses
less than others or less than she expected, she routinely will interpret this loss as a “gain”
(Thaler and Johnson 1990).16 Thus, we can expect financial assets to have an asymmetric
effect on political behavior. Significant financial losses, which I define as drops in asset value
of 25% or more, are much more likely to trigger a reaction than equivalent pecuniary gains.
In light of the evidence that people (at least Americans) do not hold the government
accountable for their personal finances (Brody and Sniderman 1977; Kinder and Sears 1985;
Sears and Funk 1990a), I suggest there is one major factor that explains whether financial
losses become politicized or not—whether the individual believes the playing field is unfair.
The self-interest literature provides tentative support for this proposition. People who feel
particularly burdened by taxes or expect to benefit substantially from tax-reduction measures
exhibit greater support for tax-cutting policies (Sears and Funk 1990b). Smokers and non-
smokers generally are indistinguishable on their political views, but sharply diverge on issues
concerning cigarettes (Green and Gerken 1989). Smokers are much more opposed to taxes
and restrictions that target cigarettes. Unless investors feel their losses are the result of some
unfair process, they are unlikely to politicize their financial losses. This is consistent with
the finding that self-interest generally lays dormant unless primed. Kramer (1983) found
that self-interest manifests when people have clear information and can specifically attribute
changes in their personal economic welfare to government policies.
For example, imagine an investor in a company which has been targeted for antitrust
16Thaler and Johnson (1990) call this the “house money effect,” based upon the example of how gamblers
rationalize losses after gains by shifting their reference point to the point in time at which they commenced
gambling, i.e. whether they are still “up” from where they started.
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violation by the government. The resultant loss in financial value of the company’s stock is
directly due to the government’s action. In May 1998, the U.S. government sued Microsoft
for alleged violation of a 1995 agreement related to earlier anti-trust investigations. Over
the next two years, the value of Microsoft’s shares dropped 40% due to the uncertainty of
the case (Economides 2001). Investors in Microsoft stock in the 1990s likely had distinct
views about the government’s actions from non-owners of Microsoft stock. Moreover, the
effect of the government action on political views potentially was greater for direct owners
of Microsoft shares than passive owners of the stock in mutual funds.
2.5 Predicted effects
The theory of portfolio politics advanced thus far posits that financial assets have a mod-
erated effect on political behavior through the mechanisms of vested interest, increased
cognitive capacity, and causal clarity. It also asserts that investors are future-oriented, due
to the structural influence of the stock market itself. Finally, it contends that investors
are motivated more by loss than by gain. Financial losses, however, will not be politicized
unless investors believe the playing field is fundamentally unfair. The theoretical claims
to this point are made without any clear prediction of specific outcomes. In this section, I
examine the predicted effect of financial assets on three different types of political behavior—
partisanship, participation, and attitudes.
2.5.1 Partisanship
The partisanship literature finds that partisan attachments are relatively stable. A form
of social identity, people think of themselves as members of partisan groups as much as
they see themselves as members of other social groups (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al.
2002).17 Parents generally influence initial partisan attachments, but these are subject to
17The revisionist model in the partisanship literature contends that partisan attachments are endogenous
to individual interests and political party positions. Revisionists assert that partisanship is shaped by
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change by social influences in the early adult years. By the time an investor reaches her
early thirties, we can expect her party ID to be relatively stable for the rest of her life (Miller
1991; Abramson and Ostrom Jr. 1991; Green et al. 2002). When change does occur, it is
more likely temporary support of another party or, in the American case, movement between
Independents and the major political parties.
Accordingly, there is no theoretical basis on which to believe acquisition of financial
assets has any effect on partisanship. A new investor is no likelier to change her party
identification than she is her religious affiliation. A union member has no obvious reasons
to disassociate herself with a labor organization once she acquires stocks and mutual funds.
Due to the strength and durability of partisan attachments, and the relatively weak and
conditional effects of financial assets on political behavior, I predict that in general stocks
and mutual fund ownership have no effect on partisanship. The only caveat is the possible
effect of financial assets on people in their twenties and thirties when the potential for
partisan change is greatest (Green et al. 2002).
2.5.2 Participation
Political participation is defined as activity intended directly or indirectly to influence gov-
ernment action (Verba et al. 1995). This influence occurs through attempts to influence the
development of public policies and/or selection of the people who make and implement these
policies. A large literature finds that income (among other variables) is highly predictive of
participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972;
Verba et al. 1995; Leighley 1995). People with more income are more likely to get involved
in the political process. However, the literature to date overlooks the distinction between
current income and saved up assets. It’s possible that financial assets have a distinct effect
rational prospective evaluations of how a political party will benefit individual interests (Achen 1992, 2002a;
Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984; Markus and Converse 1979; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006;
Clarke et al. 2009). Although the empirical evidence in the literature weighs against this argument, even if
revisionists were right the theorized weak effects of financial assets make any change in partisanship highly
unlikely.
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from current income on participation.
Political participation is costly. It generally takes time, effort and in some cases money
to participate in the political process. Voting, volunteer work, contact with politicians, and
campaign contributions all entail some degree of cost. The literature shows that people with
vested interests are more likely to pay these costs of participation. For example, Green and
Cowden (1992) found that people most opposed to forced busing to integrate schools were
more likely to join anti-busing organizations. Similarly, Sivacek and Crano (1982) found
that college students directly affected by a proposed increase in Michigan’s legal drinking
age were more likely to join protests against the change than those who would not be affected
even though both groups of college students were similarly opposed.
The “least expensive” form of participation is voting, which is relatively (but not abso-
lutely) costless. Indeed, voting is the most fundamental form of participation and the most
common means of participation for most people. Given the findings in the literature that
resources have no effect on voting and my argument about the conditional effects of finan-
cial assets on behavior, I predict that ownership of stocks and mutual funds has no effect on
voting behavior. Regarding time-based acts like volunteering and contact with politicians,
I predict that financial assets may have some effect only in the event of financial loss. In-
vestors will be more motivated to spend time in politics if they feel they have been unfairly
treated in the market. I am uncertain, however, about the effect of assets on campaign
contributions. Verba et al. (1995) find that financial resources are needed to make financial
contributions. However, people are more likely to make campaign contributions from their
saved up assets than current income. Given my contention that financial loss is more likely
to motivate political behavior, it is unclear why someone would desire to make campaign
contributions after incurring significant financial loss.
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2.5.3 Attitudes
Attitudes are summary evaluations of psychological objects, which are “anything that people
can like or dislike, wish to protect or to harm, want to acquire or to reject” (Kahneman et al.
1999, p. 205). People form beliefs about objects based their perceived value (good-bad,
likeable-unlikeable) (Ajzen 2001). Attitudes, therefore, are based in part on beliefs about the
desirability of these object attributes (Katz 1960; Fishbein and Ajzen 1972). Attitude toward
an object such as financial assets is derived from its perceived utility. Clarity, consistency,
and immediateness of costs and benefits as they relate to an individual’s actions help to
shape utilitarian attitudes. “The closer these objects are to actual need satisfaction and
the more they are clearly perceived as relevant to need satisfaction, the greater are the
probabilities of positive attitude formation” (Katz 1960, p. 171).
Attitude change involves a chain of events that include object evaluation, existing beliefs,
and prior attitudes. The more beliefs and cognitive items that go into shaping an attitude,
the more difficult it is to change (Katz 1960). Moreover, attitude change can occur in a
variety of ways. The acquisition of new information about objects can result in replacement
or overwriting of previous attitudes (Ajzen 2001; Druckman and Lupia 2000). Attitudes can
be completely reversed or partially changed. Preferences and behavior can be affected (or
not) in a variety of ways. Thus, although it is less costly to change attitudes, changes in
political attitudes are difficult without sufficient stimulus. “Attitudes toward political parties
and voting behavior are often difficult to change if there is no widespread dissatisfaction with
economic conditions” (Katz 1960, p. 177).
The self-interest literature suggests that financial assets are unlikely to change people’s
political attitudes. Researchers consistently found that self-interest does not have any effect
on political attitudes (Sears et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1990a, 1991; Feldman 1982; Kinder
and Sears 1985). Although Green and Cowden (1992) found that self-interest explained
participation in anti-busing organizations, they found no correlation regarding attitudes of
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white Americans on forced busing in Boston and Louisville in the 1970s. Similarly, Sivacek
and Crano (1982) found that although college students directly affected by a proposed in-
crease in Michigan’s legal drinking age were more likely to join protests against this action,
there was no difference in attitudes regarding the proposed law between these and older
students not directly affected by the proposed change. Therefore, I predict that financial
assets will have no effect on attitudes, save in special circumstances of financial loss. People
who experience significant loss are more likely to change political attitudes on issues that
directly affect their economic interests.
2.6 Political science and the stock market
Despite the dramatic increase in household financial asset ownership around the world over
the past thirty years, political scientists have devoted little attention to the relationship
between stock market participation and individual political behavior.18 In a recent literature
review, Kaustia and Torstila (2008) found that “there is virtually no empirical research on the
interplay of political views and investment behavior.”19 Barabas (2006) combined individual-
level U.S. opinion poll data with broad stock market indices to find that overall stock market
performance affects policy preferences. Public support in the U.S. for privatization of Social
Security appears to rise and fall with the stock market. A pair of economists analyzed data
on Finnish households that received shares of demutualized telecommunication companies
in the late 1990s to find a small rightward shift in political ideology (Kaustia and Torstila
2008).
18Political science has not completely ignored the stock market. For example, Roberts (1990) uses aggre-
gate stock market data to show that stock prices of defense-related firms responded to expected shifts in
defense policy in anticipation of the outcomes of the 1980 U.S. presidential and legislative elections. Other
scholars examine the relationship between aggregate stock markets and politics (Bernhard and Leblang 2006;
Leblang and Mukherjee 2005; Jensen and Schmith 2005; Do¨pke and Pierdzioch 2006).
19Scheve and Slaughter (2001) make a similar observation for research on the political economy of trade
policy, exhorting analysts to “consider asset ownership” in their theoretical models.
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Davis and Cotton (2007) used survey data from the 1998-2004 American National Elec-
tion Studies (ANES) to find that shareholders were about 30% more likely to identify with
the Republican Party in 1998-2002 and 130% more likely in 2004. Other scholars examined
the effect of privatized share ownership on voting (Studlar et al. 1990; Saunders 1995) and
political issue positions (Earle and Gehlbach 2003). In the privatization literature, how-
ever, Earle and Gehlbach (2003) find “a relative paucity of research that directly relates the
attitudes held by an individual to his or her experience of privatization policies, ex post.”
Barabas (2006) sums up the literature, concluding that “scholarly works showing that the
stock market affects political behavior are rare.”
2.7 Research questions and hypotheses
The main research question of this dissertation concerns the causal effect of financial assets
on political behavior. Does acquisition of financial assets—stocks and mutual funds—have
any discernible effect on partisanship, participation or attitudes? Both the investor class
and asset effect theories make strong claims that assets shape behavior, but the evidence
supporting these claims is weak. Political science has yet to weigh in on this subject. I offer
and test the following hypotheses:20
In the absence of significant financial loss (25% or more):
• Financial assets have no effect on partisanship with the possible exception of people
under 34 years.
• Financial assets have no effect on voting.
• Financial assets have no effect on time-based forms of political participation.
20I do not have any data on financial contributions in the data sets used in this dissertation, so I don’t
offer any testable hypothesis regarding the effect of financial assets on campaign contributions. However, I
do offer an uncertain prediction about the effect of assets on campaign contributions. I expect greater levels
of financial assets to have a positive effect on campaign contributions. However, I am uncertain about the
effect of portfolio losses on campaign contributions.
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• Financial assets have no effect on political attitudes.
In the event of significant financial loss (25% or more):
• Financial assets have no effect on partisanship with the possible exception of people
under 34 years.
• Financial assets have no effect on voting.
• Financial assets have no effect on time-based forms of political participation.
• Financial assets have a causal effect on attitudes directly concerning economic welfare.
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Chapter 3
Research Design and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the research design and methodology used in this dissertation. The
aim of this dissertation is to uncover the causal effects of financial asset ownership on political
behavior and rule out plausible alternative explanations. Fundamentally, the research design
of this dissertation seeks to address Teixeira’s trenchant inquiry about the investor class
theory: “Does a voter with a $50,000 annual income and a 401(k) worth $15,000 really
differ politically from a voter with the same income level who lacks that 401(k)?” (Teixeira
2003). The aim of the research design in this dissertation is causal inference, which takes
into account potential outcomes in alternative causal states (Morgan and Winship 2007).
The dissertation employs a quasi-experimental research design to attempt to overcome the
limitations of observational data, using control groups, pre-tests and post-tests of political
behavior to draw causal inferences. The dissertation treats the acquisition of financial assets
as an intervention and investigates the effect of this “treatment” on political behavior when
it is introduced into an experimental group compared to a control group.
I carefully select data sources with information about financial assets, political behavior
and predictors of asset ownership to test my hypotheses about the effect of financial assets
on political behavior. I use propensity score matching to make the treatment groups as
alike as possible save for one difference—ownership of financial assets. I attempt to make
my empirical results as transparent as possible to make the substantive implications of this
research clear. Thus, I make relative comparisons about the effect of different types of
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assets on political behavior across treatment groups rather than simple comparisons to null
hypotheses. Finally, I test the effect of assets in the United States and Britain over two and
a half decades on various measures of political behavior.
3.2 Instrumentation
Campbell (2006) identifies five characteristics of an ideal data set on household finances:
good representation of an entire population (especially with regards to age and wealth);
measures of total wealth including exhaustive categorical breakdowns; detailed information
about asset classes and specific assets; highly accurate data; and, longitudinal data structure.
To study the effect of financial assets on political behavior I also add to this wish list detailed
information about voting, political interest, political acts, and positions on a wide range of
political issues. Unfortunately, this ideal data set does not exist for finance scholars, much
less for researchers interested in the intersection of investments and politics.1 Nonetheless,
I identify nine surveys with data about financial assets and politics. Table 3.1 summarizes
the surveys used in this dissertation.
Table 3.1: Surveys of politics and investments
Survey Country/Region Structure
British Household Panel Study (1991-2005) Britain Longitudinal
National Child Development Study (1981-2000) Britain Longitudinal
American National Election Studies (2000-2002) United States Longitudinal
CBS News (December 2008) United States Cross-sectional
CBS News & New York Times (March 2008, January 2009) United States Cross-sectional
NBC News & Wall Street Journal (September 2008) United States Cross-sectional
USA Today & Gallup (January & December 2008) United States Cross-sectional
These surveys include samples from the United States and Britain. Three of these surveys
are longitudinal; one follows a natural cohort over time and the other two follow randomly
1The best sources of data on household finance do not provide detail on asset diversification, have in-
complete data for significant percentages of households, and do not follow respondents over time (Campbell
2006, p. 1556).
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selected representative panels. The other six surveys are cross-sectional. The longitudinal
surveys cover roughly 25 years, starting from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s. The cross-
sectional surveys were conducted within the last two years.
3.2.1 Longitudinal surveys
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a government-funded, nationally represen-
tative panel survey from Great Britain (Institute for Social and Economic Research 2008).
The BHPS started in 1991 as an annual survey of each adult member (16 years and older)
of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 households. A stratified random
sample of households was drawn at the start of the survey. In subsequent years, all residents
of these households were traced and re-interviewed. If departures from the original house-
holds occur, all adult members of the new households also are interviewed. I use BHPS data
from 1993-2005. Most years include data about politics; the panels for 1995, 2000, and 2005
include detailed data about financial assets.2
The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is a longitudinal survey that tracks from
birth a cohort of 16,500 individuals born in Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales)
during the week of March 3-9, 1958 (Centre for Longitudinal Studies 2008).3 There have been
eight waves of data collection of members of the birth cohort about their physical, educational
and social development. I use NCDS data from three waves administered between 1981-
2000. Surveys administered at ages 23 (1981) and 33 (1991) include data about financial
asset ownership and politics; the survey administered at age 42 (2000) includes only political
data.
The American National Election Studies (ANES) is a series of biennial, nationally rep-
resentative detailed surveys of the political behavior of Americans 18 years and older (The
2Unfortunately, one-third of the cases in my matched groups from 1995 and 2000 are missing for 2005,
so I am limited to analysis using data from 1995-2000.
3The birth cohort was augmented in the follow ups at ages 7, 11 and 16 by including immigrants born
this same week.
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National Election Studies 2005). The survey dates to 1948 when its predecessor was first
established at the University of Michigan, where it is currently housed and operated in part-
nership with Stanford University. The 2000-2004 panel includes 1,807 people who were first
interviewed in 2000 and subsequently reinterviewed in 2002 and 2004. The survey in each
of these years inquires about household stock market participation.
3.2.2 Cross-sectional surveys
The cross-sectional surveys used in this dissertation were conducted by American news media
organizations, all of which were conducted by telephone. These surveys were put into the field
between January 2008 and January 2009, a period of major financial crisis and economic
uncertainty in the United States. Sampling for these surveys generally involved random
dialing of both landline and cellular telephone numbers. The December 2008 CBS News
survey is a national poll of 1,390 adults (CBS 2009). The March 2008 and January 2009
polls conducted by CBS News and The New York Times respectively included 1,368 and
1,112 adults (CBS and New York Times 2008, 2009). The September 2008 NBC News and
Wall Street Journal poll includes 1,157 registered voters, including oversamples of Hispanic
voters and voters who only use a cellular phone (NBC and Wall Street Journal 2009). USA
Today and Gallup conducted polls in January and December 2008 that included 2,020 and
1,008 adults, respectively (USA Today and Gallup Organization 2008, 2009).
3.3 Research design
Observational studies are not well suited for analysis of cause and effect. Although the
subjects in each of my data sets are randomly selected, by definition financial asset ownership
in observational studies lacks random assignment (Shadish et al. 2002). This means I have
no control over the mechanism that determined whether subjects acquired financial assets
or not. There is near consensus in the household portfolio literature that certain factors
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such as age, education and income greatly affect the likelihood of owning stocks and mutual
funds (Campbell 2006). I can ignore this assignment mechanism and proceed to causal
inference only if I can convincingly condition my analysis on the factors that affect ownership
of investments (Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 184). This requires me both to imagine the
hypothetical randomized experiment that led to the observed data as well as approximate
the “randomized” decision rules that determined whether someone owns financial assets or
not (Rubin 2008).4
The research design for this dissertation, therefore, is quasi-experimental. At root there
are three variables—a pre-test of political behavior prior to asset ownership, a post-test
of political behavior after asset ownership, and an asset ownership indicator.5 To make
clear the potential outcomes in political behavior under different states of asset ownership,
I identify “treatment” groups, consisting of those who acquired financial assets (“treated”
group) and those who did not (“control” group). I “control” for differences between those
who acquired assets and those who do not by accounting for factors which predict asset
ownership such as age, income and education. Instead of using control variables, however,
I use these predictors (or “covariates”) to create matched treatment groups. The treated
and control groups on average are the same on all the predictors of asset ownership except
for one difference—one group owns financial assets (treated) and the other group does not
(control). I use these predictors of asset ownership to create propensity scores, which are
used to create matched groups with equal likelihood of owning a given financial asset (stocks
or mutual funds).
Propensity score matching works both as a method to facilitate quasi-experimental con-
trasts and a nonparametric method to adjust for the treatment assignment mechanism (Ho
et al. 2007; Morgan and Winship 2007). Matching also improves the quality of the quasi-
4I follow Stouffer’s advice that “though we cannot always design neat experiments when we want to, we
can at least keep the experimental model in front of our eyes and behave cautiously” (Stouffer 1950, p. 359).
5This approach heeds the advice of Achen (2002b) to limit causal analysis to no more than three explana-
tory variables.
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experimental designs in this dissertation that use cross-sectional data with control groups
but no pre-tests for prior behavior (Shadish et al. 2002). It is important to note that the
creation of treated and control groups is done without any reference to the outcome of po-
litical behavior. I do not use any measure of political behavior to create the treatment
groups, and use propensity score matching to pre-process my raw data nonparametrically.
Ho et al. (2007) contend this approach improves the reliability of parametric methods and
makes causal inference much less sensitive to model specification.
I use GenMatch, a genetic matching algorithm, in conjunction with the MatchIt package
in the R statistical software program to create the matched groups (Sekhon Forthcoming;
Ho et al. 2007, Forthcoming; R Development Core Team 2009).6 I employ matching with
replacement, which in the case of GenMatch retains all of the treated cases and allows
untreated cases to be matched to more than one treated case.7 Gelman and Hill (2007)
suggest matching with replacement can create better balance between treated and control
groups, which should yield estimates that on average are closer to the truth. Each untreated
case is assigned a weight so that the treated and untreated groups are of equal size.
Since my interest is the effect of assets on change in political behavior, my general
approach is to establish a baseline for when I know both treatment groups did not own
a given asset and a second point in time when the treated group owns the asset but the
control group does not. Although the ANES 2000-2002 panel is relatively short, it offers
a good number of measures of the entire range of political behavior under investigation. I
use 2000 as a baseline to create treatment groups based on cases who did not own assets in
6A key challenge of matching is creating balance between treatment groups on the predictor variables. The
goal is to minimize the difference in the average values of predictor variables between treated and control
groups. This can be an arduous task, requiring frequent tweaks, rebalancing and interactions between
covariates. GenMatch reduces the analyst’s burden considerably by substituting human mental work with
computation by the computer. The GenMatch algorithm finds the combination of treated and control cases
that creates the least degree of differences between treated and control groups across covariates (Sekhon
2009).
7This means that I do not use all of the “untreated” cases in my analysis. Achen (2002b) makes a
vigorous argument in support of this practice: “Put bluntly, in most of our empirical analyses, some groups
of observations should typically be discarded to create a meaningful sample with a unified causal structure”
(p. 446)
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2000 and either acquired assets over the next two years (treated) or continued not to own
financial assets (control). Pre-test data on political behavior comes from 2000; post-test
data are from 2002. The ANES includes pre- and post-test information on partisanship,
political attitudes, voting, and other forms of participation. Unfortunately, no information
is available about asset values.
The British Household Panel Study covers a longer period of time. In this case my base-
line is 1995; the treatment groups are comprised of people who did not own financial assets
in 1995, but either acquired them by 2000 (treated) or continued to not own any investments
(control).8 The BHPS includes pre-test and post-test information about partisanship, vot-
ing, political interest, political activities, and political attitudes. The BHPS also does not
include information on asset values.
The National Child Development Study includes information about financial assets in
panels collected at ages 23 (1981) and 33 (1991). The 1981 panel is the baseline; treatment
groups are based on those who did not own financial assets in 1981 and either acquired
assets between 1981-1991 (treated) or did not (control). Available pre-test data include only
voting and party identification. Although the NCDS offers rather limited information about
political behavior, it does cover the formative years of the twenties and early thirties in
which the respondents presumably are most likely to exhibit changes in political behavior
(Green et al. 2002).9 Moreover, the NCDS includes information on asset values.
The lack of pre-treatment information inherent in cross-sectional data compels use of a
“post-test only design” that is particularly weak for causal inference (Shadish et al. 2002;
Morgan and Winship 2007). Thus, I limit the use of cross-sectional data to investigate
change in political attitudes. This approach is similar to that employed in Doherty et al.
(2006), which investigates the effect of lottery winnings on attitudes toward redistribution.10
8Unfortunately, the BHPS does not indicate when exactly these assets were acquired.
9The lack of additional political behavior pre-test data is unfortunate as the panels for ages 33-46 include
data about various political acts, including demonstrations, attendance at political rallies, political campaign
activity, and contact with political officials.
10Doherty et al. (2006) did not create treatment groups presumably due to the lack of predictors which
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In this case, I use six media surveys to test the effect of asset ownership on attitudes during
the 2008 financial crisis. As the survey questions I use in this dissertation are specific to the
crisis, respondents can not reasonably be expected to have prior attitudes about government
policies toward an unexpected major event. These surveys do not include information about
asset values.
3.4 Data
In this section I describe the data used to create the matched groups and conduct empirical
analysis. Fundamentally, I need three types of data to construct the matched treatment
groups used in this dissertation: 1) data about asset ownership (treatment variable); 2)
measures of political behavior (pre-tests and post-tests); and, 3) factors that influence fi-
nancial asset ownership and political behavior (predictors or covariates). Each of the data
sets selected for this dissertation offers at least nine predictors of asset ownership. Below I
describe the variables constructed for this analysis.
3.4.1 Treatment indicators
The treatment variables in this dissertation are financial assets—stocks and mutual funds
(Keister 2005). These are the riskiest types of financial assets and are distinguished from less
riskier forms such as bonds or cash (Donkers and van Soest 1999; Campbell 2006; Shum and
Faig 2006; Heaton and Lucas 2000). By focusing on the owners of riskier assets I attempt
to identify people with the greatest vested interest in external (political) factors that may
affect their material well-being (Crano 1997a).11 I operationalize financial asset ownership
plausibly could be used to created matched groups. In my case, the finance literature provides well-researched
predictors of financial asset ownership that can be used to create treatment groups.
11Due to data limitations I am unable to include long-term government bonds and corporate bonds as
risky assets (Guiso et al. 1996). Government paper of longer maturities has default risk; corporate paper
entails bankruptcy risk.
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as dummy variables.12
Ideally, I would like to have information that allows me to disaggregate financial assets to
investigate the effect of assets on political behavior. This would be particularly useful as some
analysts speculate that different types of assets may have more pronounced effects on political
behavior (Ponnuru 2004). It would be important not only to distinguish between financial
assets owned inside and outside of tax-sheltered accounts, but also to differentiate between
types of stocks (foreign and domestic) and mutual funds (stock, bond, money market) to
discern their differential effects on political behavior. Unfortunately, this level of detail is
unavailable in the data sets used in this dissertation. Additionally, I would like to have data
on the value of these assets. Unfortunately, I only have data on asset values for the NCDS
data set. Notwithstanding these limitations, I am able to make a basic distinction between
investors and non-investors and differentiate between ownership of stocks and mutual funds.
3.4.2 Measures of political behavior
My dependent variables (post-tests) are measures of political behavior—partisanship, par-
ticipation, and attitudes. My pre-tests are these same measures at an earlier point in time.
Table 3.2 below lists the common types of political variables used in this dissertation by
survey. Operationalization of these measures varies somewhat by survey. I follow Green
et al. (2002) and create dummy variables for political party identification. I create scales for
strength of partisan attachment in the U.S. and Britain along a linear left-right dimension.
For participation I similarly create dummy variables to indicate whether a political act oc-
curred or not. For attitudes toward political issues I create dummy variables or scales that
indicate respondents’ positions on issues. Examples include the role of government, support
for the free enterprise system, and positions on specific policies. I provide specific details
about each of these measures in each of the chapters that follow.
12The surveys are not uniformly clear about asset ownership. In some instances it is unclear whether
the respondent’s response indicates household or individual investments. I am also ignorant about potential
bargaining within households over investment decisions (Campbell 2006).
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Table 3.2: Measures of political behavior
Measure Survey Operationalization
Partisanship BHPS, NCDS, ANES Dummy variables
Political ideology BHPS, ANES Scales
Voting BHPS, NCDS, ANES Dummy variables
Other forms of participation BHPS Dummy variables
Political attitudes All surveys Dummy, Scales
3.4.3 Predictor variables
To created matched treatment groups I identify predictor variables that directly or indirectly
affect the probability of investment ownership and/or certain types of political behavior. I
use predictors (also called “covariates”) to attempt to make the treated and control groups
as much alike as possible with regards to the assignment mechanism. Table 3.3 summarizes
covariates identified in the finance literature. (Since the NCDS is a cohort study, all of the
respondents are the same age.)
Financial assets
Age, income, and education are the most frequently cited predictors of asset ownership. The
life-cycle model of investments posits that younger households limit investments to home
ownership. Only later as they accumulate assets do they consider riskier financial assets
such as stocks and mutual funds. As households mature they sell off riskier investments to
preserve capital for their retirement (Keister 2005). Numerous scholars found evidence of a
quadratic effect of age on investment ownership that supports the life-cycle model (McCarthy
2004; Shum and Faig 2006; Campbell 2006).13 Income refers to household income and often
is captured in the surveys used in this dissertation as categorical data. I generally divide
income into thirds to identify low, medium and high income based on the income distribution
13Focusing on stockholding, however, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) and Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) find
no effect of age.
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Table 3.3: Predictors of financial asset ownership
Variable Operationalization ANES BHPS NCDS USAT/G CBS/NYT NBC/WSJ CBS USAT/G CBS/NYT
Jan 2008 Mar 2008 Sep 2008 Dec 2008 Dec 2008 Jan 2009
Gender Dummy (male, female) X X X X X X X X X
Age Years X X N/A X X X X X X
Income Scale (low, medium, high) X X X X X X X X X
Education level Scale (low, medium, high) X X X X X X X X X
Ethnic minority Dummy (yes, no) X X X X X X X X X
Occupation level Scale (low, medium, high) X X X S S S
Fulltime employment Scale (low, medium, high) X X X X S S S X S
Marital status Dummy (yes, no) X X X X X X X X X
Dependent children Number of children X X X X X X X X X
Home ownership Dummy (yes, no) X X X X X X X
Business/self-employ Dummy (yes, no) X X
Debt Scale (low, medium, high) X X
Health problem Dummy (yes, no) X X
Notes: X=Predictor available; S=Close substitute; N/A=Not applicable. ANES=American National Election Studies; BHPS=British Household
Panel Study; NCDS=National Child Development Study; USAT/G=USA Today/Gallup; CBS/NYT=CBS/New York Times; NBC/WSJ=NBC/
Wall Street Journal; CBS=CBS News.
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in each respective data set.14 Campbell (2006) found that education is a strong predictor of
stock ownership, even with controls for age, income and wealth. I operationalize education as
one of three values: low (less than high school), medium (high school through some college),
and high (undergraduate degree or higher).
Keister (2005) contends that occupation and employment status affect the likelihood of
acquiring financial assets. People with higher occupations acquire more assets; the lack of
full-time work negatively affects acquisition of financial assets. I follow Iversen and Sos-
kice (2001) to operationalize occupation based on skill specificity using the third version of
the International Standard Classification of Occupations adopted in 1988 by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ISCO 88). I generally divide occupation into three levels: low
(elementary occupations), medium (clerks to machine operators), and high (managers and
professionals).
Research shows that marital status affects asset ownership. Marriage tends to increase
financial wealth (Keister 2005). I operationalize marriage as a dummy variable. Keister
(2005) suggests that saving motives may affect the proclivity for investment. For example,
households are likely to save and invest for children’s education. I operationalize savings
motives by including the number of dependent children in the household. Scholars found
that the riskiness of the specific asset of a home might make households less likely to invest
in similarly risky investments such as stocks and mutual funds (Heaton and Lucas 2000;
Cocco 2005; Shum and Faig 2006). I operationalize home ownership as a dummy variable.
Researchers found that business ownership is negatively correlated with financial investments
such as stocks and mutual funds (Shum and Faig 2006; Campbell 2006). I operationalize
business ownership or self-employment as a dummy variable based on occupational and/or
investment data. Debt might also be a barrier to acquiring financial assets (Campbell 2006).
I operationalize debt in three categories (low, medium, high) based on the distribution of
the cases in each data set.
14This also facilitates logistic regression by reducing the possibility of empty cells.
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Berkowitz and Qiu (2006) found that health status affects financial investments. The
existence of a serious health ailment negatively affects household financial wealth. I construct
a dummy variable to indicate the presence of a long-term serious illness. Analysts found that
minorities in the United States own investments at much lower levels than whites (Chiteji
and Stafford 1999; Yao et al. 2005; Keister 2005; Gutter et al. 1999; Gutter and Fontes 2006).
For the American surveys I conceptualize ethnic minorities as blacks and Latinos. For the
British surveys, ethnic minorities are conceptualized as non-whites—primarily blacks and
Asians. For both sets of surveys I operationalize ethnic minorities with a dummy variable.
Politics
A large literature finds that socioeconomic status (e.g., income, education and occupation) is
highly predictive of political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Leighley 1995). People with higher SES are
more likely to get involved in the political process. As noted above, I include income,
education and occupation as predictors. Scholars also find differences between the political
participation of men and women (Verba et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001). I thus include gender
as a predictor of political behavior, which I operationalize as a dummy variable.15
3.4.4 Omitted variables
There are several known or theorized predictors of financial asset ownership for which I
unfortunately do not have data. The most significant omitted variable is wealth. Wealth is
the sum of total property (financial and real assets) less total debts (Keister 2005). Most
surveys include data about income but none for wealth. This is an important distinction
since these two variables often are not highly correlated (Nam et al. 2008). Moreover,
wealth may have an effect on the probability of owning particular investments. For example,
15The literature does not suggest that gender is a predictor of asset ownership. However, there is some
debate as to whether men are overly confident investors compared to women. See Barber and Odean (2001)
and Deaves et al. (2008).
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Campbell (2006) found a quadratic pattern in the relationship between wealth and stock
ownership. Low-wealth households are unlikely to own financial assets, but in high-wealth
households there is a strong relationship between wealth and stock ownership. Omission of
this important variable hopefully is mitigated by the inclusion of highly correlated variables
such as age and education.16
Another omitted variable is awareness about investment options. Guiso and Jappelli
(2005) show that nearly one-third of Italians in the mid-to-late 1990s were unaware of the
existence of stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts. Individuals obviously cannot
be expected to invest in stocks and mutual funds if they are unaware of the opportunity.
These researchers find that awareness is positively associated with variables included in this
study (education, income and age). Thus, although I do not directly measure this variable
hopefully the inclusion of these correlates mitigates its omission.
Donkers and van Soest (1999) suggest that interest in finances might drive the investment
decision. People who are interested in personal finance might be more aware and motivated
to invest. Regrettably, I do not have data for this factor either. Although these scholars do
not provide any information about correlates, I presume variables such as education, income,
age, and occupation also are strongly related to interest in financial issues.
Keister (2005) found that the investment decisions of individuals are shaped by the in-
vestment behavior of their parents. In other words, an individual is more likely to participate
in the stock market if as a child she observed her parents engaged in this activity. In fact,
Chiteji and Stafford (1999) argue that the effect of parental investment behavior washes out
some of the negative effects of race on asset ownership. Unfortunately, I do not have data
on parent’s investment behavior in any of the surveys used in this dissertation.
There is some evidence of social effects on investment ownership. Guiso et al. (2005) found
that people with higher levels of general trust are more likely to buy stocks. Researchers
16For example, Campbell (2006) finds that education is a strong predictor of stock ownership, even with
controls for age, income and wealth.
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also argue that socially active households are more likely to own stocks (Hong et al. 2004)
and that investment decisions are shaped by neighbor effects (Hong et al. 2005; Ivkovic´ and
Weisbenner 2007; Brown et al. 2008). Keister (2005) found that households that regularly
participate in religious services accumulate greater levels of assets. She argues religion shapes
views about sexual behavior and marriage, which affect educational attainment. (As noted
earlier, education is one of the strongest predictors of investment ownership.) Similar to
Verba et al. (1995) Keister also argues that participation in religious organizations promotes
skill development and social capital that may affect saving and investment. I do not have
good data on social networks or religious participation for my surveys.
The final omitted variable is risk aversion. McCarthy (2004) defines risk aversion as
“the desire of individuals for consumption to be similar in different states of the world.” In
other words, individuals want to make investment decisions in ways that do not negatively
affect their ability to realize the value of their assets over time. There is debate in the
literature about the effect of risk aversion on investment behavior. Haliassos and Bertaut
(1995) found that risk aversion does not explain investments in stocks. Guiso et al. (2005)
also found that risk aversion does not predict stock ownership when they include measures
of trust. Other scholars, however, found evidence that risk averse households are less likely
to own risky assets such as stocks and mutual funds (Campbell 2006; Donkers and van Soest
1999) and hold more diversified investment portfolios (Dorn and Huberman 2005). Campbell
(2006) and Heaton and Lucas (2000) found that households that are self-employed or have
significant private business assets are more risk averse. Surveys typically use measures
about respondents’ attitudes about hypothetical investment losses to proxy risk aversion.
Unfortunately, I do not have any of these types of measures in the surveys used in this
dissertation.
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3.5 Matched groups
Valid causal inference using the potential outcomes model requires similarity between treat-
ment groups (Gelman and Hill 2007; Morgan and Winship 2007). The treated and control
groups on average should be exactly the same except for ownership of financial assets. Oth-
erwise, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is some other difference between these
groups that explains differences in political behavior. This condition is satisfied only to
the extent that I successfully model the treatment assignment process. It is not enough to
control for factors such as age, income and education that affect the probability of owning
investments and political outcomes. I also need to make certain that the distribution of these
characteristics is equal across both groups as much as possible. Estimates of the effects of
the treatment indicator on outcomes will lead to incorrect causal inference if 1) there is a
lack of complete overlap of the factors that affect asset ownership (e.g. income, education,
age, etc.) between treatment and control groups or 2) these two groups are imbalanced
(Gelman and Hill 2007).17
Tables 3.4 to 3.16 provide descriptive statistics for the matched groups by treatment
indicator. In each table the first two columns provide the mean for each predictor and the
propensity score before matching and the fifth and sixth columns provide the same after
matching. The third and fourth columns provide two statistics to compare the pre-matched
groups, and the two final columns provide the same for the matched groups. Although
standardized mean differences are often used to compare means across different covariates,
Imai et al. (2008b) argue this is a flawed approach to checking for balance between treatment
17A key assumption of the potential outcomes model is the stable unit value assumption (SUTVA). The
causal effect of assets on the political behavior of one subject should not be affected by the assets of others
in the sample. Several studies, however, argue for the presence of neighbor effects on individual investment
decisions (Hong et al. 2005; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner 2007; Brown et al. 2008). Scholars also suggest the
possibility of cohort effects over the past 25 to 30 years as stock market participation became more common
across households (McCarthy 2004; Starr 2008). Given the challenges of explicit modeling of causal effect
exposure, I proceed with data analysis on the assumption of SUTVA. However, I keep this assumption in
mind and “rather than consider SUTVA as overly restrictive...reflect on the plausibility of SUTVA [and] use
such reflection to motivate a clear discussion of the meaning and scope of a causal effect estimate” (Morgan
and Winship 2007, p. 38).
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groups. Thus, I also include the mean of the empirical cumulative density functions (eCDF)
for each predictor, which I use to check for covariate balance.18
The goal of propensity score matching is to minimize the differences between treated and
control groups on each covariate. Although this difference should ideally be as close to nil
as possible, in practice it is often difficult to achieve this benchmark. In assessing covariate
balance, we generally want to see mean difference between treated and control groups of less
than 10% across predictors. Especially important is balance on the propensity score, which
represents the probability of being assigned to one treatment group or the other. In each of
these tables, the mean eCDF for each covariate (column eight) should be 0.10 or less and
the propensity score (bottom row in columns five and six) should be equivalent. In general,
I achieve good balance between treated and control groups for each of my treatments.19
18The eCDF standardizes the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots, which compare the average distance between
the empirical quantile distributions of the treated and control groups. The smaller the difference between
these two distributions, greater the similarity of matched groups on the given covariate.
19Since I use the missingness of predictors as important information in the matching process, covariate
means are not directly interpretable in these tables. This is because I code missing values for all predictors
as “777.” In the case of the ANES data (Table 3.4), I include a missing data dummy indicator to account for
slightly higher percentages of missing values for employment (13.61%) and occupation (7.69%). This allows
me to make sure treated and control groups are balanced in the degree of missingness of these covariates.
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Table 3.4: ANES group comparisons prior to and after matching on stock market investments treatment
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=92 N=345 N=92 N=77
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.424 0.351 0.147 0.037 0.424 0.424 0.000 0.009
Age in 2002 47.293 52.820 -0.331 0.052 47.293 47.326 -0.002 0.021
Household income 2002 (3=high, 1=low) 44.228 28.438 0.089 0.167 44.228 52.250 -0.045 0.102
Education (3=high, 1=low) 10.652 1.968 0.108 0.070 10.652 2.239 0.104 0.016
Ethnic minority (1=yes, 0=no) 8.630 2.516 0.075 0.026 8.630 0.304 0.103 0.038
High skill occupation (1=yes, 0=no) 59.424 92.548 -0.160 0.032 59.424 59.380 0.000 0.011
Full-time employed (1=yes, 0=no) 110.326 113.000 -0.010 0.047 110.326 93.435 0.062 0.016
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 0.446 4.904 -8.922 0.015 0.446 0.446 0.000 0.002
Number of dep. children 0.652 2.870 -2.219 0.011 0.652 0.533 0.120 0.025
Homeowner (1=yes, 0=no) 0.717 5.130 -9.748 0.030 0.717 0.674 0.096 0.021
Employment missing variable indicator 0.141 0.145 -0.010 0.002 0.141 0.120 0.062 0.006
Occupation missing variable indicator 0.076 0.119 -0.160 0.021 0.076 0.076 0.000 0.001
Propensity score 0.266 0.196 0.486 0.168 0.266 0.254 0.083 0.016
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Table 3.5: BHPS group comparisons prior to and after matching on stocks treatment
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=789 N=4691 N=789 N=707
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.485 0.422 0.127 0.032 0.485 0.487 -0.003 0.004
Average age during treatment period 44.894 45.055 -0.011 0.033 44.894 44.663 0.015 0.008
Avg. household income during treatment period 25.624 24.116 0.011 0.019 25.624 25.591 0.000 0.016
Education in 2000 (3=high, 1=low) 10.788 5.991 0.058 0.066 10.788 9.698 0.013 0.028
Race (non-white=1, white=0) 9.867 6.326 0.041 0.004 9.867 9.861 0.000 0.003
Average job skill level (3=high, 1=low) 9.209 18.303 -0.125 0.055 9.209 9.193 0.000 0.013
Employed fulltime entire treatment period (1=yes, 0=no) 12.265 15.4 -0.033 0.040 12.265 12.247 0.000 0.009
Married entire treatment period (1=yes, 0=no) 0.617 0.509 0.222 0.054 0.617 0.615 0.005 0.009
Highest number of children under 16 yrs 25.281 23.796 0.011 0.006 25.281 25.225 0.000 0.014
Homeowner anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 2.915 4.742 -0.047 0.059 2.915 2.905 0.000 0.004
Business owner anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 31.589 33.518 -0.013 0.005 31.589 31.579 0.000 0.003
High debt, top third of sample in 2000 (1=yes, 0=no) 25.954 32.798 -0.049 0.006 25.954 25.97 0.000 0.006
Health problem anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 11.028 14.872 -0.042 0.037 11.028 11.06 0.000 0.011
Propensity score 0.153 0.143 0.287 0.081 0.153 0.153 0.005 0.012
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Table 3.6: BHPS group comparisons prior to and after matching on mutual funds treatment
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=353 N=5912 N=353 N=338
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.518 0.437 0.163 0.041 0.518 0.516 0.006 0.011
Average age during treatment period 49.602 45.439 0.308 0.089 49.602 49.602 0.000 0.012
Avg. household income during treatment period 15.187 25.325 -0.101 0.006 15.187 15.19 0.000 0.017
Education in 2000 (3=high, 1=low) 10.793 6.195 0.056 0.071 10.793 10.771 0.000 0.018
Race (non-white=1, white=0) 11.034 6.341 0.051 0.003 11.034 11.028 0.000 0.003
Average job skill level (3=high, 1=low) 17.819 16.966 0.008 0.075 17.819 17.802 0.000 0.019
Employed fulltime entire treatment period (1=yes, 0=no) 13.609 15.991 -0.024 0.017 13.609 13.629 0.000 0.001
Married entire treatment period (1=yes, 0=no) 0.64 0.536 0.218 0.052 0.64 0.635 0.012 0.002
Highest number of children under 16 yrs 14.955 24.997 -0.100 0.013 14.955 14.892 0.001 0.013
Homeowner anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 5.357 4.22 0.019 0.051 5.357 5.348 0.000 0.004
Business owner anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 33.133 32.525 0.004 0.018 33.133 33.099 0.000 0.015
High debt, top third of sample in 2000 (1=yes, 0=no) 13.479 32.006 -0.184 0.036 13.479 13.439 0.000 0.014
Health problem anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 11.184 14.21 -0.033 0.036 11.184 11.173 0.000 0.007
Propensity score 0.063 0.056 0.370 0.107 0.063 0.063 0.022 0.009
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Table 3.7: BHPS group comparisons prior to and after matching on Personal Equity Plan treatment
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=532 N=5549 N=532 N=486
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.457 0.438 0.038 0.010 0.457 0.457 0.000 0.011
Average age during treatment period 48.712 45.229 0.263 0.088 48.712 48.646 0.005 0.006
Avg. household income during treatment period 22.404 25.17 -0.022 0.006 22.404 22.361 0.000 0.013
Education in 2000 (3=high, 1=low) 7.791 6.193 0.024 0.061 7.791 7.771 0.000 0.009
Race (non-white=1, white=0) 7.344 6.613 0.010 0.004 7.344 7.327 0.000 0.007
Average job skill level (3=high, 1=low) 6.752 17.364 -0.183 0.060 6.752 6.729 0.000 0.012
Employed fulltime entire treatment period (1=yes, 0=no) 10.658 15.748 -0.057 0.030 10.658 10.662 0.000 0.005
Married entire treatment period (1=yes, 0=no) 0.658 0.524 0.283 0.067 0.658 0.656 0.004 0.004
Highest number of children under 16 yrs 22.038 24.848 -0.023 0.007 22.038 21.987 0.000 0.017
Homeowner anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 0.959 4.713 -18.840 0.055 0.959 0.962 -0.019 0.000
Business owner anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 27.852 32.825 -0.034 0.014 27.852 27.838 0.000 0.007
High debt, top third of sample in 2000 (1=yes, 0=no) 10.487 32.962 -0.254 0.044 10.487 10.523 0.000 0.011
Health problem anytime during treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 10.429 14.845 -0.050 0.029 10.429 10.419 0.000 0.003
Propensity score 0.097 0.087 0.414 0.114 0.097 0.097 0.005 0.010
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Table 3.8: NCDS group comparisons prior to and after matching on stocks treatment
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=1498 N=7524 N=1498 N=1725
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.570 0.466 0.211 0.052 0.570 0.569 0.001 0.031
Net weekly household income in 1981 (3=high, 1=low) 38.352 31.972 0.039 0.039 38.352 37.816 0.003 0.012
Net weekly household income in 1991 (3=high, 1=low) 2.174 2.302 -0.154 0.045 2.174 2.172 0.002 0.009
Education level in 1991 (3=high, 1=low) 12.095 18.868 -0.078 0.073 12.095 12.083 0.000 0.015
Ethnic minority (non-white=1, white=0) 2.095 3.426 -0.033 0.001 2.095 2.091 0.000 0.004
Occupation level in 1991 (ISCO-88) 72.375 100.385 -0.180 0.094 72.375 72.337 0.000 0.019
Fulltime employed in 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 1.251 1.222 0.001 0.043 1.251 1.248 0.000 0.024
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 12.683 26.284 -0.142 0.027 12.683 12.696 0.000 0.016
No. dependent children in 1991 58.289 64.416 -0.030 0.028 58.289 58.298 0.000 0.025
Homeowner in 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 49.107 70.207 -0.113 0.054 49.107 49.107 0.000 0.006
Businessowner in 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.643 0.732 -0.004 0.004 0.643 0.642 0.000 0.006
High debt [top third] (1=yes, 0=no) 14.828 25.522 -0.102 0.016 14.828 14.817 0.000 0.015
Longterm illness/disability in 1981 or 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 1.724 1.311 0.012 0.002 1.724 1.197 0.015 0.015
Propensity score 0.180 0.163 0.370 0.105 0.180 0.180 0.002 0.029
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Table 3.9: NCDS group comparisons before and after matching on mutual funds treatment
Variable Before genetic matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=1498 N=7524 N=1498 N=1725
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.596 0.479 0.240 0.059 0.596 0.596 0.000 0.028
Net weekly household income in 1981 (3=high, 1=low) 28.641 33.089 -0.031 0.010 28.641 28.620 0.000 0.035
Net weekly household income in 1991 (3=high, 1=low) 2.150 2.282 -0.154 0.034 2.150 2.148 0.003 0.030
Education level in 1991 (3=high, 1=low) 12.609 17.897 -0.060 0.094 12.609 10.480 0.024 0.032
Ethnic minority (non-white=1, white=0) 0.037 3.400 -17.806 0.006 0.037 0.032 0.028 0.010
Occupation level in 1991 (ISCO-88) 63.736 96.688 -0.225 0.131 63.736 63.863 -0.001 0.025
Fulltime employed in 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.757 1.241 -1.127 0.046 0.757 0.755 0.006 0.031
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 19.153 24.179 -0.042 0.006 19.153 19.172 0.000 0.035
No. dependent children in 1991 78.963 62.631 0.070 0.038 78.963 78.956 0.000 0.052
Homeowner in 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 62.351 66.851 -0.021 0.039 62.351 62.343 0.000 0.015
Businessowner in 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.103 0.739 -2.092 0.005 0.103 0.100 0.009 0.009
High debt [top third] (1=yes, 0=no) 18.763 24.173 -0.046 0.009 18.763 16.707 0.017 0.033
Longterm illness/disability in 1981 or 1991 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.195 1.330 -2.859 0.007 0.195 0.190 0.013 0.038
Propensity score 0.047 0.041 0.405 0.120 0.047 0.047 -0.004 0.025
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Table 3.10: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: USA Today/Gallup January 2008 Poll
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=1414 N=589 N=1414 N=346
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.525 0.463 0.124 0.031 0.525 0.529 -0.007 0.021
Age 62.153 57.961 0.047 0.067 62.153 60.170 0.022 0.042
Household income (1=low, 2=medium, 3=high) 71.897 72.589 -0.003 0.188 71.897 70.797 0.005 0.139
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 5.806 7.358 -0.031 0.105 5.806 5.205 0.012 0.066
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 4.487 2.829 0.028 0.033 4.487 1.800 0.046 0.025
Employed fulltime (1=yes, 0=no) 13.204 12.231 0.010 0.070 13.204 11.576 0.017 0.044
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 11.117 8.290 0.032 0.103 11.117 9.471 0.018 0.080
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 12.986 10.803 0.022 0.034 12.986 11.305 0.017 0.035
Homeowner (1=yes, 0=no) 1.948 3.229 -0.044 0.086 1.948 1.381 0.019 0.061
Income missing variable indicator 0.090 0.092 -0.007 0.001 0.090 0.088 0.005 0.007
Propensity score 0.764 0.566 1.120 0.278 0.764 0.763 0.008 0.210
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Table 3.11: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: CBS/New York Times March 2008 Poll
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=801 N=555 N=801 N=335
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.442 0.364 0.157 0.039 0.442 0.444 -0.005 0.045
Age group (1=18-29, 2=30-44, 3=45-64, 4=65+) 2.994 2.906 0.113 0.058 2.994 2.990 0.005 0.048
Household income (1=low thru 6=high) 56.537 46.099 0.054 0.220 56.537 55.450 0.006 0.161
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 5.401 7.699 -0.049 0.096 5.401 5.383 0.000 0.058
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 1.055 8.591 -0.275 0.042 1.055 1.044 0.000 0.010
Currently employed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.582 1.856 -2.581 0.042 0.582 0.594 -0.024 0.063
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 1.662 6.074 -0.161 0.073 1.662 1.666 0.000 0.048
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 0.298 0.277 0.046 0.010 0.298 0.300 -0.003 0.030
Homeowner (1=yes, 0=no) 4.793 11.906 -0.130 0.069 4.793 4.789 0.000 0.025
Propensity score 0.600 0.577 0.369 0.069 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.038
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Table 3.12: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: NBC/Wall Street Journal September 2008 Poll
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=660 N=447 N=660 N=221
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.518 0.450 0.137 0.034 0.518 0.515 0.006 0.022
Age group (1=18-24 thru 12=75+) 12.591 7.895 0.070 0.055 12.591 8.847 0.056 0.039
Household income 63135.080 39238.991 0.705 0.195 63135.080 63002.761 0.004 0.100
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 10.768 16.067 -0.067 0.088 10.768 7.157 0.045 0.064
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 7.252 5.595 0.022 0.064 7.252 3.800 0.047 0.044
Occupation level 17.153 21.322 -0.040 0.089 17.153 17.236 -0.001 0.056
Currently employed (1=yes, 0=no) 14.788 17.879 -0.030 0.055 14.788 14.770 0.000 0.032
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 6.608 7.468 -0.013 0.069 6.608 5.445 0.017 0.020
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 5.083 9.000 -0.065 0.022 5.083 5.079 0.000 0.007
Propensity score 0.652 0.514 0.839 0.223 0.652 0.650 0.010 0.118
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Table 3.13: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: NBC/Wall Street Journal September 2008 Poll (Form B)
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=318 N=234 N=318 N=113
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.531 0.444 0.174 0.044 0.531 0.538 -0.013 0.009
Age group (1=18-24 thru 12=75+) 11.657 9.295 0.039 0.071 11.657 11.484 0.003 0.062
Household income 65583.245 39093.175 0.801 0.213 65583.245 64404.000 0.036 0.129
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 9.881 15.423 -0.074 0.098 9.881 7.362 0.034 0.063
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 7.519 3.675 0.051 0.055 7.519 0.289 0.096 0.043
Occupation level 20.022 17.004 0.027 0.075 20.022 19.912 0.001 0.041
Currently employed (1=yes, 0=no) 17.774 13.829 0.035 0.044 17.774 17.808 0.000 0.017
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 5.607 7.150 -0.025 0.071 5.607 3.211 0.039 0.019
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 2.830 10.269 -0.171 0.026 2.830 2.792 0.001 0.023
Propensity score 0.645 0.483 0.889 0.238 0.645 0.645 -0.001 0.142
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Table 3.14: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: CBS December 2008 Poll
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=839 N=531 N=839 N=349
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.406 0.409 -0.005 0.001 0.406 0.398 0.017 0.005
Age group (1=18 to 29 thru 4=65+) 3.011 2.902 0.134 0.050 3.011 3.017 -0.007 0.033
Household income (1=low thru 6=high) 58.735 50.930 0.039 0.216 58.735 59.544 -0.004 0.151
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 6.232 6.497 -0.005 0.105 6.232 7.125 -0.017 0.083
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 12.120 6.058 0.063 0.041 12.120 4.746 0.077 0.004
Currently employed (1=yes, 0=no) 1.529 0.384 0.043 0.074 1.529 0.602 0.035 0.060
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 7.138 3.363 0.053 0.076 7.138 3.455 0.052 0.057
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 2.133 1.706 0.011 0.013 2.133 1.176 0.025 0.024
Propensity score 0.641 0.567 0.610 0.146 0.641 0.640 0.011 0.093
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Table 3.15: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: USA Today/Gallup December 2008 Poll
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=644 N=355 N=644 N=192
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.542 0.451 0.183 0.046 0.542 0.548 -0.012 0.024
Age 64.803 60.375 0.049 0.048 64.803 61.856 0.032 0.040
Household income (1=low, 2=medium, 3=high) 85.427 65.017 0.085 0.184 85.427 85.427 0.000 0.107
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 8.543 8.654 -0.002 0.106 8.543 8.526 0.000 0.061
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 6.110 19.865 -0.202 0.041 6.110 8.550 -0.036 0.024
Professional/business class (1=yes, 0=no) 6.616 13.400 -0.099 0.105 6.616 6.616 0.000 0.080
Fulltime employed (1=yes, 0=no) 1.716 4.701 -0.098 0.062 1.716 0.567 0.038 0.048
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 3.075 2.597 0.011 0.085 3.075 0.702 0.055 0.042
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 9.941 8.989 0.011 0.019 9.941 9.930 0.000 0.020
Homeowner (1=yes, 0=no) 2.082 2.823 -0.024 0.081 2.082 2.075 0.000 0.038
Income missing variable indicator 0.107 0.082 0.082 0.013 0.107 0.107 0.000 0.001
Propensity score 0.727 0.496 1.275 0.274 0.727 0.725 0.007 0.186
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Table 3.16: Group comparisons prior to and after matching: CBS/New York Times January 2009 Poll
Variable Prior to matching After matching
Treated Control Comparisons Treated Control Comparisons
N=733 N=368 N=733 N=226
Std. Mean eCDF Std. Mean eCDF
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Mean Difference Mean
Gender (male=1, female=0) 0.445 0.378 0.135 0.034 0.445 0.457 -0.025 0.017
Age group (1=18-29 thru 4=65+) 2.959 3.011 -0.064 0.052 2.959 2.943 0.020 0.055
Household income 39.065 51.065 -0.075 0.213 39.065 36.407 0.017 0.162
Education level (3=high, 1=low) 2.521 6.245 -6.904 0.122 2.521 2.438 0.155 0.119
Black or Latino (1=yes, 0=no) 5.386 2.274 0.049 0.026 5.386 0.095 0.083 0.010
Social class group (1=low thru 5=high) 7.154 8.709 -0.027 0.090 7.154 7.042 0.002 0.067
Currently employed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.570 0.394 0.356 0.088 0.570 0.576 -0.011 0.068
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 1.733 4.595 -0.100 0.100 1.733 0.612 0.039 0.073
Dependent children (1=yes, 0=no) 0.304 0.215 0.195 0.045 0.304 0.297 0.015 0.041
Homeowner (1=yes, 0=no) 6.196 21.780 -0.244 0.077 6.196 6.156 0.001 0.039
Propensity score 0.682 0.633 0.510 0.114 0.682 0.681 0.016 0.075
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3.6 Causal inference
The goal of causal inference is to evaluate the aggregate effect of the acquisition of financial
assets (stocks and mutual funds) on change in political behavior. I accomplish this in two
different ways. First, to make the results as transparent as possible, I evaluate change in
the outcome variables across treatment groups. For example, I compare the percentage of
people who changed their party preference from the Labour Party to the Conservative Party
after acquiring stocks or mutual funds to those who did not acquire any financial assets.
This simple analysis provides first-level evidence of any general trends that distinguish the
two treatment groups.
Next, I follow Gelman and Hill (2007) and Rubin (2008) to make causal inference using
regression on the treatment variable. I regress political behavior (the post-test or dependent
variable) on financial asset ownership (treatment indicator) and prior political behavior (pre-
test). I generally use binary logistic regression as most of my measures of political behavior
are dichotomous. (A subject either voted in an election or she did not. She is or is not a
political party member.) Logistic regression is the preferred method for situations with a
dependent variable with two outcome categories and continuous or dichotomous independent
variables. Where I have polychotomous dependent variables, such as questions concerning
political attitudes, I use either ordered logistic regression or ordinary least squares regression
(OLS).
Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to maximize the odds that the
observed values of the dependent variable (political behavior) may be predicted from the
observed values of the independent variables (financial assets). Logistic regression does not
share some of the more challenging assumptions of OLS. It does not assume a linear relation-
ship between dependent and independent variables, does not require normally distributed
variables, and does not assume uniform variance of residuals. Logistic regression does as-
sume, however, a linear relationship between the independent variables and the log odds
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(logit) of the dependent variable. Otherwise, the customary concerns of OLS regression still
apply, such as sampling error, multicollinearity, and omitted variables. Since I use matching
with replacement, I use weighted logistic regression.20
I evaluate the “substantive significance” of my findings by comparison of the effect of the
intervention of financial asset ownership under alternative treatments (treated and control)
(Morgan and Winship 2007). A common way to evaluate regression estimates is to compare
the results to the null hypothesis of no effect. Although I follow convention and report point
estimates, standard errors and p-values, in this dissertation empirical results are interpreted
in terms of relative risk, a common method of reporting results of clinical trials (Zhang and
Kai 1998; Davies et al. 1998).21 I calculate relative risk by the risk ratio, the probability of
a given outcome if treated compared to the probability of the same outcome if untreated.22
Risk ratios offer the advantage of literal interpretation of increased or decreased likelihood
of an outcome between treated and control groups. For example, a risk ratio of 2 means a
given outcome is two times more likely to occur in the treated group than in the control
group. Conversely, a risk ratio of 0.5 means a given outcome is two times less likely to occur
in the treated group than in the control group. The minimum threshold for a significant
finding in this dissertation is a risk ratio of 2; risk ratios of 3 or higher represent substantively
meaningful differences between treatment groups (Taubes 1995).23 Since point estimates and
20There appears to be little formal advice on this subject. Gary King’s online documentation for the
MatchIt package makes a very limited reference to the need to use weights or fixed effects to account for the
difference in numbers of treated and untreated cases. (gking.harvard.edu\matchit\docs\Conducting_
Analyses-af.html). The only other reference on this subject that I found in the matching literature is a
table note in Dehejia and Wahba (2002) that refers to the use of weighted least squares for data matched
with replacement (see note C in Table 2 on page 155).
21Another way to think of relative risk is as the average treatment effect of a given financial asset on a
given measure of political behavior.
22Another way to compute relative risk is the odds ratio, which is the ratio of the odds of an outcome
in the treated group to the odds of the same outcome in the control group. Logistic regressions compute
log odds, the natural logarithm of odds ratios. Odds ratios, however, are frequently misinterpreted when
calculating relative risk. Moreover, the odds ratio can give a biased interpretation of relative risk. “If the
odds ratio is interpreted as a relative risk it will always overstate any effect size: the odds ratio is smaller
than the relative risk for odds ratios of less than one, and bigger than the relative risk for odds ratios of
greater than one” (Davies et al. 1998).
23This minimum threshold accounts for both the uncertainty inherent to parametric estimates as well as
the possibility of known or unknown confounds. Risk ratios above two represent greater certainty of actual
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standard errors are arrived at through a process of data reduction, I avoid information loss
only if my data are normally distributed. Simulation allows me to represent the uncertainty
of my parameter estimates by summarizing statistical inferences using random numbers
rather than point estimates and standard errors alone (Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 137). For
each logistic regression I present the mean risk ratio and 95% confidence intervals of 100,000
simulations (Imai et al. 2008a).24
3.7 Missing data
Missing data are a common challenge for observational studies. Incomplete data pose a
change to internal validity (relationship between observed outcome and independent vari-
ables) and external validity (generalizability of findings) (McKnight et al. 2007). Hence,
missing data are a direct threat to causal inference of the effects of financial assets on polit-
ical behavior. I treat missing data differently prior to and after matching.
Prior to matching, I treat the missingness of my predictors (covariates) as information.
In other words, I assume that by refusing to answer a question a respondent may disclose
information about themselves related to their treatment status. Since my interest at the
matching stage is to create like treated and untreated groups, I include a missing value indi-
cator for this case and use this information in propensity score matching (D’Agosotino and
Rubin 2000). If a given covariate has 10% or more missing values across cases I also include
a separate binary indicator as a predictor to fit the propensity score model.25 Haviland et al.
(2007) indicate this approach helps balance the observed values of the predictors as well as
the pattern of missingness between treatment groups.
After matching, I am now concerned about all missing variables—predictors and out-
differences between treated and control groups.
24Since I use multiple imputation to account for missing data (described in next section), these are mean
simulated risk ratios and 95% confidence intervals for five multiply imputed data sets.
25The binary indicator is applied to all observations for the affected covariate, with missing values coded
as 1 and non-missing values coded as 0.
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comes. The basic concern at this point is the missing data mechanism. Prior to matching,
if a person was unwilling to answer a survey question about, say income, I could take this
refusal as information about that person and use it to match her with another person sim-
ilar in every way who also refused to answer information about his income. But for causal
inference this is problematic. I can ignore how the data came to be missing only if the data
are missing at random (MAR) and the factors that influence missingness are unrelated to
the outcomes under analysis (Allison 2002; McKnight et al. 2007). Two people with low
and high incomes could refuse to answer the same question about household income for very
different reasons. Given the strong relationship between socioeconomic status and political
behavior, this missingness is non-trivial.
My approach to missing data during data analysis is three-fold. First, I drop any variable
in which more than 20% of the observations are missing. This decision rule does not affect any
of the predictor or treatment variables, but does limit the availability of some of the pre-test
and post-test variables. Second, I use the Amelia package in R to multiply impute missing
values (King et al. 2001). Multiple imputation assumes the data at minimum are missing
at random (even better would be “missing completely at random”). Although my data
most likely do not completely fulfill this implied ignorability criterion, multiple imputation
is generally considered a good solution for missing data (King et al. 2001; Allison 2002;
McKnight et al. 2007). I create five imputation data sets, which is consistent with general
recommendations in the statistics literature (McKnight et al. 2007, p. 201). I include in the
imputation process propensity scores, predictor, treatment, and outcome variables that may
be correlated with the variables that have missing data or associated with the probability
that those variables have missing data (Allison 2002, p. 35).26 Finally, I use the Zelig
package in R to combine the multiply imputed data sets and perform regression analysis
(Imai et al. 2008a).
26The binary missingness indicator used during the matching process plays no role at this stage.
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3.8 Limitations and delimitations
Methodologically, I follow Rubins’ admonition that research design trumps statistical analy-
sis for causal inference (Rubin 2008). I focus on quasi-experimental research design in place
of more powerful and sophisticated statistical tools. For example, I do not use multilevel
models to account for the effect of groups or regions in my estimate of the effect of financial
assets on political behavior. I also seek to control for treatment assignment mechanisms
instead of modeling selection (Heckman 1976). Despite the findings of neighbor effects on
investment decisions (Shiller and Pound 1989; Hong et al. 2004; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner
2007; Brown et al. 2008) and arguments for the spatial structure of political participation
(Cho and Rudolph 2008), I do not attempt to conduct a spatial analysis of these data. Sub-
stantively, there is one issue from the literature that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Scholars argue that political behavior is often motivated by economic issues, particularly
for those with few or no resources (Huntington 1968; Gurr 1971; Scott 1985; Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006). Although I rigorously examine the effect of owning financial assets on
political behavior, I do not study the effect of having few or no assets.
3.9 Summary
Convincing causal inference requires careful attention to research design to rule out biases
and alternative explanations. Although I have observational data, I keep the experimental
model firmly in mind. I identify treatment groups and seek to make them as alike as possible.
I address the assignment mechanism into treatment groups with predictors that represent
potential “back-door” paths to the outcome variables. I evaluate the effect of assets by
comparison of the effect of “intervention” of investments between treated and control groups.
I use a combination of longitudinal and cross-sectional surveys from the United States and
Britain over a 25-year period. In sum the research design of this dissertation intends to offer
rigorous tests of the causal effects of financial assets on political behavior.
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Chapter 4
Partisanship
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the effect of acquisition of stocks and mutual funds on partisan
identity in the United States and Britain. Both political systems have a well-defined left-right
ideological dimension regarding economic and social policies, so investors can reasonably be
expected to be able to identify which party is presumed to be more “pro-market.” In the
U.S., the investor class thesis predicts that investors overtime will shift their support toward
the Republican Party. Extension of the theory to Britain predicts that investors will exhibit
similar behavior toward the Conservative Party. I hypothesize, however, that financial assets
have no effect on partisanship, except possibly for people under 34 years for whom partisan
identity is still somewhat in flux. Otherwise, there is no theoretical reason to expect that
purchase of stocks and mutual funds will have any influence on partisan identity.
Partisanship is one of the most fundamental concepts in political science. “Partisanship
[is] the central factor in explaining not just how people vote, but also how they see the
political world” (Achen 2002a, p. 151). The investor class theory claims that as a person
acquires stocks and mutual funds, her economic interests begin to alter her worldview. Over
time her political preferences shift to support pro-market policies consistent with her financial
interests. This shift in economic preferences also influences other beliefs, such as the proper
role of government in the economy and society. This re-evaluation of interests and preferences
over time leads to a shift in partisan support toward political parties that support these
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positions (Nadler 2005; Ponnuru 2004).1
The investor class theory fits squarely in the middle of the debate in the partisanship
literature over the stability of partisan attachments. The political socialization model (also
known as the “Michigan school”) contends that party ID is a form of social identity (Camp-
bell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002). People think of themselves as members of partisan groups
in much the same way they see themselves as members of religious organizations (Green and
Palmquist 1990; Green et al. 2002). They might over time not fully support all tenets of
their faith but are relatively unlikely to switch religions. Partisan attachments are initially
formed by parental partisanship (Franklin 1984; Achen 2002a), but later are shaped by so-
cial influences in the early adult years. Party ID generally settles down by the early thirties
and for the most part does not change thereafter (Miller 1991; Abramson and Ostrom Jr.
1991; Green et al. 2002). In the U.S. context, when change does occur it is more likely to
be movement between Independents and the major political parties rather than between the
Democratic and Republican parties. Unless financial asset ownership somehow shapes social
identity (Di Tella et al. 2007), the political socialization model predicts stocks and mutual
funds will have no effect on partisanship.
The revisionist model, however, argues that partisan attachments are endogenous to
individual interests and political party positions. “New issues, or old issues that become
more salient, may divide the electorate in new ways, such that regardless of the positions
the parties are perceived to adopt, they will lose some of their past supporters and gain new
ones” (Franklin and Jackson 1983, p. 968). Revisionists assert that partisanship is not as
stable as the political socialization model contends, and that party ID is shaped by rational
prospective evaluations of how a political party will benefit individual interests (Achen 1992,
2002a; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984; Markus and Converse 1979; Abramowitz
1Investor class proponents are careful not to claim that everyone will become a Republican or that this
change will occur overnight. Rather, these analysts argue that the acquisition of stocks and mutual funds
affects the probability of becoming Republican (Nadler 2000b, 2005; Ponnuru 2004).
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and Saunders 2006; Clarke et al. 2009).2
This forward-looking aspect of the revisionist model accords well with both the investor
class and asset effect theories. Nadler (1999) contends that financial investments shape
the individual’s orientation toward the future and her preferences over government policies.
Sherraden (1991) asserts that the accumulation of assets today leads to expectations of
greater assets in the future. Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform, claims
that “[investment] changes your time horizon, over time it changes your party affiliation,
and it also changes what you read and what you watch on TV” (Deane and Balz 2003).
The revisionist model predicts stocks and mutual funds can shape partisan attachments
by shifting preferences towards parties that will best protect and enhance these financial
interests.
4.2 Prior research
Scant research exists on the effect of financial asset ownership on political behavior in general,
much less partisanship (Barabas 2006; Kaustia and Torstila 2008). Kaustia and Torstila
(2008) used a natural experiment to examine the effect of involuntary stock ownership on
voting for right-wing parties in Finland. In 1997-1998, tens of thousands of customers of
three state-owned Finnish telecommunications companies received stock market shares from
the privatization of these firms.3 These analysts investigated the change in right-wing voting
from 1995 to 1999 in the 391 zip codes served by these companies. They used propensity
score matching to identify treated and control groups for the intervention of telecom share
ownership. Controlling for a range of possible alternative explanations for changes in voting
patterns, these scholars found an increase ranging from 0.6 to 1.0 percent vote share for
the conservative political party (National Coalition) in voting districts that received telecom
shares.
2The notable exception is Fiorina (1981), who emphasizes retrospective evaluations of party performance.
3The value of these shares ranged from $4,000 to $8,000.
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Saunders (1995), however, presented mixed findings regarding the effect of share own-
ership of privatized water and electricity companies on partisanship in Britain in the late
1980s-early 1990s. In 1989, the Conservative Party government privatized these public util-
ities despite majority public opposition to this change. Support for the government’s priva-
tization efforts never exceeded forty percent.4 The Labour Party, perhaps sensing a political
opportunity, indicated that it would renationalize these industries if it gained control of the
government in the 1992 General Election. Based on a 1989-1991 panel survey of 828 indi-
viduals in south and northwest England, Saunders found that Labour Party supporters who
bought privatized water company shares were about five times more likely to switch support
to the Conservative Party in 1991 than those who did not.5 Apparently, these Labour Party
supporters perceived that their financial self-interest would be threatened by a Labour gov-
ernment. However, Saunders found no equivalent effect on voting intentions of supporters of
other political parties or undecided voters. “Share purchase discouraged Labour supporters
from voting Labour, but it did not encourage non-Conservatives to vote Tory” (Saunders
1995, p. 135).
The effect of financial assets on partisanship is most directly investigated by Davis and
Cotton (2007) with data from the 1998-2004 American National Election Studies (ANES).6
Davis and Cotton construct a dichotomous measure of asset ownership from a question about
stock market participation: Do you personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money
invested in the stock market right now—either in an individual stock or in a mutual fund?
Partisanship is operationalized as a dichotomous measure of Republican party ID. These
analysts estimate ordinary least squares regression of Republican party ID on stock market
participation, controlling for age, income, education, race, gender, home ownership, political
4Despite widespread negative public opinion toward privatization, roughly 2.5 million people bought
water company shares.
5Respondents were surveyed three months before and eighteen months after water industry privatization.
Saunders did not appear to investigate whether party identification had any effect on the willingness to buy
privatized shares.
6These scholars use a series of cross-sectional data and a three-wave year panel (2000-2004).
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ideology, and prior party ID. Davis and Cotton find shareholders were about 30% more
likely to identify with the Republican Party in 1998-2002 and 130% in 2004. They attribute
this huge jump in 2004 to presidential campaign promises by President George W. Bush to
privatize Social Security.
This conclusion is puzzling since nearly identical proportions of investors voted for the
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2000 and 2004 (Continetti 2005).
Even the most ardent supporters of the investor class theory concede the effects of asset
ownership likely take longer to manifest than two to four years (Nadler 2000b, 2005). Since
the authors are unable to purge asset ownership from partisanship prior to 2000, we can-
not discount the possibility that party ID is driving stock market participation. This is
particularly important as analysts find that investment decisions may be shaped by social
interactions (Hong et al. 2005; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner 2007; Brown et al. 2008). Further,
despite the use of a number of control variables for political orientation, Davis and Cotton
do not sufficiently account for important differences that affect the probability of financial
asset ownership. For example, employment, occupation level, and marital status are known
predictors of stock market participation omitted in this study. As much as possible, we need
to account for all known factors that affect financial asset ownership and partisan identity
in order to make valid causal inference.
4.3 Data
To ascertain the causal effect of financial assets on party ID, I focus on the effects of change
in financial asset ownership on subsequent change in partisanship. The important question is
whether acquisition of stocks and mutual funds has any effect upon partisan attachments. I
use longitudinal data from the American National Election Studies (2000-2002), the British
Household Panel Survey (1993-2005), and the National Child Development Study (1981-
2000). For each of these surveys I establish a baseline to identify respondents who report
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not owning any financial assets. I use a subsequent reporting period to sort through these
respondents to identify those that acquired financial assets and those that did not. I then
use propensity score matching to divide respondents into treated and control groups based
on the predictors of asset ownership listed in Table 3.3.
Treatment indicators vary by survey. The ANES asks the single question about stock
market participation described in section 4.2. The baseline year for stock market partic-
ipation in the ANES is 2000. The treatment period is 2000-2002, meaning that investors
acquired stock investments during this two year period.7 The BHPS includes questions
about ownership of stocks, mutual funds (known in Britain as “unit trusts”), and personal
equity plan (PEP) accounts. PEPs were tax-privileged investment accounts available to
British investors between 1986-1999.8 From 1992 to 1999 investors were able to invest in ei-
ther single-company PEPs (annual limit of £3,000) or general PEPs that invested in mutual
funds (annual limit of £6,000). The baseline for the BHPS is 1995; investors acquired these
assets during the subsequent five-year period (1995-2000).
The NCDS includes questions about stock and mutual fund (unit trust) ownership. The
baseline is 1981; investors acquired these assets during the following decade (1981-1991). In
sum, the treatment periods for these three surveys range from two to ten years. Ideally, I
would prefer much greater precision about exactly when these assets were acquired. Un-
observed heterogeneity on duration of asset ownership potentially biases any findings and
challenges the validity of causal inference. It is possible that the value of financial assets
may interact with ownership to have an effect on partisanship. Unfortunately, I only have
data on asset values for the NCDS data set. At minimum, however, for all three data sets
I am at least able to distinguish between those who acquired financial assets during some
defined treatment period from those who did not.
The pre- and post-tests for these interventions are measures of partisan identification.
7Although the ANES panel extends to 2004, I am limited to two years as one-third of the cases are
missing for this third wave.
8PEP accounts were free of capital gains and income taxes.
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The conceptualization of this measure is slightly different on either side of the pond. The
American survey (ANES) asks a standard question about partisan identity: “Generally
speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?”
By contrast, the British surveys (BHPS and NCDS) inquire about vote choice—which party
the respondent would be most likely to vote for if an election was held tomorrow. Respon-
dents in these surveys generally choose from a half a dozen parties from Britain’s multiparty
system.
This means these surveys measure different concepts, since partisan identity does not
necessarily constrain vote choice (Green et al. 2002). In other words, it is possible for a
Liberal Party supporter to vote for Labour or the Tories without changing her sense of
partisan attachment. (It also may be rational if she perceives voting for the Liberals as a
wasted vote.) So in a sense, the vote choice question is a noisy measure of partisanship that
is less precise than partisan identity. Thus, we might find greater movement in vote choice
over time than partisan identity. If financial assets do in fact have any effect on partisanship,
the bar appears lower for the British data sets.
I operationalize party ID as a dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of
support for a given political party. For the ANES data, the pre-test is partisan identification
in 2000; the post-test is party ID in 2002. For the BHPS data, the pre-test is party ID in
1995; post-tests are party ID in 2000 and 2002. The pre-test for the NCDS data set is party
ID in 1981; post-tests are party ID in 1991 and 2000.
4.4 Partisan stability
Before I begin causal analysis of the effect of assets on partisanship, I need to first ascertain
the stability of partisan identity in my data sets. If party ID is unstable over time, this
would challenge the validity of causal inference. Green et al. (2002) find partisanship to
be relatively stable in both the United States and Britain over a thirty-year period (1960s-
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1990s). Although I have no reason to suspect that partisanship operates differently in the
data sets that I use in this dissertation, I examine the stability of partisan attachments to
rule out possible alternative explanations for any findings. This is particularly important
since these treatment groups were matched without any reference or prior knowledge of their
partisan attachments. To ascertain the stability of party ID in my data sets, I follow Green
et al. (2002) to compute the polychoric correlations of party identification over time. A
polychoric correlation is a technique for estimating the correlation between two theorized
normally distributed continuous latent variables from two observed ordinal variables.9 It
measures the degree to which party ID for the same respondents correlate between successive
waves of measurement.
At least three waves of panel data are necessary to compute polychoric correlations,
although four waves or more are preferable. Since I only have two waves of data for the
ANES data set, I limit computation of the polychoric correlation matrix to the BHPS and
NCDS data sets. In Table 4.1 I divide the data into multiple panels based on treatment
indicator and separate dichotomous party identification measures for the Conservative Party
and Labour Party. This allows me to ascertain the stability of partisan identification for
both major British political parties under three separate treatment conditions–stockholding,
mutual fund holding and PEP account ownership. Since I use multiple imputation to account
for missing data, I follow Roscino and Pollice (2004) and present the average association
matrix of five polychoric correlation matrices separately computed for each of the multiply
imputed data sets for the BHPS and NCDS matched groups.
To measure partisan stability, I do not examine the correlation between two successive
periods, but rather the rate of decline of this correlation over time. If party identification
changes over time without measurement error, in a three wave panel the correlation between
the first and last waves (indicated as r13) is the product of r12 and r23. However, if parti-
9Since both observed variables are dichotomous technically this is a special case known as a tetrachoric
correlation.
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sanship is stable but measured with error, then r13 will be greater than r12r23 (Green et al.
2002, p. 67). For example, in the first panel of Table 4.1 identification with the Conservative
Party among the stockholding treatment groups correlates at 0.898 between 1993 and 1994
(r12). Between 1993 and 2002 identification with the Tories correlates at 0.781 (r16). If
Conservative Party ID was changing during this period I would expect to see a correlation
of only 0.726 (r12r26). I find similar results for each set of treatment groups and partisan-
ship measures in Table 4.1 (in some cases with greater differences).10 Although party ID at
first glance appears less stable in the NCDS matched groups, r13 is greater than r12r23 in
every panel in Table 4.2. Partisanship is stable under each treatment condition in both the
BHPS and NCDS matched data sets. Therefore, I can safely rule out instability in partisan
attachments as a rival explanation for any potential change in partisanship after acquisition
of financial assets.
10According to Green et al. (2002) the discrepancy in correlation between successive panels is largely due
to response or measurement error.
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Table 4.1: Partisan stability in British Household Panel Study matched groups, 1993-2002
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Mean SD
Stocks 1993-2002 BHPS (N=1496)
Conservative Party ID
1993 1 0.191 0.393
1994 0.898 1 0.161 0.368
1995 0.898 0.900 1 0.152 0.360
2000 0.807 0.851 0.853 1 0.175 0.380
2001 0.799 0.807 0.840 0.922 1 0.157 0.364
2002 0.781 0.808 0.821 0.912 0.925 1 0.155 0.362
Labour Party ID
1993 1 0.175 0.380
1994 0.908 1 0.193 0.395
1995 0.901 0.928 1 0.219 0.414
2000 0.821 0.858 0.852 1 0.209 0.407
2001 0.774 0.815 0.822 0.908 1 0.248 0.432
2002 0.802 0.826 0.842 0.929 0.928 1 0.223 0.416
Mutual Funds 1993-2002 BHPS (N=691)
Conservative Party ID
1993 1 0.266 0.442
1994 0.913 1 0.228 0.420
1995 0.861 0.927 1 0.230 0.421
2000 0.798 0.850 0.830 1 0.230 0.421
2001 0.787 0.839 0.840 0.929 1 0.214 0.410
2002 0.802 0.854 0.852 0.920 0.908 1 0.220 0.415
Labour Party ID
1993 1 0.155 0.362
1994 0.941 1 0.162 0.369
1995 0.931 0.955 1 0.188 0.391
2000 0.898 0.879 0.902 1 0.188 0.391
2001 0.834 0.821 0.848 0.944 1 0.225 0.418
2002 0.860 0.808 0.869 0.959 0.941 1 0.210 0.408
PEP 1993-2002 BHPS (N=1018)
Conservative Party ID
1993 1 0.246 0.431
1994 0.898 1 0.201 0.402
1995 0.903 0.907 1 0.203 0.402
2000 0.873 0.886 0.877 1 0.220 0.415
2001 0.841 0.829 0.825 0.925 1 0.193 0.394
2002 0.860 0.849 0.861 0.948 0.953 1 0.200 0.401
Labour Party ID
1993 1 0.175 0.380
1994 0.921 1 0.204 0.403
1995 0.922 0.935 1 0.221 0.415
2000 0.847 0.895 0.853 1 0.210 0.407
2001 0.832 0.879 0.850 0.940 1 0.239 0.426
2002 0.833 0.896 0.877 0.956 0.959 1 0.223 0.416
Source: British Household Panel Study.
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Table 4.2: Partisan stability in National Child Development Study matched groups, 1981-
2000
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Mean SD
Stocks 1981-2000 NCDS (N=3223)
Conservative Party ID
1981 (23 yrs.) 1 0.220 0.414
1991 (33 yrs.) 0.613 1 0.437 0.496
2000 (42 yrs.) 0.541 0.719 1 0.283 0.450
Labour Party ID
1981 (23 yrs.) 1 0.239 0.426
1991 (33 yrs.) 0.581 1 0.281 0.449
2000 (42 yrs.) 0.402 0.627 1 0.372 0.484
Mutual Funds 1981-2000 NCDS (N=988)
Conservative Party ID
1981 (23 yrs.) 1 0.236 0.425
1991 (33 yrs.) 0.589 1 0.456 0.498
2000 (42 yrs.) 0.496 0.703 1 0.295 0.456
Labour Party ID
1981 (23 yrs.) 1 0.200 0.401
1991 (33 yrs.) 0.573 1 0.275 0.447
2000 (42 yrs.) 0.395 0.635 1 0.381 0.486
Source: National Child Development Study.
4.5 Partisan change
Now that I have established the stability of partisan identification in my data sets, I now
turn to investigation of the relationship between financial assets and partisanship. I under-
take two steps to examine whether acquisition of stocks and mutual funds has any effect
on party identification. First, I present simple percentage comparisons of partisan change
for the treated and control groups. Tables 4.3 through 4.5 summarize the percentage of
partisan change under each treatment condition before and after the intervention period.11
The investor class theory predicts that people become more conservative after they acquire
11These percentages are weighted averages of five multiply imputed data sets.
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financial assets. The key comparison, therefore, is percentage of party switchers (particularly
toward conservative parties) in the treated and control groups after the treatment period.
Table 4.3 shows a complete lack of switching from the Democratic to Republican Party
between 2000 and 2002 for the treated and control groups. I also find very low percentages
of movement between Labour and the Conservative Party. In Table 4.4 I find less than one
percent of treated cases in the BHPS data set switched from Labour to the Conservative
Party. Moreover, the rate of party switching in most cases was very similar for the treated
and control groups.
Table 4.3: Partisan change in the United States by treatment type 2000-2002, weighted
percentages
Party ID Treated Control
N=92 N=77
Republican in 2000 and 2002 20.7 21.7
Democrat in 2000 and 2002 32.6 38.0
Republican 2000 to Democrat 2002 1.1 0.0
Democrat 2000 to Republican 2002 0.0 0.0
Source: American National Election Studies.
I find slightly higher percentages of party switching in the NCDS data set in Table 4.5.
This supports earlier findings concerning the malleability of partisanship of people in their
twenties and early thirties (Green et al. 2002).12 Nevertheless, for both stocks and mutual
funds I find the rate of change from Labour to the Conservative Party to be less than five
percent. Moreover, the percentages of partisan change in Table 4.5 are virtually identical
for treated and control groups.13 The evidence for all three data sets across treatment types
strongly supports the contention of Green et al. (2002) that people generally do not change
political parties. Not only is the percentage of people who switch parties low, but there
12Respondents in the NCDS survey were 23 years old in 1981 and 33 years old in 1991.
13In fact, a slightly smaller percentage of the treated group switched from Labour to the Tories than the
control group for stocks (3.0% vs. 3.7%) and mutual funds (2.2% vs. 3.8%).
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appears to be no significant difference in the very low percentage of people who changed
parties across treated and control groups.
Table 4.4: Partisan change in Britain by treatment type 1995-2002, weighted percentages
Party ID Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=789 N=707 N=353 N=338 N=532 N=486
Tory in 1995 and 2000 13.1 9.1 18.0 13.2 16.5 13.7
Labour in 1995 and 2000 15.2 14.9 13.6 14.3 12.2 19.1
Tory 1995 to Labour 2000 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4
Labour 1995 to Tory 2000 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0
Tory in 1995 and 2002 11.8 7.9 17.9 13.8 15.2 12.8
Labour in 1995 and 2002 15.9 14.8 13.1 15.1 13.4 20.3
Tory 1995 to Labour 2002 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
Labour 1995 to Tory 2002 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Table 4.5: Partisan change in Britain by treatment type 1981-2000, weighted percentages
Party ID Stocks Mutual Funds
Treated Control Treated Control
N=1498 N=1725 N=379 N=609
Tory in 1981 and 1991 20.2 13.8 22.8 14.9
Labour in 1981 and 1991 11.6 16.5 10.4 13.1
Tory 1981 to Labour 1991 1.1 1.7 1.0 1.7
Labour 1981 to Tory 1991 4.6 4.7 3.3 3.6
Tory in 1981 and 2000 14.8 10.0 17.0 9.4
Labour in 1981 and 2000 12.7 15.6 10.6 13.4
Tory 1981 to Labour 2000 3.8 3.5 4.5 4.4
Labour 1981 to Tory 2000 3.0 3.7 2.2 3.8
Source: National Child Development Study.
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Next, I estimate a series of logistic regressions of the post-test (party identification after
treatment) on the treatment indicator (financial asset) and the pre-test (party identification
prior to treatment). The principal summary statistic of a causal effect of financial assets
on party identification is the risk ratio: the probability of a given party attachment if in
the treated group divided by the probability of the same party attachment if in the control
group. The risk ratio equals one if the odds are even; greater distance from one in either
direction indicates the relative greater or lesser probability of observing this outcome in the
treated versus control group. A general rule of thumb is that the risk ratio must at least be
greater than two in order to claim minimal evidence of a causal effect; a risk ratio of 3 or
more would be more convincing evidence.14 To account for the uncertainty inherent in my
parametric estimates, I simulate mean risk ratios and associated 95% confidence intervals.15
I begin with the ANES, which is the most limited data set in terms of the “crudeness”
of the treatment indicator and relative brevity of the time horizon (two years). Contrary
to Davis and Cotton (2007), I find no evidence in Table 4.6 that stock market participation
affected partisanship among Americans who acquired financial assets between 2000 and 2002.
The risk ratio for both Democratic and Republican party ID is approximately one.
14A risk ratio that indicates lesser probability of occurrence in the treated group compared to the control
group would have to be smaller than 0.500 to meet the minimum threshold ( 1
0.500
= 2) and smaller than
0.333 for convincing evidence ( 1
0.333
= 3).
15I use the Zelig package in R to run 100,000 simulations (Imai et al. 2008a).
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Table 4.6: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic re-
gression of acquisition of stock market investments from 2000-2002 on partisan identification
in 2002
Republican 2002 Democrat 2002
Intercept -2.832 -2.338
(0.533)** (0.469)**
Investments -0.204 0.031
(0.707) (0.531)
Republican 2000 5.833
(0.834)**
Democrat 2000 4.457
(0.534)**
RRa 1.004 1.084
RR 95% CIb (0.272,2.656) (0.531,2.007)
N 169 169
Source: American National Election Studies.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five
multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
Next, I turn to the BHPS matched groups. Tables 4.7 to 4.9 present the results of logistic
regressions of party identification in 2000 and 2002 on acquisition of stocks, mutual funds
and PEP accounts between 1995-2000. I find that none of these treatments had any effect
on partisan attachment in either 2000 or two years later in 2002. In most cases the risk
ratio is close to one and always less than two. Although mutual fund acquisition in the late
1990s appears to have a statistically significant negative effect on support for Labour in 2002
(column four of Table 4.8), the inverted risk ratio ( 1
0.659
) is 1.5, meaning the control group
was only one a half times more likely to vote for Labour than the treated group. This falls
short of the minimum risk ratio threshold of 2.
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Table 4.7: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of stocks from 1995-2000 on partisan identification in 2000 and 2002
Tory 2000 Labour 2000 Tory 2002 Labour 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -2.480 -2.520 -2.493 -2.201
(0.137)** (0.141)** (0.140)** (0.136)**
Stocks 0.110 -0.003 0.059 -0.136
(0.170) (0.164) (0.176) (0.159)
Tory 1995 3.372 3.038
(0.180)** (0.182)**
Labour 1995 3.327 3.158
(0.164)** (0.164)**
RRa 1.109 1.011 1.066 0.907
RR 95% CIb (0.815,1.486) (0.775,1.313) (0.778,1.394) (0.693,1.168)
N 1496 1496 1496 1496
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 4.8: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of mutual funds from 1995-2000 on partisan identification in 2000
and 2002
Tory 2000 Labour 2000 Tory 2002 Labour 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -2.397 -2.874 -2.280 -2.075
(0.192)** (0.236)** (0.197)** (0.188)**
Mutual funds 0.273 0.046 -0.177 -0.518
(0.226) (0.281) (0.276) (0.248)*
Tory 1995 3.007 3.201
(0.228)** (0.239)**
Labour 1995 3.960 3.463
(0.280)** (0.265)**
RRa 1.243 1.097 0.888 0.659
RR 95% CIb (0.859,1.783) (0.652,1.755) (0.580,1.270) (0.432,0.943)
N 691 691 691 691
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard error in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 4.9: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of PEP accounts from 1995-2000 on partisan identification in 2000
and 2002
Tory 2000 Labour 2000 Tory 2002 Labour 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -2.583 -2.486 -2.504 -2.611
(0.174)** (0.171)** (0.173)** (0.181)**
PEP 0.305 -0.048 0.150 0.173
(0.201) (0.197) (0.203) (0.204)
Tory 1995 3.468 3.205
(0.205)** (0.216)**
Labour 1995 3.277 3.558
(0.197)** (0.205)**
RRa 1.316 0.971 1.145 1.167
RR 95% CIb (0.923,1.807) (0.674,1.321) (0.801,1.593) (0.814,1.593)
N 1018 1018 1018 1018
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Since I don’t know when these assets were acquired in the BHPS data set, it is possible
that the duration of ownership could be fairly limited. Many people piled into the stock
market in the waning years of the 1990s as the bull market continued apace. Thus, even
a post-test in 2002 could actually be capturing a significant number of people who owned
stocks and mutual funds for just two or three years. Fortunately, the NCDS data set allows
me to examine a longer period of potential ownership. The treatment period is ten years
and the second post-test in 2000 occurred nine years later, which allows me to test the effect
of ownership after a reasonable period of time (from 9-19 years).
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 present the results of the effect of acquisition of stocks and mutual
funds on party identification. Once again, I find no evidence of a causal effect of financial
assets on party ID. Although stocks reach statistical signifiance in columns 1-4 in Table 4.10,
the risk ratios fail to reach at least two in any of the models. The coefficients on mutual
funds fail to reach statistical significance in any of the models in Table 4.11, save for Tory
ID in 2000 in column three. However, once again the risk ratio is well below two. These
assets were acquired when respondents were between 23-33 years old, the time period in
which party identification is most malleable (Green et al. 2002). Even during these most
impressionable years, acquisition of financial assets appears to have had a negligent effect
on partisan attachments.
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Table 4.10: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of stocks from 1981-1991 on partisan identification in 1991 and 2000
Tory 1991 Labour 1991 Tory 2000 Labour 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.777 -1.272 -1.404 -0.740
(0.056)** (0.070)** (0.081)** (0.081)**
Stocks 0.214 -0.389 0.214 -0.389
(0.083)* (0.097)** (0.083)* (0.097)**
Tory 1981 1.958 1.631
(0.118)** (0.114)**
Labour 1981 1.799 1.186
(0.104)** (0.097)**
RRa 1.128 0.752 1.099 0.893
RR 95% CIb (1.031,1.230) (0.656,0.861) (0.966,1.242) (0.802,0.989)
N 3223 3223 3223 3223
Source: National Child Development Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 4.11: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of mutual funds from 1981-1991 on partisan identification in 1991
and 2000
Tory 1991 Labour 1991 Tory 2000 Labour 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.762 -1.285 -1.479 -0.688
(0.105)** (0.111)** (0.125)** (0.128)**
Mutual funds 0.280 -0.261 0.363 -0.031
(0.155) (0.163) (0.169)* (0.174)
Tory 1981 1.853 1.438
(0.189)** (0.172)**
Labour 1981 1.833 1.213
(0.189)** (0.183)**
RRa 1.168 0.830 1.309 0.986
RR 95% CIb (0.991,1.364) (0.649,1.041) (1.033,1.631) (0.810,1.198)
N 988 988 988 988
Source: National Child Development Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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4.6 Thresholds
In this section I investigate the possibility of threshold effects of financial assets on parti-
sanship. The partisanship literature suggests that young adults are much more likely to
change party identification than people past their early thirties. In the previous section I
did not find any evidence that acquisition of financial assets affected the partisanship of
respondents who were 23-33 years of age during the treatment period in the NCDS data
set. To further investigate this possibility, I use the ANES and BHPS data sets to estimate
separate regressions for cases under 34 years of age at the time the data were collected.16
Tables 4.12 to 4.13 report the results of these estimates for respondents who acquired assets
at age thirty-three or younger for the ANES and BHPS data sets. Interacting financial asset
ownership with the age dummy variable does not indicate any threshold effect for age. The
risk ratio for financial assets in each case is close to one. As with the NCDS data sets, I find
no effect of assets on partisanship regardless of age.17
16For the ANES data, this means respondents were under 34 years when they acquired assets during
2000-2002. For the BHPS, by the time asset ownership was reported in 2000, a respondent was no older
than 33 years old, meaning that they were in their twenties or early 30s when assets were acquired during
1995-2000.
17Results for ages 34 and older not presented. These results also did not find any effect of age.
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Table 4.12: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of stock market investments from 2000-2002 by people under 34
years of age on partisan identification in 2002
Republican 2002 Democrat 2002
(1) (2)
Intercept -2.589 -2.413
(0.557)** (0.496)**
Investments -0.535 -0.057
(0.800) (0.606)
Republican 2000 5.850
(0.861)**
Democrat 2000 4.497
(0.545)**
Under 34 yrs -1.888 -0.541
(1.912) (0.942)
Investments x Under 34 yrs 2.203 0.446
(2.225) (1.244)
RRa 1.216 1.095
RR 95% CIb (0.288,3.538) (0.537,2.028)
N 169 169
Source: American National Election Studies.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five
multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
Another possible threshold effect is the value of financial assets. People with greater
financial assets might have greater vested interests and might be more likely to consider
switching support to a political party that will protect their investments. Table 4.14 provides
summary statistics for reported asset values of stocks and mutual funds in 1991 for the
treated groups in the NCDS data sets (asset values are zero for control groups). On average
the size of portfolios for stock and mutual funds was quite small, approximately £10,500 for
stocks and £19,000 for mutual funds. These averages, however, are skewed as the median
values for stocks (£800) and mutual funds (£2,000) were much smaller.
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Table 4.13: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of stocks from 1995-2000 by people under 34 years of age on partisan
identification in 2000 and 2002
Tory 2000 Labour 2000 Tory 2002 Labour 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -2.384 -2.488 -2.398 -2.149
(0.148)** (0.154)** (0.154)** (0.144)**
Stocks 0.128 0.085 0.057 -0.177
(0.185) (0.181) (0.186) (0.177)
Tory 1995 3.342 3.008
(0.181)** (0.183)**
Labour 1995 3.329 3.148
(0.165)** (0.164)**
Under 34 yrs -0496 -0.181 -0.499 -0.260
(0.354) (0.311) (0.376) (0.332)
Stocks x Under 34 yrs -0.093 -0.459 0.035 0.201
(0.471) (0.431) (0.478) (0.406)
RRa 1.112 1.002 1.069 0.907
RR 95% CIb (0.818,1.498) (0.764,1.465) (0.772,1.448) (0.707,1.144)
N 1496 1496 1496 1496
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed
data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
To analyze the potential threshold effects of financial asset values, I estimated a series of
logistic regressions with dummy variables for £5,000, £25,000 and £50,000. Table 4.15 sum-
marizes the results of these estimates. I limit presentation to those results in which inclusion
of the asset value dummy results in a p-value less than or equal to 0.05 for the coefficient of
the treatment indicator. (I am unable to interact asset values with the investment ownership
dummy since the asset values for all members of the control group is zero.) Column five in
Table 4.15 appears to show that acquisition of just £5,000 of stocks from 1981-1991 had a
negative effect on support for the Labour Party in 1991. However, the risk ratio is short of
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Table 4.14: Summary statistics of asset values for National Child Development Study treated
group
Stocks Mutual Funds
Minimum £1.00 £4.00
Maximum £999,999.00 £1,999,998.00
Mean £10,528.69 £19,063.41
Median £800.00 £2,000.00
Standard deviation £66,607.18 £130,251.27
Interquartile range £2,170.00 £5,000.00
0.500, the threshold for the minimal case for causality. I find no difference between treated
and control groups. In every other case in Table 4.15 the risk ratio also fails to reach at
least two.18 Once again, the data provide no evidence that financial assets—regardless of
value—make any difference on partisan identification.
18Risk ratios less than one would need to be .500 or smaller in order to reach this threshold.
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Table 4.15: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression of acquisition of stocks
and mutual funds from 1981-1991 on partisan identification in 1991 and 2000, controlling for asset values
Tory 1991 Tory 2000 Labour 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -0.776 -0.776 -1.480 -1.481 -1.271 -1.271 -1.272
(0.0561)** (0.0561)** (0.126)** (0.126)** (0.070)** (0.070)** (0.070)**
Stocks 0.194 0.202 -0.325 -0.363 -0.375
(0.087)* (0.086)* (0.103)** (0.097)** (0.097)**
Mutual funds 0.374 0.392
(0.168)* (0.169)*
Tory 1981 1.951 1.954 1.441 1.445
(0.117)** (0.117)** (0.172)** (0.172)**
Labour 1981 1.797 1.798 1.799
(0.104)** (0.103)** (0.104)**
£5,000 -0.444
(0.200)*
£25,000 0.429 -0.171 -0.638
(0.324) (0.535) (0.372)
£50,000 0.3507 -1.05 -0.470
(0.385) (1.024) (0.409)
RRa 1.116 1.121 1.318 1.336 0.789 0.767 0.760
RR 95% CIb (1.016,1.22) (1.022,1.226) (1.037,1.641) (1.052,1.661) (0.683,0.910) (0.668,0.878) (0.663,0.871)
Treatment Stocks Stocks M. Funds M. Funds Stocks Stocks Stocks
Asset threshold £25,000 £50,000 £25,000 £50,000 £5,000 £25,000 £50,000
N 3223 3223 988 988 3223 3223 3223
Source: National Child Development Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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4.7 Partisan strength
A dichotomous measure of party identification may obscure more subtle changes in parti-
sanship. Although I find no evidence that financial assets affect party ID, it is possible that
stocks and mutual funds might influence the strength of partisan attachments. In other
words, if buying stocks and mutual funds does not cause someone to switch parties, perhaps
it affects partisan fervor? If so, this effect may take place before or in place of wholesale
change in partisan identification. I test this proposition with measures of partisan strength
in two data sets (ANES and BHPS) that include this information.
For the ANES data set I use the standard seven-point measure of partisan identity.
Strong Democrats are coded as -3 and strong Republicans are coded as 3. Independents
are coded as 0, and intermediate levels of partisan attachment (weak and independent
Democrats/Republicans) fill out the rest of the scale. For the BHPS data set I follow
Green et al. (2002) to put the Labour and Conservative parties at either end of the scale
(-3 and 3) and code respondents who did not identify with either of these major parties in
the middle (0). Respondents who self-identify as fairly strong and not very strong partisans
complete the rest of the scale.
Tables 4.16 and 4.17 provide descriptive statistics of partisan strength for the matched
groups from the BHPS and ANES data sets. In both of these tables I show the mean partisan
scales for all respondents and for partisans pre- and post-treatment.19 I further disaggregate
these divisions into treated and control groups. The strength of partisan attachment in
the United States and Britain appears largely unaffected by the acquisition of stocks or
mutual funds. Whether we look at the short two-year period of the American data or the
longer seven-year period of the BHPS data, the strength of partisan attachments appear
very similar across treatment groups.
19These are weighted averages of five multiply imputed data sets.
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Table 4.16: British partisan strength before and after treatment (1995-2000) of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts,
weighted means
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
1995 2000 2002 1995 2000 2002 1995 2000 2002
All 0.006 0.024 -0.024 0.264 0.224 0.170 0.138 0.122 0.078
Treated 0.064 0.086 0.024 0.432 0.398 0.286 0.230 0.284 0.230
Control -0.060 -0.050 -0.072 0.088 0.042 0.044 0.034 -0.052 -0.042
Tories 2.518 1.680 1.492 2.578 1.670 1.644 2.520 1.764 1.698
Treated 2.516 1.734 1.576 2.604 1.676 1.628 2.514 1.800 1.750
Control 2.512 1.594 1.366 2.540 1.660 1.672 2.522 1.720 1.630
Labour -1.404 -1.512 -1.526 -1.474 -1.512 -1.552 -1.440 -1.534 -1.616
Treated -1.396 -1.490 -1.518 -1.472 -1.436 -1.506 -1.436 -1.374 -1.434
Control -1.412 -1.540 -1.534 -1.482 -1.582 -1.592 -1.446 -1.664 -1.762
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds
unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted N=1118
(532 treated, 486 control).
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Table 4.17: American partisan strength before and after treatment (2000-2002) of stock
market investments, weighted means
2000 2002
All -0.46 -0.42
Treated -0.34 -0.30
Control -0.59 -0.55
Republicans 2.56 2.43
Treated 2.57 2.33
Control 2.55 2.55
Democrats -2.59 -2.37
Treated -2.62 -2.50
Control -2.56 -2.24
Independents -0.02 -0.10
Treated -0.04 -0.10
Control 0.00 -0.50
Source: American National
Election Studies.
Notes: Unweighted N=169
(92 treated, 77 control).
To investigate the causal effect of financial assets on partisan strength, I estimate a series
of ordinary least squares regressions of partisan strength on acquisition of financial assets.
As before, I use pre- and post-tests of partisan strength along with a dichotomous treatment
indicator. Table 4.18 presents the findings for the British data. Substantively, the key
statistic for this table is the 95% confidence interval of the point estimate.20 In this case,
only the PEP accounts in 2000 (columns 3) appears to show any effect on partisan strength.
However, the low end of the confidence interval is very small, reflecting the possibility that
the size of any effect could be very, very small (3.5% of a standard deviation).21 Furthermore,
20I am able to compute relative risk (risk ratios) only for logistic regressions.
21For reference I include a summary statistic for goodness of fit. Since the BHPS estimates are of five
multiply imputed data sets, R2 in columns 2-7 is the simple mean of five multiply imputed data sets; the
range shows the spread of these estimates in each of the imputed data sets.
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PEP accounts have no effect on partisan strength in the 2002 post-test. Table 4.19 shows
acquisition of stock market investments have no effect on American partisan strength. The
coefficient on stock market investments fails to reach the 5% level.
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Table 4.18: Point estimates and 95% confidence interval from an ordinary least squares regression of acquisition of stocks,
mutual funds and PEP accounts from 1995-2000 on British partisan strength in 2000 and 2002
Partisan strength 2000 Partisan strength 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.003 -0.021 -0.083 -0.027 -0.005 -0.068
(0.044) (0.068) (0.048) (0.039) (0.068) (0.064)
Stocks 0.040 -0.016
(0.056) (0.055)
Mutual funds 0.115 -0.068
(0.095) (0.076)
PEP 0.184 0.054
(0.066)** (0.067)
Partisan strength 1995 0.791 0.702 0.796 0.312 0.332 0.311
(0.019)** (0.029)** (0.023)** (0.036)** (0.035)** (0.033)**
Partisan strength 2000 0.558 0.545 0.606
(0.029)** (0.034)** (0.030)**
Asset simulated 95% CI (-0.068,0.148) (-0.065,0.293) (0.056,0.312) (-0.114,0.124) (-0.213,0.076) (-0.070,0.179)
Adj. R2 a 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.63 0.66 0.71
MI R2 Rangeb (0.54,0.56) (0.47,0.50) (0.48,0.49) (0.62,0.65) (0.63,0.69) (0.70,0.72)
N 3223 988 1018 3223 988 1018
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
a Mean R2 of five multiply imputed data sets; b Minimum and maximum R2 of five multiply imputed data sets.
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Table 4.19: Point estimates and 95% confidence interval from an ordinary least squares
regression of acquisition of stocks and mutual funds from 2000-2002 on American partisan
strength in 2002
Intercept 0.000
(0.109)
Investments 0.019
(0.145)
Partisan strength 2000 0.927
(0.035)**
Investments 95% CI (-0.268,0.302)
Adj. R2 0.82
N 166
Source: American National Election Studies.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
4.8 Partisan attachments and asset ownership
The final step in this analysis concerns the relationship between party ID and financial
assets. The investor class theory claims that acquisition of financial assets has a causal
effect on partisanship. However, it is possible that party ID affects the probability of owning
financial assets in the first place. People who support pro-market positions associated with
the Republican Party in the United States and the Conservative Party in Britain might have
a greater propensity to purchase stocks and mutual funds. Any analysis concerning financial
assets and partisan attachments must rule out the possibility of a reverse causal relationship.
I investigate this possibility by first examining the correlations between prior partisanship
and subsequent financial asset ownership. Table 4.20 presents the correlations between party
ID in 2000 and stock market investments over the next two years in the ANES data set. I
find no evidence of any correlation between prior partisanship and acquisition of financial
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assets.
Table 4.20: Correlation between prior partisanship and investment in the stock market
between 2000-2002
Republican Democrat
Correlation 0.012 -0.092
T-Test 0.153 -1.187
DF 166 166
P-Value 0.878 0.237
Source: American National Election Studies.
Notes: Unweighted N=169.
For the British data, I focus on just the riskiest asset—stocks. Table 4.21 presents data
from the BHPS data set. I find a statistically significant correlation between prior support for
the Tories and subsequent stock purchases, but none for Labour. However, at a mere 8% this
does not suggest a strong relationship between prior partisanship and the decision to invest
in stocks. In Table 4.22 I present similar correlations for the NCDS data set. Although I find
a statistically significant correlation for prior support for both the Labour and Conservative
Party on subsequent stockholding, substantively this relationship is negligible (7% for Tories
and -5% for Labour).
Table 4.21: Correlation between prior partisanship and purchase of stocks between 1995-2000
Tory Labour
Correlation 0.079 0.004
T-Test 3.044 0.162
DF 1494 1494
P-Value 0.003 0.872
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Unweighted N=1496.
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Table 4.22: Correlation between prior partisanship and purchase of stocks between 1981-1991
Tory Labour
Correlation 0.069 -0.049
T-Test 3.792 -2.807
DF 3221 3221
P-Value 0.000 0.005
Source: National Child Development Study.
Notes: Unweighted N=3223.
Finally, I estimate a series of logistic regressions to investigate whether prior partisanship
predicts the decision to acquire financial investments. In each case, the dependent variable
is a dichotomous indicator of financial asset ownership: stock market investments for the
ANES data set and stocks for the BHPS and NCDS data sets. The predictor variable is prior
party ID. Once again, the key summary statistic is the risk ratio. The risk ratio should be
greater than two to provide minimal evidence that prior partisanship affects the probability
of owning a financial asset in the treated group compared to the control group.
In Table 4.23 I find that the risk ratio is approximately 1 for both Republican and
Democratic party ID. Prior partisanship had no effect on the probability of owning stock
market investments during 2000-2002. I make similar findings regarding prior partisanship on
stockholding in Britain from 1995-2000 (Table 4.24) and 1981-1991 (Table 4.25). Although
the coefficients reach statistical significance for Tory party ID in Table 4.24 (column one)
and for Tory and Labour party ID in Table 4.25, the risk ratio in each case falls well short of
the critical threshold of two. Whatever effect partisanship may have on political behavior,
it apparently has little effect on the decision to invest in the stock market.
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Table 4.23: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of prior partisan identification on acquisition of stock market investments between
2000 and 2002
(1) (2)
Intercept 0.150 0.324
(0.176) (0.201)
Republican 2000 0.077
(0.840)
Democrat 2000 -0.394
(0.317)
RRa 1.039 0.839
RR 95% CIb (0.719,1.39) (0.609,1.109)
N 169 169
Source: American National Election Studies.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000
simulations of five multiply imputed data sets;
bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 4.24: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of prior partisan identification on acquisition of stocks between 1995 and 2000
(1) (2)
Intercept 0.047 0.101
(0.056) (0.056)
Tory 1995 0.411
(0.147)**
Labour 1995 0.042
(0.126)
RRa 1.197 1.020
RR 95% CIb (1.058,1.336) (0.905,1.139)
N 1496 1496
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000
simulations of five multiply imputed data sets;
bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 4.25: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of prior partisan identification on acquisition of stocks between 1981 and 1991
(1) (2)
Intercept -0.230 -0.080
(0.040)** (0.041)*
Tory 1981 0.411
(0.087)**
Labour 1981 -0.256
(0.084)**
RRa 1.232 0.869
RR 95% CIb (1.133,1.333) (0.790,0.951)
N 3223 3223
Source: National Child Development Study.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000
simulations of five multiply imputed data sets;
bmean 95% confidence interval.
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4.9 Summary
This chapter empirically examined the claim that acquisition of financial assets—stocks
and mutual funds—shapes partisan identification. The investor class theory claims that as
people buy stock market investments over time they begin to shift their partisan preferences
toward parties perceived more likely to protect or benefit these financial interests. The
theoretical framework for this prediction is straightforward. New investors will eventually
want to support political parties that will protect and enhance their financial self-interests.
I used survey data from the United States and Britain over a twenty-year period starting
in the early 1980s to investigate this claim. I find no evidence to support the argument that
investment in the stock market has any causal effect on partisan attachments. Partisanship
is relatively stable among people who acquired financial assets in the 1980s, mid-to-late
1990s, and early 2000s. There is no difference in effect between ownership of stocks, mutual
funds, or tax-privileged investment accounts. There also is no apparent differential effect
of financial assets either by age or asset value. These findings support my hypothesis that
financial assets have no effect on party identification.
These findings provide additional support for the political socialization model of parti-
sanship. Financial assets play no significant role in explaining change in partisan support,
whether measured by partisan identity, vote intention or strength of partisan identification.
These results also buttress prior research findings that personal pocketbook issues play little
to no role in shaping partisan attachments (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Sears and Funk
1991). It is unclear whether this is due more to the enduring strength of partisan attach-
ments or because investors simply do not perceive parties as having much impact on their
portfolio returns.
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Chapter 5
Participation
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the effect of acquisition of stocks and mutual funds on political
participation in the United States and Britain. The investor class theory claims that as
people acquire stocks and mutual funds they become more likely to vote and engage in the
political process (Glassman 2001; Nadler 2000a, 2005). The theory asserts that the political
preferences of new investors and their incentives to engage in the political process change over
time. Financial asset ownership is predicted to lead to greater engagement in the political
process as investors rationally increase their participation in the political process to protect
their financial interests. The asset effect theory similarly claims asset ownership increases the
likelihood of political participation. “Wealth leads to a greater effort to protect property, and
ultimately, to greater political participation...People with assets become politically active in
protecting those assets, which leads to social policy development” (Sherraden 1991, p. 165).
As I argue in Chapter 2, however, I expect to find no effect of financial assets on political
participation.
Political participation is activity intended directly or indirectly to influence government
action. Participation is the means by which citizens “communicate information about their
interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure [on the government] to respond”
(Verba et al. 1995, p. 1). This influence occurs through attempts to influence the devel-
opment of public policies and/or selection of the people who make and implement these
policies. Although voting is the most fundamental and common form of participation, par-
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ticipation comprises a broad array of political acts including volunteer work on campaigns,
financial contributions, contact with public officials, attendance at campaign rallies, and
political demonstrations and protests (Verba et al. 1995).
The literature on political participation is roughly divided into the resource-based and
rational choice camps.1 The resource model of political participation distinguishes between
the types of resources needed to engage in different modes of political participation.2 This
model emphasizes the opportunity structure for participation—motivation, capacity and
recruitment. People have to want to be involved in politics and have the ability and rationale
to do so. However, the ability to get involved is shaped by the availability of time, skills, and
money (resources) needed to participate in various time-based, skill-based and money-based
activities (Verba et al. 1995; Brady et al. 1995).
By contrast, the rational choice model emphasizes opportunity costs and benefits. In
this view, rational actors compare the costs of participation with the benefits they expect
to receive (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974). Political
activity only occurs when the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. The fundamental challenge
with the rational choice approach (the so-called “paradox of the rational voter”) is that it
leads to predictions that no one should ever participate, because the odds of any one person
deciding a political outcome through voting, campaign donations, or volunteer work are
extremely low.3
Financial assets could fit into either the resource-based or rational choice explanations
of participation. It is possible that financial assets might both pull and push their owners
toward greater political participation. Scholars claim that financial assets can increase social
1Prior to Verba et al. (1995), the literature referred to the former as the socioeconomic model of partici-
pation. By focusing on resources, Verba and colleagues, in the words of Brady et al. (1995) go “beyond SES”
to explain variance in political participation by showing how resources are distributed differentially among
groups defined by socioeconomic status. This resource-based model explains why socioeconomic status has
traditionally been so powerful in predicting participation.
2Dalton (2000) notes that “this theoretical framework of participation modes has become the common
foundation of participation research” (page 927).
3Rational choice scholars argue, however, that partisanship, group interests, values and preferences can
increase the benefits of participation (Aldrich 1993).
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standing and political influence (Keister 2005; Paxton 2001; Lerman and McKernan 2008;
Sherraden 1991). People with financial assets might be pulled into the political process by
virtue of the social status, visibility, and resources that come with financial assets. Fenno
(1977) contends legislative representatives have multiple constituencies that vary in prox-
imity and influence. Assets may pull their owner into the orbit of political actors. Indeed,
Miler (2007) finds that time-constrained legislators focus their efforts on politically active
and resource-rich constituents.
It is also possible that financial assets also might compel investors to become more active
in the political process. Investors presumably have a strong vested interest to protect and
enhance the value of their assets. Investors may want to ensure that political institutions
will protect the future value of their current financial investments (Bates 2001). Investors
have strong incentives to support policies consistent with their tangible financial interests
(Kahneman et al. 1999). It is possible that financial investment can lead to greater awareness
of economic issues that affect the value of investments. This initial interest in financial issues
might “switch on” a related interest in political processes that shape economic policies
(Roberts 1990). Nonetheless, I expect that under most circumstances financial assets have
no effect on political participation.
5.2 Prior research
A large literature finds that political participation generally increases with income (Campbell
et al. 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Leighley 1995). People
with greater financial resources not only are more engaged in the political process, but
“typically have more at stake in a variety of policy areas” (Campbell 2002, p. 565). For
example, Verba et al. (1995) found that political activists tend to have higher incomes
than the specific population or interest groups that they represent. Financial resources are
cited as a principal explanation for the disparity in rates of participation between men and
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women. Schlozman et al. (1994) argued that if the gender income gap was closed women’s
overall levels of political participation would be closer to men, especially with regards to
financial contributions. Cho (1999) found that although certain socioeconomic factors (e.g.
education) do not explain participation of certain immigrant sub-populations, higher income
is a significant predictor of participation among Asian Americans and Latinos. Leighley and
Vedlitz (1999) reached similar conclusions about the effect of income on participation among
African Americans, Mexican Americans and whites.
Despite these general findings, Verba et al. (1995) found that household income has a
very small direct effect on voting and time-based political acts such as contacting public
officials, working on a campaign or volunteering to work on community issues.4 The only
area where financial resources appears to make a substantively large effect is financial contri-
butions to candidates or political parties. Thus, it appears that income is a proxy for other
factors that affect the proclivity to participate. Moreover, the effect of income appears to
be asymmetrical. Income appears to have the greatest influence on people without a college
education, and has a relative threshold effect for those with college degrees (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980, p. 25).5
Income, however, is only one form of financial resource. Money can take the form of
income or wealth. Income is the flow of resources through a household. It is measured by
wages and salaries from work, government transfers and investment income (Keister 2005).
Wealth, however, is the stock of assets stored up for future consumption (Sherraden 1991;
Shapiro 2001; Nam et al. 2008). Financial wealth is the value of liquid assets such as stocks
and mutual funds. The value of these stored up assets is their potential to be converted into
4For example, the effect of education on participation in time-based acts is twice as large than income;
the effect of civic skills and political interest are four times as great. With regards to voting, the effect of
religious attendance, political interest, and partisan strength were three to six times greater than household
income (Verba et al. 1995, p. 358).
5In 2005 dollars, a household income of $35,000 to $46,662 increases the probability of voting for someone
without a college degree by roughly 13 percentage points. Increases of income above $46,667 for college
graduates and $70,000 for non-college graduates do not substantially increase the likelihood, respectively,
that people with a college degree or with less education will vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Officer
and Williamson 2009).
117
something else (e.g. power, influence, votes, etc.). This potential creates social and political
opportunities and thus arguably is a more encompassing measure of financial resources than
the standard socioeconomic measure of income (Shapiro 2001; Keister 2005). Moreover,
assets and income often are used for different purposes (Conley 1999; Keister 2005). Indi-
viduals likely make decisions about campaign contributions based on their savings rather
than current income. Few people, however, likely save up assets with the goal of making
campaign contributions. More common are long-term goals like retirement, education, or
major purchases. Therefore, the decision to use some of these saved-up assets for politi-
cal purposes potentially is driven by distinct motivations than contributions from current
income (Keister 2005; Nam et al. 2008).
5.3 Data
To ascertain the causal effect of financial assets on political participation, I focus on the
effects of change in financial asset ownership on subsequent change in participation. The
important question is whether acquisition of financial assets has any effect upon the level of
participation in the political process. I use longitudinal data from the American National
Election Studies (ANES), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and the National
Child Development Study (NCDS). Since the methodology described in Chapter 3 creates
treatment groups without reference to political behavior, I use the same treated and control
groups described in Chapter Four to investigate the causal effect of financial assets on partic-
ipation. Once again the interventions are stock market investments for the ANES matched
groups, stocks and mutual funds for the NCDS groups, and stocks, mutual funds and PEP
accounts for the BHPS groups. Information about asset values is limited to the NCDS data
set.
The pre- and post-tests for the interventions in this chapter are measures of political
participation. I follow Verba et al. (1995) to construe participation broadly as four different
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measures: voting in national elections, political party activity, political party membership,
and participation in voluntary organizations. Each of these variables is operationalized as
a dichotomous variable; a subject either engaged in that particular activity or not. Voting
and political party membership are straightforward; coding is defined by whether a subject
engaged in that act or not. For political party activity and voluntary groups, each subject
is coded as a 1 if they indicate they are regularly active in that organization; otherwise they
are coded as a 0. Pre-tests, post-tests, treatments, and treatment periods for voting are
indicated in Table 5.1 below. I have voting data for all three data sets. Unfortunately, pre-
and post-test data for the other measures of participation in this chapter are limited to the
BHPS data sets. The pre-test for non-voting forms of participation is from 1994 and two
post-tests are from 2001 and 2005.
Table 5.1: Pre-tests and post-tests of voting behavior
ANES BHPS NCDS
Pre-test 2000 1987, 1992 1979
Post-test 2002 2001, 2005 1997, 2001
Treatment period 2000-2002 1995-2000 1981-1991
Treatment indicators Stock market Stocks, Stocks,
investments mutual funds, PEP mutual funds
Notes: ANES=American National Election Studies; BHPS=British
Household Panel Study; NCDS=National Child Development Study.
5.4 Voting
In this section, I investigate the effect of acquisition of financial assets on voting behavior.
Tables 5.2 to 5.4 provide descriptive statistics of reported voter turnout by treatment group
in the ANES, NCDS and BHPS data sets. The first observation is the unusually high rate
of voting in both the U.S. and British data sets. In Table 5.2 roughly 80% of the treated
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and control groups reported voting in the 2000 national elections; over sixty percent of both
treatment groups reported voting in the 2002 congressional elections. This is much higher
reported turnout than the roughly half of eligible Americans who actually voted in U.S.
national elections; the nearly 57% of Americans who turned out for the 2008 presidential
election was the highest level of voter turnout in forty years (Infoplease 2008). British
turnout in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 also appears inflated. In Britain three-quarters of eligible
voters traditionally participated in national parliamentary elections, but for the General
Elections in 2001 and 2005 turnout decreased to around sixty percent (UK Political Info
2009).
Table 5.2: Voting in U.S. national elections in 2000 and 2002, stock market investment
treatment, weighted percentages
Treated Control
N=92 N=77
2000 0.84 0.79
2002 0.68 0.61
Source: American National Election Studies.
Table 5.3: Voting in British General Elections in 1979, 1997 and 2001, stocks and mutual
funds treatments, weighted percentages
Stocks Mutual Funds
Treated Control Treated Control
N=1498 N=1725 N=379 N=609
1979 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.71
1997 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.81
2001 0.82 0.76 0.84 0.79
Source: National Child Development Study.
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Table 5.4: Voting in British General Elections 1987-2005, stocks, mutual funds and PEP
treatments, weighted percentages
Stocks Funds PEP
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=789 N=707 N=353 N=338 N=532 N=486
1987 0.87 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.91
1992 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.88
2001 0.77 0.73 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.79
2005 0.80 0.77 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.84
Source: British Household Panel Study.
There are two possible explanations for these differences. First, scholars have long noted
the disparity in survey-based reports of voting behavior and actual turnout (Campbell et al.
1960; Burden 2000; McDonald 2003). People tend to report higher individual levels of
voting behavior than supported by aggregate measures of turnout. Second, it is possible
these higher percentages of turnout could somehow be an artifice of the matching process.
The genetic matching process described in Chapter 3 keeps all treated cases and creates
a matched control group based on predictors of asset ownership. It is possible that the
matched groups have higher levels of participation than one would ordinarily find in a more
representative pool.
Voting turnout appears relatively comparable between treated and control groups in each
of these data sets regardless of treatment type. In no case is there ever more than a difference
of seven percentage points in voter turnout across treatment groups for either the American
or British data sets. However, an interesting pattern emerges from these summary data. In
almost every instance the turnout rate in the pre-test is higher for the treated group than the
control group in Table 5.4 (the sole standout is the PEP treatment in the BHPS data set).
Given that these treatment groups were pre-processed without any reference to political
participation, this suggests that perhaps an important predictor of political participation
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was omitted in the matching process (see Table 3.3). However, this slight gap in initial
turnout (roughly 3% to 6% in the ANES and NCDS groups and 1% to 4% in the BHPS
groups) does not appear to grow substantially after the treatment period (approximately 5%
to 7% in the ANES and NCDS groups and 2% to 3% in the BHPS groups). In summary,
although there are some small differences between treatment groups, I find no significant
pattern in difference in the percentage of voting before and after intervention.
Next, I turn to investigation of the causal effects of financial asset acquisition on voting
behavior. I estimate a series of logistic regressions of the post-test (voting after treatment)
on the treatment indicator (financial asset) and the pre-test (voting prior to treatment). The
principal summary statistic again is the risk ratio; the probability of voting if financial assets
were acquired divided by the probability of voting if assets were not acquired. A risk ratio
greater than two is needed for minimal evidence of a causal effect; three or higher is needed
for convincing evidence of a causal effect. By contrast, a risk ratio of one means there is
no difference between treatment groups.6 I begin with analysis of the American data set,
which has a relatively short treatment period of two years. Table 5.5 presents the results of
logistic regression of acquisition of stock market investments on voting. The coefficient on
investments is not significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the risk ratio falls well below two. I
find no evidence of any effect of acquisition of stock market investments between 2000-2002
on voting behavior in the 2002 U.S. congressional elections. There is no apparent short-term
effect of acquisition of stock market investments on voting.
6I also provide simulated 95% confidence intervals to represent the uncertainty of my estimates. Similar
to confidence intervals regarding the null hypothesis, a confidence interval that includes one means that
regardless of the size of the risk ratio there is the possibility that the true risk ratio is one.
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Table 5.5: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of stock market investments from 2000-2002 on voting behavior in
U.S. congressional elections in 2002
Intercept -2.003
(0.849)*
Investments 0.281
(0.444)
Vote 2000 3.038
(0.818)**
RRa 1.121
RR 95% CIb (0.835,1.531)
N 169
Source: American National Election Studies.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000
simulations of five multiply imputed data
sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
Next I turn to the two British data sets. Table 5.6 summarizes the estimates of the
effect of acquisition of stocks and mutual funds on the vote in the 1997 and 2001 British
parliamentary elections using the NCDS data sets. The 1997 General Election witnessed
the historic return of the Labour Party to government after eighteen years in opposition.
Roughly sixty percent of the British electorate participated in the 2001 General Election,
the first time in the previous fifty-five years in which turnout was below 70% (UK Political
Info 2009). The coefficient on mutual funds does not reach the 5% level for voting in 1997
or 2001 (columns one and three). Although stocks reaches the 5% level for the vote in the
1997 General Election (column two), the risk ratio is roughly one for this model, as it is
for all of the models in Table 5.6. The acquisition of stocks and mutual funds in the 1980s
apparently had no effect on subsequent voting behavior in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
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Table 5.6: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of acquisition of stocks and mutual funds from 1981-1991 on voting behavior in
British General Elections in 1997 and 2001
Vote 1997 Vote 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.923 0.709 -0.427 -0.727
(0.165)** (0.086)** (0.223) (0.121)**
Mutual funds -0.063 0.395
(0.175) (0.213)
Stocks 0.220 0.261
(0.106)* (0.131)
Vote 1979 0.763 0.991 0.645 0.586
(0.183)** (0.102)** (0.219)** (0.121)**
Vote 1997 1.814 2.091
(0.289)** (0.111)**
RRa 0.988 1.039 1.061 1.047
RR 95% CIb (0.925,1.048) (1.001,1.073) (0.999,1.133) (1.000,1.087)
N 988 3223 988 3223
Source: National Child Development Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data
sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
Table 5.7 summarizes the results for the BHPS data set. The coefficients for each treat-
ment type fail to reach the 5% level for any of the treatments. Moreover, the risk ratio
is roughly one in each case. Acquisition of stocks, mutual funds, or PEP accounts in the
late 1990s had no appreciable effect on voting behavior in the 2001 or 2005 parliamentary
elections.
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Table 5.7: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression of acquisition of stocks,
mutual funds and PEP accounts from 1995-2000 on voting behavior in British General Elections in 2001 and 2005
Vote 2001 Vote 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.227 -0.664 -0.740 -1.144 -1.281 -1.271
(0.293) (0.195)** (0.261)** (0.336)** (0.218)** (0.392)**
Mutual funds -0.078 0.226
(0.211) (0.252)
Stocks 0.184 0.065
(0.137) (0.155)
PEP 0.299 -0.031
(0.172) (0.222)
Vote 1987 0.527 0.985 1.274 1.116 0.632 1.530
(0.354) (0.218)** (0.326)** (0.596) (0.251)* (0.448)**
Vote 1992 1.010 1.14 1.14 0.358 1.022 0.148
(0.341)** (0.190)** (0.290)** (0.616) (0.222)** (0.425)
Vote 2001 2.187 1.950 2.289
(0.250)** (0.161)*** (0.280)**
RRa 0.988 1.044 1.053 1.020 1.025 0.997
RR 95% CIb (0.918,1.06) (0.982,1.109) (0.993,1.117) (0.957,1.086) (0.972,1.080) (0.936,1.057)
N 691 1496 1018 691 1496 1018
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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The use of dichotomous treatment indicators overlooks the possibility that participation
might be influenced by asset values. People with larger portfolios might have greater in-
centives to vote. To analyze this possibility I re-estimated the logistic regressions for the
NCDS matched groups with dummy variables for £5,000, £25,000, £50,000 and £100,000.7
Table 5.8 summarizes the results of these estimates. I limit presentation to those results in
which inclusion of the asset value dummy results in a p-value less than or equal to 0.05 for
the coefficient of the treatment indicator.8 In every case the risk ratio is approximately one,
indicating no greater likelihood of voting in the treated group than the control group. The
data provide no evidence that the value of financial assets had any effect on voting behavior.
7As noted earlier, I only have asset values for the NCDS data set.
8The mutual fund treatment did not yield any estimate that met this threshold.
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Table 5.8: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression of acquisition of stocks
from 1981-1991 on voting behavior in British General Elections in 1997 and 2001, controlling for asset value
Vote 1997 Vote 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.708 0.708 0.709 -0.729 -0.730 -0.731
(0.086)** (0.086)** (0.086)** (0.121)** (0.121)** (0.121)**
Stocks 0.227 0.225 0.220 0.279 0.282 0.275
(0.108)* ( 0.107)* (0.107)* (0.130)* (0.129)* (0.133)*
£25,000 -0.121 -0.324
(0.333) (0.366)
£50,000 -0.127 -0.516
(0.392) (0.388)
£100,000 0.030 -0.644
(0.551) (0.561)
Vote 1979 0.991 0.991 0.990 0.589 0.590 0.591
(0.102)** (0.102)** (0.102)** (0.122)** (0.122)** (0.122)**
Vote 1997 2.092 2.092 2.093
(0.112)** (0.112)** (0.122)**
RRa 1.040 1.040 1.039 1.050 1.050 1.050
RR 95% CIb (1.003,1.076) (1.003,1.078) (1.003,1.081) (1.007,1.092) (1.008,1.092) (1.002,1.094)
Asset threshold £25,000 £50,000 £100,000 £25,000 £50,000 £100,000
N 3223 3223 3223 3223 3223 3223
Source: National Child Development Study
Notes: Standard error in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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5.5 Other forms of participation
In this section I examine the effect of acquisition of financial assets on other modes of political
participation: active involvement in political party activities, political party membership,
and voluntary service groups. Valid causal inference requires that pre- and post-tests for
these measures be administered clearly outside of the treatment period. Unfortunately, the
NCDS data set does not offer any pre-tests for measures of political participation. Although
the ANES offers valid pre-tests, I cannot be sure whether the post-tests occurred after the
“intervention” of asset ownership. Thus, I limit my empirical investigation to the BHPS
matched groups for which I can clearly establish that pre- and post-tests occurred outside
of the treatment period of 1995-2000.
Tables 5.9 through 5.11 summarize the rates of participation in each of these activities
by treatment group prior to and after the treatment period (1995-2000).9 The immediate
observation is the relatively low level of participation in these different activities. In contrast
with the remarkably high level of voting in the British matched groups, Tables 5.9 and 5.10
show that precious few are involved directly with British political parties.10 Similarly low
numbers report regular involvement in voluntary service organizations in Table 5.11. No
discernible difference is detectable prior to and after the intervention of asset ownership
across treatment groups.
9These are simple averages of five multiply imputed data sets.
10Nonetheless, roughly 30% to 40% of the people in these groups reported support for one of the two
major British political parties over this time period. See Table 4.1.
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Table 5.9: Active political party participation 1994-2005 by treatment type, weighted per-
centages
Stocks Funds PEP
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=789 N=707 N=353 N=338 N=532 N=486
1994 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
2001 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01
2005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Table 5.10: Political party membership 1994-2005 by treatment type, weighted percentages
Stocks Funds PEP
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=789 N=707 N=353 N=338 N=532 N=486
1994 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03
2001 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.02
2005 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Table 5.11: Active participation in voluntary groups 1994-2005 by treatment type, weighted
percentages
Stocks Funds PEP
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=789 N=707 N=353 N=338 N=532 N=486
1994 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.06
2001 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
2005 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05
Source: British Household Panel Study.
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To ascertain the causal effect of asset ownership on these various measures of political
participation, I estimate a series of logistic regressions of the post-test measure of partic-
ipation on the treatment indicator and relevant pre-tests. The results of these estimates
are included in Tables 5.12 to 5.14. Table 5.12 summarizes the estimate of the regression
analysis of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts on political party participation. In al-
most every case, the risk ratio fails to reach two. In column six, the risk ratio reaches 2.443
for PEP accounts for the post-test in 2005, however, the 95% confidence interval includes
one, indicating the possibility of no difference between treated and control groups.11 Thus,
I cannot conclude that financial assets had any effect on active involvement with political
parties.
Moving on to political party membership, in Table 5.13 I find no effect for financial
assets. The coefficients on financial assets falls below the 5% level for all of the models.
Finally, in Table 5.14 I find no evidence of any effect of financial assets on participation in
voluntary groups. The coefficients for financial assets does not reach the 5% level for any
of the models. Further, the risk ratio fails to reach the threshold of two for stocks, mutual
funds and PEP accounts for both the 2001 and 2005 post-tests. In summary, I do not find
any evidence that acquisition of financial assets has any effect on political participation.
11Further, the coefficient on the PEP accounts fails to reach the 5% level.
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Table 5.12: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression of acquisition of stocks,
mutual funds and PEP accounts from 1995-2000 on political party participation in 2001 and 2005
Party 2001 Party 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -4.980 -3.903 -4.767 -4.247 -4.54 -4.842
(0.468)** (0.376)** (0.577)** (0.359)** (0.485)** (0.605)**
Stocks 0.157 -0.260
(0.523) (0.530)
Mutual funds 0.080 0.198
(0.496) (0.573)
PEP 0.098 0.693
(0.639) (0.697)
Party 1994 4.108 4.255 4.806 2.195 0.946 1.422
(0.566)** (0.602)** (0.639)** (0.862)* (0.896) (0.986)
Party 2001 2.202 3.591 2.484
(0.807)** (0.703)** (0.091)**
RRa 1.335 1.209 1.324 0.874 1.420 2.443
RR 95% CIb (0.430,3.231) (0.421,2.752) (0.346,3.607) (0.309,2.103) (0.406,3.646) (0.564,6.942)
N 691 1496 1018 691 1496 1018
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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Table 5.13: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression of acquisition of stocks,
mutual funds and PEP accounts from 1995-2000 on political party membership in 2001 and 2005
Party Member 2001 Party Member 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -4.305 -3.700 -4.446 -4.452 -4.106 -4.416
(0.317)** (0.352)** (0.440)** (0.424)** (0.482)** (0.592)**
Stocks 0.366 0.029
(0.361) (0.448)
Mutual funds -0.306 -0.007
(0.476) (0.566)
PEP 0.628 -0.112
(0.428) (0.592)
Party Member 1994 4.233 4.855 4.508 1.785 2.229 1.393
(0.369)** (0.494)** (0.422)** (0.700)* (0.756)** (0.698)*
Party Member 2001 4.019 3.952 3.996
(0.486)** (0.582)** (0.681)**
RRa 1.521 0.823 2.023 1.123 1.146 1.052
RR 95% CIb (0.733,2.851) (0.303,1.799) (0.830,4.226) (0.450,2.332) (0.356,2.851) (0.336,2.875)
N 1496 691 1018 1496 691 1018
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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Table 5.14: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression of acquisition of stocks,
mutual funds and PEP accounts from 1995-2000 on voluntary group participation in 2001 and 2005
Volunteer 2001 Volunteer 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -3.600 -3.115 -3.109 -3.129 -3.401 -3.691
(0.233)** (0.264)** (0.235)** (0.193)** (0.329)** (0.281)**
Stocks 0.191 -0.119
(0.291) (0.300)
Mutual funds -0.214 0.063
(0.361) (0.391)
PEP 0.309 0.226
(0.272) (0.343)
Volunteer 1994 2.09 2.601 2.36 0.827 1.879 0.226
(0.343)** (0.408)** (0.294)** (0.497) (0.513)** (0.343)
Volunteer 2001 2.023 1.991 2.37
(0.386)** (0.477)** (0.396)**
RRa 1.250 0.863 1.381 0.925 1.137 1.308
RR 95% CIb (0.697,2.077) (0.416,1.579) (0.821,2.194) (0.524,1.494) (0.524,2.177) (0.668,2.318)
N 1496 691 1018 1496 691 1018
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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5.6 Summary
This chapter empirically examined the claim that acquisition of financial assets—stocks and
mutual funds—shapes political participation. The investor class theory claims that financial
asset ownership increases incentives for voting. The asset effect theory makes similar claims,
arguing that asset ownership increases opportunity and motivation to engage in the political
process. I used survey data from the United States and Britain over a twenty-year period
starting in the early 1980s to investigate these claims. In sum, the evidence supports my
hypothesis that investment in the stock market has no causal effect on voting or other forms
of political participation.
These findings support the contention of Verba et al. (1995) that financial resources have
weak effects on participation. Voting is a relatively costless political act and in contrast to
other forms of participation requires no special resources. The fact that any single vote is
unlikely to affect the outcome of an election means that at the individual level voting is
instrumentally irrational (Bohanon and Van Cott 2002). The individual bears the “cost”
of going to the polls and voting even though she most likely could enjoy the same electoral
outcome by “free riding.” Thus, voting behavior apparently cannot be explained by financial
assets since in a democratic system everyone has one vote regardless of the size of their stock
portfolio. “What matters most for going to the polls is not the resources at voters’ disposal,
but rather, their civic orientations, especially their interest in politics” (Verba et al. 1995,
p. 361).
Financial assets also were unimportant for party membership or activity. Assets also
had no effect on civic engagement in voluntary groups. The findings in this chapter support
my argument that financial assets have no effect on political participation. These results
also support conclusions of the self-interest literature that personal finances have relatively
little effect on political behavior. As Dalton (2000) suggests, the fact that people participate
politically at all suggests that more than pure economic rationalization is at play.
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Chapter 6
Attitudes
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I investigate the effect of acquisition of financial assets on political attitudes.
The investor class theory claims that people’s political attitudes and preferences change
after they acquire financial assets. Over time new investors begin to prefer pro-market and
“investor-friendly” policies believed to protect and enhance their stock market investments
(Nadler 2005; Ponnuru 2004). Further, as people become more involved in managing their
own investments, they become more wary of government attempts to direct or redistribute
their financial assets. The asset effect theory claims that acquisition of financial assets leads
to greater political interest (Paxton 2001; Lerman and McKernan 2008). In this chapter I
empirically evaluate these claims regarding political interest and attitudes toward economic
policies. I hypothesize that acquisition of financial assets has no effect on political attitudes.
Attitudes are summary evaluations of psychological objects, which are “anything that
people can like or dislike, wish to protect or to harm, want to acquire or to reject” (Kahneman
et al. 1999, p. 205). Political objects can be abstract (parties, policies, institutions, events)
or concrete (people) (Petty et al. 1997; Ajzen 2001). Accordingly, financial assets such as
stocks and mutual funds are valid psychological objects. People form beliefs about objects
based on relevant data about their characteristics: “good-bad, harmful-beneficial, pleasant-
unpleasant, and likeable-unlikeable” (Ajzen 2001, p. 28). Beliefs are probability distributions
of possible characteristics of objects, i.e. “the subjective values of the object’s attributes in
interaction with the strength of the associations” (Ajzen 2001, p. 30). Attitudes are based
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in part on beliefs about the desirability of these object attributes (Katz 1960; Fishbein
and Ajzen 1972).1 Expressions of attitudes include statements of approval or disapproval,
financial contributions, and answers to survey questions (Kahneman et al. 1999).
Katz (1960) proposes four functions of attitudes, one of which is the “adjustment” or
“utilitarian” function.2 Attitude toward an object (such as financial assets) is derived from
its perceived utility. Clarity, consistency, and immediateness of costs and benefits as they
relate to an individual’s actions help to shape utilitarian attitudes. “The closer these objects
are to actual need satisfaction and the more they are clearly perceived as relevant to need
satisfaction, the greater are the probabilities of positive attitude formation” (Katz 1960, p.
171). Lockerbie (2008) contends that money is a basic resource needed to fulfill a variety of
daily human activities. “Like election is for politicians, financial well-being is a prerequisite
for many of the goals we citizens have” (page 3). So we can safely argue that financial assets
such as stocks and mutual funds are non-trivial objects.3
In theory, acquisition of financial assets could affect the evaluation of attributes of politi-
cal objects, such as political parties or policies. Re-evaluation of these objects in turn would
reshape attitudes, preferences and behavior. Figure 6.1 depicts this relationship between
attitudes, beliefs, preferences and behavior.4 Attitudes are distinguished by their degree of
differentiation. The more beliefs and cognitive items that go into shaping an attitude, the
more difficult it is to change (Katz 1960). Thus, there is no guaranteed effect of the singular
1Psychologists find that attitudes have both affective (emotional) and cognitive (belief) bases (Petty et al.
1997).
2The other three major functions are ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge. The utilitarian
function is grounded in the reward-punishment thesis upon which self-interest and rational choice theory is
based (see section 2.4.1). Simply put, people seek to maximize rewards and minimize penalties. Campbell
et al. (1960) refer to this as “primitive self-interest” (p. 205).
3Sears notes that money can have positive or negative connotations, prompting attitudes in favor of
acquisition of more money, shame about not having enough money, or the belief that money is morally evil
(Sears 1997, p. 495).
4This linkage between attitudes and behavior is complex. Leighley (1995) contends that attitudes some-
times are shaped by behavior; political activity sometimes can shape attitudes where none existed prior to
the activity (e.g. protests). Katz (1960) argues that two people with similar attitudes may differ in their
behavior. For example, two political party supporters may require different degrees of external motivation
to get to the polls on election day.
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act of investing in stocks or mutual funds on extant political attitudes. Furthermore, atti-
tude change can occur in a variety of ways. The acquisition of new information about objects
can result in replacement or overwriting of previous attitudes (Ajzen 2001; Druckman and
Lupia 2000). Attitudes can be completely reversed or partially changed. Preferences and
behavior can be affected (or not) in a variety of ways.
Figure 6.1: The relationship between attitudes and behavior.
Kahneman et al. (1999) note that people’s attitudes toward objects and their actions that
affect these objects are usually consistent. In other words, it is not unreasonable to expect
investors to support positions and policies that they believe will protect their investments.
However, the manner in which an object is framed can result in separate attitudes toward
the same object (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Druckman 2001, 2004).5 This means we
can not predict in advance political behavior based on separate attitudes toward multiple
objects such as financial investments and politics (Kahneman et al. 1999, p. 206).
5This is consistent with findings that attitudes can be primed based on perceived self-interest (Sears and
Funk 1991; Chong et al. 2001).
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Attitude change occurs more readily when people realize that they can more easily achieve
their objectives by updating their current attitudes (Katz 1960). In order for people to
change utilitarian-based attitudes, however, one of two conditions must exist. Either the
individual’s current attitude and associated activities no longer provide the same level of
satisfaction, or her aspirations have been elevated. Katz notes that changes in political
behavior based on the utilitarian function may be difficult without sufficient motivation.
“Attitudes toward political parties and voting behavior are often difficult to change if there
is no widespread dissatisfaction with economic conditions” (Katz 1960, p. 177). The question
therefore is whether acquisition of financial assets provides sufficient stimulus for attitudinal
change.
6.2 Prior research
Di Tella et al. (2007) describe a natural experiment from Argentina that offers tentative
support for the idea that asset ownership can shape attitudes. In 1981, approximately 1,800
families occupied a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires and sub-divided the land into small
parcels. These families believed that the land belonged to the state at the time of the
occupation. Subsequently, it was discovered that the land in fact was comprised of thirteen
privately-held tracts. In 1984, a law was passed to expropriate the private owners’ land for
redistribution to the squatters. Land owners of eight tracts quickly accepted government
terms, while owners of the other five tracts disputed the level of compensation through the
courts. One of these five disputes was resolved in 1998.
As a result, some squatters received early property rights (early treated), others received
property rights later on (late treated), and others did not receive property rights at all
(control group). Each of the treatment groups on average had identical demographic char-
acteristics. None could have known in advance what the outcome of their expropriation of
seemingly “public” lands would be several years later nor predict which treatment group
138
they would be in. The relative weakness of property rights in Argentina makes this an es-
pecially interesting case. If people do not expect that the government is capable or willing
to protect their property rights, holding legal title to the land should make little difference
to their attitudes or behavior.
Di Tella et al. (2007) surveyed a random selection of households from each group to
examine the effect of property ownership on beliefs across these treatment groups. These
scholars found that households in both the early and late treatment groups had statistically
significant different beliefs about self-efficacy, meritocracy, and materialism from those in
the control group. Compared to the untitled group, property owners had stronger beliefs in
individualism and materialism, and professed greater support for merit-based advancement.
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2009) found these households substantially increased investment
in their property, had smaller household sizes, and invested more in the education of their
children compared to the control group.
The scant research on the effects of financial assets on attitudes offers mixed findings.
Doherty et al. (2006) found that lottery winnings increased support for elimination of the
estate tax but had no effect on general attitudes of lottery winners about income redistri-
bution. Bynner (2001) analyzed data from the National Child Development Study to study
the effect of financial investments on political attitudes. He found a positive effect of invest-
ments on political interest for both men and women and a negative effect of investments on
“political cynicism” for women (but no effect for men).6 Davis (2009) analyzed data from
the 2004 American National Election Study to compare differences between investors and
non-investors on a range of economic issues. Outside of significant differences in support for
tax cuts and Social Security privatization, he found no support for the claims of investor class
proponents. “Shareholders, in short, were not doctrinaire devotees of free market policies,
and were largely indistinguishable from non-shareholders on a range of attitudinal issues”
6Cynicism is measured on an attitudinal scale based on answers to the following questions: “politicians
are mainly in politics for their own benefit”; “none of the political parties would do anything to benefit me”;
and, “it does not make much difference which political party is in power.”
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(Davis 2009, p. 221).
Researchers quite consistently find that self-interest does not have an effect on political
attitudes. Sears and colleagues examined a range of issues on which we would expect to find
evidence of self-interest effects: race, violence and economics. These analysts not only found
that attitudes of white Americans regarding forced busing, affirmative action and bilingual
education cannot be explained by self-interest, but in fact are better explained by general
attitudes of racial intolerance (Sears and Funk 1990a, 1991). These large-N studies were
further corroborated by Green and Cowden (1992) who found no effect of self-interest on
attitudes of white Americans on forced busing in Boston and Louisville in the 1970s. Sears
and Funk (1991) reported that having a personal concern about safety explained only 0.4
percent of the variance in general support for law and order policies.7 Researchers found
that people with friends and relatives serving in the military during the Vietnam War were
no more opposed to the war than their peers who did not have this very personal connection
(Sears et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1990a).
These studies also did not find an effect of economic self-interest on political attitudes.
Sears and Funk (1991) found “economic discontent” (both subjective and objective measures
of family finances) had no effect on attitudes regarding state tax and spending cuts. More-
over, public employees and recipients of government services, who purportedly should have
direct interests in issues that affect the public sector, showed very limited additional support
for the government sector compared to people without similar interests. Kinder and Sears
(1985) found that people whose lives were disrupted during the energy shortages of 1974 in
the United States were no more likely to support policies concerning energy conservation or
development of new energy sources than those whose lives were unaffected by the energy
crisis that year.
Kramer (1983) argues these types of negative findings are artifactual given that the gov-
7Operationalized as recent crime victims and individuals who reported fear of walking in their neighbor-
hoods at night.
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ernment is responsible for little of what affects people’s daily material well-being. Indeed,
there appear to be three exceptions to these general non-findings. First, researchers found
evidence of self-interest effects on political attitudes when there are clear, substantial indi-
vidual costs and benefits. Kramer (1983) suggests that government-induced and politically
relevant issues are more likely to elicit self-interest effects on political attitudes. The best
economic example is taxes; survey-based and experimental studies show consistent effects
of self-interest on attitudes regarding taxes, especially when a political solution is clearly
provided (Sears and Funk 1991). Analysts found that people who feel particularly burdened
by taxes or expect to benefit substantially from tax-reduction measures exhibit greater sup-
port for tax-cutting policies (Sears and Funk 1990b). Green and Gerken (1989) also found
that self-interest played a decisive role in their study of attitudes regarding smoking restric-
tions and cigarette taxes. Smokers and non-smokers generally are indistinguishable on their
political views, but sharply diverge on issues concerning cigarettes.
Second, severe and ambiguous threats also can motivate self-interest. These are cases
which combine considerable uncertainty about outcomes and significant individual costs. For
example, Sears and Funk (1991) show that public employees in Massachusetts and California
were much more opposed to state tax and spending referenda in the late 1970s than other
voters. Presumably, the uncertainty public employees felt about their future welfare in the
face of state spending cuts evoked a significant self-interest effect on their attitudes toward
these polices.8 Similarly, white opposition to forced busing in Los Angeles, California in
the 1970s was motivated by self-interest only during the uncertain period between the court
mandate for busing and the announcement of a specific implementation plan (Sears and
Funk 1991, p. 51).
Third, self-interest can manifest when it is politically activated. Sears and Funk (1990a)
found that support for President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s was stimulated in part by direct
8This is a limited and focused effect. In general, the attitudes of these same public employees toward the
public sector are indistinguishable from those of the general public.
141
appeal to voters’ economic self-interests. This was a deliberate strategy during Reagan’s
entire time in office. Chong et al. (2001) similarly found that self-interest effects can be
activated when people are “primed” to recognize and act upon individual costs and benefits.
Attitudes about Social Security, mortgage interest deduction, and domestic partner benefits
can be shaped by how the costs and benefits are framed.9 For example, the opinions of
young and old survey respondents (and employed and retired respondents) about Social
Security were significantly different depending upon whether respondents were primed or
not. Opinions converged when primed to take into account the welfare of future generations.
Sears and Funk show that effects of self-interest can be manipulated by the item-order
of survey questions. Placement of questions about personal finances immediately prior to
questions about relevant political attitude questions can create artificially high levels of con-
sistency between these two items (Sears and Funk 1991, p. 48).10 Boninger and colleagues
in a series of studies found that self-interest can influence attitude importance; “one effective
way to convince people to care deeply about political attitudes they hold may be to con-
vince them that their self-interests are at stake” (Boninger et al. 1995, p. 75). Chong and
colleagues reached similar conclusions. “Self-interest is more likely to matter when people
actually have a stake in a policy and can see that they have a stake. Whether they can
recognize those stakes depends upon the transparency of the policy, the clarity with which
the policy is presented to them, and their capacity to understand the implications of the
policy” (Chong et al. 2001, p. 544).
On the whole, however, these effects appear to be narrow and specific. For example,
state public employee opposition to tax and spending cuts in California and Massachusetts
was focused on defense of their jobs and wages, but did not extend to broader support of
9Sears and Funk (1991) note that priming helps to increase the accessibility of a construct such as Social
Security to personal self-interests. However, “in political life information about the self may generally not
be very accessible, because the mass media are our primary sources of information, and their focus is on
national and collective affairs rather than on matters directly relevant to our own lives” (page 9).
10These authors also report higher effects of self-interest in exit polls than in pre-election polls. Voters
apparently rationalize their votes post-elections in ways that are consistent with their interests rather than
the other way around.
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the government sector (Sears and Funk 1990a, 1991).11 Moreover, responses to government
induced economic changes sometimes provoke self-interested attitudes, but more often they
do not as people do not or can not consistently attribute changes in their personal economic
well-being to government actions (Sears and Funk 1991). More recent research continues to
find no effect of self-interest on political attitudes (Lau and Heldman 2009). This accords
with the conclusion of Chong and colleagues that when the stakes and impact of policies are
unclear, people rely on “general political orientation” such as partisanship and ideology to
make political decisions.12
6.3 Data
In this chapter I investigate the effects of change in financial asset ownership on subsequent
change in attitudes. I use data from the British Household Panel Survey, which offer pre-
and post-test data on political attitudes. The interventions are stocks, mutual funds, and
PEP accounts for the BHPS matched groups. The pre- and post-tests for these interven-
tions are measures of political attitudes. In some cases these attitudes are appropriately
operationalized as dichotomous measures (approve-disapprove, yes-no). In other cases, re-
spondents provided three or more possible responses, in which case I elect not to dichotomize
their responses to avoid information loss.
The pre-tests for the BHPS groups (treatment period 1995-2000) are from either 1994
or 1995; post-tests are from 2001, 2003 or 2004. For the dichotomous measures I estimate
binary logistic regression to infer the causal effect of assets on political attitudes. For the
measures with non-binary responses, I estimate ordered logistic regressions. To facilitate
interpretation of these results, I evaluate my findings in terms of risk ratios—the probability
of a given attitude if treated compared to the probability of the same attitude if untreated.
11Sears and Funk (1991) note that taxes prove to be the exception to this general finding. Tax burdens
in one area appear to carryover to negative attitudes toward government spending in other areas.
12Sears and colleagues refer to this as “symbolic politics” (Sears and Funk 1990a, 1991).
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6.4 Political interest
The investor class theory and asset effect theory argue that acquisition of financial assets
increases interest in the political process. I use longitudinal data from the BHPS to test this
proposition. Tables 6.1 to 6.3 provide descriptive statistics of the levels of political interest
prior to and after the acquisition of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts. For stocks
and PEP treatments, a slightly higher percentage of the treated group expressed interest in
politics (fairly interested and very interested) prior to treatment. This raises the possibility
that differences between these two groups may not have been totally purged by the matching
process. The overall level of positive interest in politics (fairly interested and very interested)
in the treated group, however, is largely unchanged in the 2003 post-test. The proportion
of the treated group expressing interest in politics declines for both the stock and PEP
treatments, and increases by roughly two percentage points for mutual fund holders.
Table 6.1: Political interest before and after intervention of stocks treatment, weighted
percentages
1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control
Not at all interested 13.8 18.2 17.3 22.4
Not very interested 33.1 34.5 33.1 32.0
Fairly interested 42.7 39.6 38.3 35.7
Very interested 10.4 7.7 11.3 10.0
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control).
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Table 6.2: Political interest before and after intervention of mutual funds treatment, weighted
percentages
1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control
Not at all interested 10.8 14.0 10.6 15.9
Not very interested 30.9 26.8 28.7 29.5
Fairly interested 47.0 45.8 47.0 39.2
Very interested 11.3 13.5 13.6 15.4
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control).
Table 6.3: Political interest before and after intervention of PEP treatment, weighted per-
centages
1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control
Not at all interested 11.1 12.1 12.0 18.7
Not very interested 30.6 35.5 31.9 35.0
Fairly interested 50.4 43.2 44.8 35.9
Very interested 7.9 9.1 11.3 10.4
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Unweighted N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
To estimate the effect of acquisition of financial assets on political interest I estimate
a series of ordered logistic regressions of the post-test (political interest in 2003) on the
treatment indicator (financial asset) and pre-test (political interest in 1995). Tables 6.4 and
6.5 report the results of these estimates. Table 6.4 presents the point estimates for stocks,
mutual funds, and PEP accounts as well as the predicted change in probabilities of reported
levels of political interest if exposed to the “treatment” of each financial asset. Only the
coefficient for PEP accounts reaches statistical significance in Table 6.4. However, Table 6.5
shows that the risk ratios for PEP accounts (as well as stocks and mutual funds) fails to
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reach the critical threshold of two for any level of political interest. I find weak evidence
that acquisition of financial assets has any causal effect on interest in politics.
Table 6.4: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stocks, mutual funds, and PEP accounts on levels of political interest, 1995-2003
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Independent variables Log odds Not at all Not very Fairly Very
interested interested interested interested
Stocks 0.051 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.107)
Mutual funds 0.205 -0.003 -0.027 0.009 0.021
(0.163)
PEP 0.362 -0.006 -0.053 0.022 0.037
(0.134)**
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds
unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted N=1118
(532 treated, 486 control).
Table 6.5: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from ordered logistic
regressions of stocks, mutual funds, and PEP accounts on levels of political interest, 1995-
2003
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
Attitude RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Not at all interested 0.973 0.783 1.195 0.828 0.597 1.118 0.707 0.544 0.905
Not very interested 0.978 0.825 1.152 0.856 0.656 1.096 0.759 0.616 0.924
Fairly interested 1.004 0.982 1.027 1.013 0.993 1.048 1.033 1.005 1.075
Very interested 1.035 0.851 1.250 1.210 0.906 1.591 1.387 1.094 1.736
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds unweighted N=691
(353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets;
bmean 95% confidence interval.
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6.5 Economic policy
The investor class theory asserts that after people acquire financial assets, over time their
political preferences shift to support more pro-market positions. I test this claim with a
series of questions related to economic issues. Tables 6.6 to 6.9 provide descriptive statistics
on attitudes regarding four free market “acid tests” before and after the acquisition of stocks,
mutual funds and PEP accounts: government provision of employment, role of the private
sector, privatization of public services, and government-imposed earnings limits. If assets
move people toward a pro-market position, I would expect to see some effect of acquisition
of financial assets on attitudes toward these issues. However, I find no significant difference
in Tables 6.6 to 6.9 in percentage point change between the treated and control group for
stocks, mutual funds or tax-privileged PEP accounts before and after the treatment period
(1995-2000) for any of these issues.
147
Table 6.6: Attitudes about whether government has an obligation to provide jobs prior to and after intervention, weighted
percentages
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Agree 44.5 47.0 35.1 36.5 38.2 43.6 27.0 33.4 39.5 45.8 29.3 34.0
Neither 15.7 18.5 18.0 22.6 15.2 17.0 21.5 20.1 14.7 16.8 19.3 23.5
Disagree 39.8 34.5 46.9 40.8 46.6 39.4 51.5 46.5 45.9 37.4 51.4 42.5
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control);
PEP accounts unweighted N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
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Table 6.7: Attitudes about whether “private enterprise solves economic problems” prior to and after intervention, weighted
percentages
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Agree 29.5 21.1 31.9 25.7 39.5 26.6 39.3 30.6 31.4 31.8 33.8 29.9
Neither 36.1 37.0 38.5 42.3 30.4 32.2 40.0 38.5 33.8 29.0 37.9 39.3
Disagree 34.5 42.0 29.7 32.0 30.1 41.2 20.6 30.9 34.8 39.1 28.2 30.7
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control);
PEP accounts unweighted N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
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Table 6.8: Attitudes about whether public services ought to be state-owned prior to and after intervention, weighted percentages
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Agree 48.5 48.9 40.9 40.7 40.2 50.6 33.3 39.9 44.2 50.6 37.9 41.0
Neither 23.4 24.8 27.8 30.2 24.2 21.8 29.3 27.6 22.3 19.1 28.6 29.0
Disagree 28.1 26.4 31.4 29.0 35.6 27.6 37.4 32.6 33.6 30.4 33.5 30.0
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control);
PEP accounts unweighted N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
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Table 6.9: Attitudes about whether the government ought to impose an earnings ceiling prior to and after intervention,
weighted percentages
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Agree 18.8 23.1 16.5 18.3 18.2 21.4 16.2 18.2 18.9 23.0 16.1 22.0
Neither 12.9 11.4 14.0 17.4 11.0 11.4 10.0 17.9 10.8 12.5 14.9 17.5
Disagree 68.3 65.5 69.5 64.3 70.8 67.2 73.8 63.8 70.3 64.5 69.0 60.5
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control);
PEP accounts unweighted N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
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To examine the causal effect of acquisition of financial assets on attitudes, I estimate a
series of ordered logistic regression equations of the post-test (attitude after intervention)
on the treatment indicator (financial assets) and pre-test (attitude prior to intervention).
The results of these estimates are summarized in Tables 6.11 to 6.16. For each question I
separately analyze the causal effect of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts. I present
two tables for each topic. The first table includes the coefficient from the logistic regression
for each asset type as well as the change in predicted probabilities for possible responses to
each question. The second table includes information about the risk ratio, which provides
the clearest indication of the average treatment effect for each attitude.
For each of these “acid tests” of pro-market positions, I find no evidence of an effect of
financial assets. Neither stocks, mutual funds, nor PEP acconts had any effect on attitudes
regarding government provision of employment (Tables 6.11 and 6.10), the role of the private
sector in the economy (Tables 6.13 and 6.12), privatization of public services (Tables 6.15
and 6.14), or government imposition of limits on earnings (Tables 6.17 and 6.16). In each
case, the coefficient for each financial asset does not reach the 5% level, and the risk ratios
fail to reach the critical threshold of two. The empirical evidence provides no support for the
argument that acquisition of financial assets has a causal effect on attitudes toward economic
policy.
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Table 6.10: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stocks, mutual funds, and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether government has
an obligation to provide jobs, 1995-2004
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Indep. variables Log odds Agree Neither Disagree
Stocks 0.108 -0.027 0.008 0.018
(0.111)
Mutual funds 0.133 -0.013 -0.013 0.026
(0.158)
PEP 0.180 -0.045 0.012 0.013
(0.146)
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Table 6.11: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from ordered logistic
regressions of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether gov-
ernment has an obligation to provide jobs, 1995-2004
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
Attitude RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Agree 0.956 0.871 1.047 0.897 0.677 1.168 0.918 0.802 1.047
Neither 1.040 0.964 1.121 0.926 0.761 1.116 1.051 0.976 1.139
Disagree 1.092 0.921 1.285 1.038 0.955 1.129 1.153 0.932 1.410
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds
unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted
N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed
data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 6.12: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stocks, mutual funds, and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether private enterprise
solves economic problems, 1995-2004
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Indep. variables Log odds Agree Neither Disagree
Stocks -0.060 0.007 0.008 -0.015
(0.106)
Mutual funds -0.297 0.033 0.040 -0.073
(0.172)
PEP -0.119 0.011 0.019 -0.030
(0.148)
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Table 6.13: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from ordered logistic
regressions of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether private
enterprise solves economic problems, 1995-2004
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
Attitude RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Agree 1.057 0.884 1.256 1.309 0.974 1.713 1.123 0.865 1.416
Neither 1.021 0.952 1.097 1.104 0.990 1.233 1.055 0.935 1.185
Disagree 0.971 0.872 1.077 0.854 0.710 1.017 0.948 0.834 1.080
Source: British Household Panel Study.
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds
unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted
N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed
data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 6.14: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stocks, mutual funds, and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether public services
should be state-owned, 1995-2004
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Indep.variables Log odds Agree Neither Disagree
Stocks 0.023 -0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.111)
Mutual funds 0.092 -0.023 0.009 0.014
(0.154)
PEP 0.065 -0.014 0.006 0.007
(0.136)
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Table 6.15: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from ordered logistic
regressions of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether public
services should be state-owned, 1995-2003
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
Attitude RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Agree 0.991 0.903 1.087 0.960 0.831 1.100 0.974 0.869 1.087
Neither 1.010 0.930 1.095 1.033 0.931 1.145 1.028 0.928 1.143
Disagree 1.023 0.856 1.212 1.086 0.847 1.371 1.062 0.854 1.311
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds
unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted
N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed
data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 6.16: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stocks, mutual funds, and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether government
should impose an earnings ceiling, 1995-2004
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Indep. variables Log odds Agree Neither Disagree
Stocks 0.145 -0.009 -0.012 0.021
(0.124)
Mutual funds 0.352 -0.023 -0.026 0.050
(0.181)
PEP 0.308 -0.025 -0.027 0.052
(0.144)
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Table 6.17: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from ordered logistic
regressions of stocks, mutual funds and PEP accounts on attitudes regarding whether gov-
ernment should impose an earnings ceiling, 1995-2004
Stocks Mutual Funds PEP
Attitude RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb RRa 95% CIb
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Agree 0.880 0.698 1.093 0.731 0.519 1.000 0.762 0.587 0.974
Neither 0.900 0.746 1.075 0.773 0.584 1.000 0.812 0.666 0.980
Disagree 1.025 0.984 1.069 1.063 1.000 1.131 1.070 1.006 1.139
Source: British Household Panel Study
Notes: Stocks unweighted N=1496 (789 treated, 707 control); mutual funds
unweighted N=691 (353 treated, 338 control); PEP accounts unweighted
N=1118 (532 treated, 486 control).
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed
data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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6.6 Summary
This chapter empirically examined the claim that acquisition of financial assets has a causal
effect on political attitudes. The investor class theory claims that financial asset ownership
shapes political attitudes and leads to shifts toward pro-market policy preferences. The
asset effect theory claims that acquisition of financial assets increases political interest. I
used survey data from Britain in the late 1990s-early 2000s to examine these claims. I find
no evidence to support the claims that investment in the stock market during this period
had any causal effect on political interest, economic attitudes or political self-efficacy.
In previous chapters, I analyzed the effect of asset values on partisanship and participa-
tion. Unfortunately, the BHPS data set does not include asset values, so I cannot rule out
the possibility that people with larger portfolios might have greater political interest and
different views on economic policy. Due to data limitations, this question remains open for
future research. The evidence so far, however, supports my hypothesis that financial assets
have no effect on political attitudes.
These results also provide additional fodder for the self-interest literature, namely that
personal financial well-being has little to no effect on political attitudes. Even on “acid test”
free market issues, financial asset ownership had no obvious effect on attitudes. These find-
ings mirror those of Davis (2009) who likewise finds no effect of stock market investments on
political attitudes. In order for attitudes to be motivated by financial self-interest, investors
need to clearly see the connection between their assets and politics (Chong et al. 2001).
Investments appear to provide insufficient stimulus to reshape political attitudes.
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Chapter 7
Market shocks
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the effect of financial asset ownership on attitudes in the United
States during the 2008 financial crisis. This focus on ownership rather than acquisition of
assets is intentional. The data sets used in this chapter come from cross-sectional surveys
by media organizations conducted from January 2008 through January 2009 described in
Chapter 3. Cross-sectional surveys data do not allow me to define a “treatment period” and
examine change in behavior before and after ownership of financial assets. Nonetheless, I
believe these data sets allow for valid inference insofar that most people reasonably can be
assumed to have not foreseen the major financial crisis that unfolded in 2008.
Although the self-interest literature generally finds individual economic welfare has no
effect on attitudes, there are three notable exceptions. I argue that 2008 incorporates each
of these conditions identified in the literature for self-interest to manifest (Sears and Funk
1991).1 First, the threat of economic meltdown was severe and ambiguous. By the middle of
2008 there were legitimate fears that the United States was in imminent danger of entering
an economic depression. Policymakers scrambled to find ways to avoid catastrophe; the
U.S. Treasury Secretary at one point in September 2008 opined that if Congress didn’t pass
emergency legislation that “we won’t have an economy on Monday.” Second, there were
clear and substantial individual costs and benefits. The stock market dropped by over a
third in 2008. This pain was felt acutely by investors large and small. Finally, self-interest
1Note that the literature finds that only one of these conditions is necessary to prime self-interest.
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was politically activated. The collapse of the stock market and slowdown of the economy
occurred during a presidential election year. By mid-2008 the economy had taken priority
in the political contest over other pressing concerns such as the ongoing wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The Democratic and Republican presidential candidates each appealed directly to
voters’ economic interests. The airwaves were filled with news reports on the financial crisis.
Thus, investors in 2008 arguably were well primed to be influenced by their stock market
portfolios.
The investor class theory predicts that ownership of stocks and mutual funds will compel
investors to support pro-market positions. This theory, however, was developed in response
to the significant growth in household stock market participation in the United States during
the bull market of the 1990s. During the second half of this decade the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average increased over 200%. Many people who jumped into the market did so with
little to no experience or memory of significant downturn in the market. Indeed, the asset
effect theory claims that assets shape the investor’s political behavior in part based on her
expectations of greater assets in the future (Sherraden 1991).
Stock markets, however, go up and down. Neither the investor class theory nor the asset
effect theory indicate what we should expect to happen when markets fall.2 The psychology
literature suggests that the effect of stock market losses on political behavior indeed might
be greater than gains. People frequently weigh losses more heavily than equivalent gains
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). I argue that if financial assets have any effect at all, it is
on political attitudes after significant financial loss. Thus, the 2008 financial crisis offers a
unique opportunity to test for the effect of stock market investments on political behavior.
2At least one supporter of the investor class theory fretted that a significant stock market downturn
might compel investors to seek political safety: “[As] stocks fall, there will be a general drift in the investor
class away from risk and towards security—a drift likely to take them in a Democratic direction” (O’Sullivan
2000).
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7.2 Prior research
Like 2008, the 1973-1974 stock market crash was global in scope and one of the worst
downturns in modern history. In the U.S., the stock market lost 45% of its value; it took
over 20 years for the market to return to pre-crash levels. A number of studies on self-
interest examined political behavior during this period. In addition to the stock market
crash, the United States from 1973-75 experienced an economic recession, stagflation (high
unemployment and high inflation), and a major energy crisis produced by the 1973 OPEC
oil embargo. Despite these severe economic conditions, Feldman (1982) found no effect of
economic self-interest on political attitudes in his analysis of survey data from the 1972-1976
CPS American National Election Study. Kinder and Sears (1985) reported similar results.
People whose lives were disrupted during the energy shortages of 1974 were no more likely
to support energy policies (conservation or new energy sources) than those whose lives were
unaffected by the energy crisis that year.
Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) found virtually no effect of personal economic grievances
(income or unemployment) on voting behavior in U.S. congressional elections in 1974 or
1976.3 Moreover, there was no evidence of economic self-interest on the vote for specific
subgroups more likely to politicize their economic circumstances (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979,
1981).4 Sigelman and Tsai (1981) also did not find evidence that personal finances had
any effect on the presidential vote in 1972 or 1976. Sears et al. (1980) concurred, finding
that self-interest on a range of issues (guaranteed jobs, health insurance, school busing, and
crime) added very little to explain variance in the 1976 presidential vote.5
Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) analyzed data from the General Social Survey from
1972-1993 to study the effect of economic recessions on political and social beliefs during
3The coefficients in their regression equation for 1976 reached statistical significance, but was relatively
small (compared to party identification) and added little to explain the variance in voting in behavior.
4Self-defined working class, union members, independent voters, voters with high political interest, and
voters who identified economic issues as national problems.
5These scholars did, however, find a much greater substantive effect of “symbolic attitudes” (partisanship,
ideology, racial prejudice) on the presidential vote.
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the formative years of 18 to 25. These analysts found that Americans who experience a
recession during this period of their life have lower confidence in national legislative and
executive political institutions. Growing up during a recession, however, had no apparent
effect on political ideology (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2009, p. 11).
7.3 Data
In this chapter I use cross-sectional data to ascertain the causal linkage between financial
assets on political attitudes. Cross-sectional data sets usually are inappropriate for causal
inference as they do not offer information about the outcome variable prior to intervention.
Without some measure of political attitudes prior to acquisition of financial assets I cannot
be certain that my estimates are not “contaminated” by possible confounders or selection
biases. Shadish et al. (2002) suggest that matching is one way to improve the inherent
challenge of this “post-test only” research design. In addition to use of matched groups, I
also attempt to improve upon the weakness of cross-sectional observational data by focusing
on contemporaneous issues that emerged during the financial crisis of 2008. People can
reasonably be considered unbiased in their attitudes about novel policies that respond to an
unforeseen crisis.6 Although I am ignorant about the treatment period, it is reasonable to
expect that respondents in these surveys had no prior beliefs about the specific policies that
developed in response to the rapidly changing political economic environment of 2008.7
I use data from six polls conducted by news media organizations from January 2008
through January 2009. Unlike the longitudinal surveys used in previous chapters, these
surveys represent distinct “snapshots” over this time period. This offers the advantage of
6This approach is somewhat similar to that employed by Doherty et al. (2006) in their use of cross-
sectional data to study lottery winners’ attitudes toward redistribution. The approach in this dissertation
arguably is stronger since I use a control group whereas the lottery study does not.
7This is not to suggest that survey respondents did not have prior attitudes regarding economic policies.
For example, someone who preferred libertarian economic policies likely had prior biases that affected their
evaluation of government policies during the 2008 financial crisis. Nonetheless, I simply make the reasonable
assumption that evaluation of specific policies and government actions occurred contemporaneously and can
inform us about the comparative views of investors and non-investors during a market shock.
161
repeated testing of views about identical or similar issues over time. This allows me to
investigate whether asset ownership had any differential effect on attitudes at various points
in time as the crisis evolved during the year. The trade-off, however, is that results from
these data sets are not directly comparable since the subject pool in each survey is unique.
I try to address this concern through propensity score matching, which creates matched
groups based on their propensity for financial asset ownership. The treatment indicator
for each of these surveys is stock market investments (stocks or mutual funds, inside or
outside of retirement accounts) derived from a generic question about household ownership
of investments.8 This means that as much as possible the treatment groups across surveys
are similar in their propensity to own stock market investments.
Compared to the other data sets used in this dissertation, these news media polls offer
a more limited number of predictors of financial asset ownership. The six media surveys
listed in Table 3.3 (columns 5-10) have only nine to ten of the thirteen predictors identified
in Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3. None of these surveys include information about household
debt, health status, or business ownership. Only four of the six surveys include information
about home ownership. This is an important omission, since the 2008 financial crisis at root
involved the bursting of a housing asset bubble. Although all six surveys include information
about employment status, only two surveys inquire whether the respondent is full-time
employed. The balance simply ask whether the respondent is currently employed. None of
the surveys inquire directly about the respondent’s occupation. One survey inquires about
occupation groups (managers and white collar, blue collar, farmers, etc.) and two surveys
inquire about the respondent’s social class. The lack of complete or preferred predictors
challenges the validity of any findings based on these surveys, as I am unable to ascertain
whether the treated and control groups vary in important ways other than financial asset
ownership that might affect their political attitudes.
8Tables 3.10 to 3.16 provide descriptive statistics for matched groups from these six surveys. One of the
questions from the NBC News-Wall Street Journal survey was administered to only half of the sample. I
create separate matched groups for this reduced sample; summary statistics are included in Table 3.13.
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Unfortunately, none of the data sets used in this chapter include information about as-
set values. This is a particularly important omission for two reasons. First, portfolio size
plausibly might be related to vested interest. Larger portfolios might be more “hedonically
relevant,” creating greater personal relevance between individual economic welfare and po-
litical attitudes. Second, the degree of loss or gain during a market shock might be an
important factor. People who realized smaller percentage losses than the market as a whole
might be expected to exhibit different attitudes from those whose losses matched or exceeded
the market. However, financial loss might not have a linear effect on attitudes. Psychological
experiments find that sensitivity to loss is greater between $0 and $100 than between $1,000
and $1,100 (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). So it is possible that the effect of loss is greater
for people with smaller portfolios.9
For causal inference of the effect of stock market investments on attitudes, I estimate
logistic regressions of the post-test (attitude after treatment) on the treatment indicator
(stock market investments). I provide the point estimates, standard errors and p-values of
these estimates. However, my principal summary statistic of a causal effect of financial assets
on attitudes is the risk ratio: the probability of a given attitude if in the treated group divided
by the probability of the same attitude if in the control group. A risk ratio of 3 or more is
needed for convincing evidence of a causal effect. To account for the uncertainty inherent in
my parametric estimates, I simulate mean risk ratios and associated 95% confidence intervals.
7.4 The 2008 financial crisis
The 2008 financial crisis, widely considered the most serious global economic situation since
the Great Depression, was felt from Wall Street to Main Street. In the United States, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average, which tracks the thirty largest and most widely held public
companies in the United States, lost nearly a third of its value, the worst annual loss since
9Portfolio size might also be a proxy for experience in the market or the capacity to weather financial
losses.
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1931 and the third-worst in history. In Britain, the FTSE 100 Index, which follows the 100
most highly capitalized companies on the London Stock Exchange, fell by 31%. The MSCI
All Country World Index (ACWI), comprised of 23 developed and 22 developing countries,
declined by 44%. All told, U.S. and global stock markets in 2008 lost roughly $7 trillion and
$29 trillion in value respectively (Krantz 2009; Adam 2009).
In the United States, a record three million homes had foreclosure filings, an increase of
81% from 2007 and 225% from 2006 (Armour 2009). In 2008, one in every fifty-four homes
received at least one foreclosure notice. Unemployment rose from 4.9% in January 2008
to 7.2% in December 2008 as the U.S. economy shed 2.6 million jobs—the greatest annual
decline in sixty years (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009; Uchitelle 2009). The economic crisis
also pushed the U.S. automotive industry into crisis, necessitating a $17.4 billion government
bailout of General Motors and Chrysler (and a line of credit for Ford).10
The origins of the financial crisis lie in a housing bubble exacerbated by very low interest
rates and an explosion in “subprime loans” (virtually non-existent prior to 2000) to borrowers
with marginal credit histories (Baily et al. 2008). Banks created new types of loans with low-
to-no down payments and adjustable interest rates that allowed these borrowers to purchase
homes with little to no assets. Financial institutions developed sophisticated instruments
that sliced and repackaged these subprime mortgages into “securitized” investments that
presumably lowered the risk of loan default.11 The average individual investor, however, was
oblivious to the existence or hidden danger in these financial innovations. Indeed, the risk
inherent in these financial instruments often was beyond the comprehension of many who
worked in government agencies charged with regulating the market.12
10Chrysler and General Motors eventually filed for bankruptcy in the second quarter of 2009.
11This type of “mortgage-backed” security actually had existed for the previous twenty years but limited
to “conforming” loans with a minimum principal and a credit score (Baily et al. 2008). The income stream
from these mortgages went to investors who bought these securities. The securitization of home mortgages
made it possible to loan more money for home purchases than if the loan originators held on to the mortgages
for the duration of the loans.
12For example, “The Warning,” a public television documentary produced by Frontline, details how the
inherent risk of financial derivatives was not well understood and dismissed by leadership at the U.S. Treasury,
Federal Reserve Bank and Securities and Exchange Commission. This documentary is available for viewing
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Three interrelated economic events came together to produce an economic tsunami in
2008: 1) the collapse of the housing bubble in 2005 and 2006; 2) the onset of the subprime
mortgage crisis beginning in early 2007;13 and, 3) the start of an economic recession in the
United States in December 2007 (although not officially recognized until a year later). The
trigger was the increase in delinquent mortgage payments in three waves: 1) housing specu-
lators hurt by the decline in housing prices; 2) subprime borrowers with expired introductory
low interest rates subsequently adjusted higher; and, 3) (prime) borrowers with good credit
scores who lost their jobs due to the recession (New York Times Website 2009c). As the
number of delinquent mortgages began to rise in 2007, hundreds of billions of dollars in
mortgage-related investments began to sour (New York Times Website 2009b). Financial
institutions with significant obligations to insure these securitized mortgages were massively
over leveraged, having too few assets to pay the claims of investors whose investments were
negatively affected by rising defaults. Previously “insured” investments became uninsured
debts, which resulted in credit downgrades by the rating agencies of the companies who
owned these securities.
As the crisis unfolded, the average investor became buffeted by events largely beyond her
control. The clearest indication of the severity of the crisis was the collapse of banks and
other financial institutions. Bear Stearns, which had been forced to pledge up to $3.2 billion
to bail out one of its subprime hedge funds and negoatiate loans for another similar fund in
2007, was the first major financial institution to fall (Creswell and Bajaj 2007). On March
16, 2008 the Federal Reserve engineered a deal in which the venerable 85-year old company
was sold to JPMorgan Chase for $2 a share. The next major financial institution to be
affected was Lehman Brothers, a global financial services firm with a 158-year old history on
Wall Street. After talks with the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve failed to yield a deal to
save the company, Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15, 2008. In its wake, already
online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/.
13Default and delinquency rates actually began to rise in 2006 (New York Times Website 2009b).
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tight global credit markets began to seize as banks no longer knew who was solvent due to
the relative opacity of the mortgage-backed security market. Banks refused to lend to other
banks, consumers or businesses. The collapse of the housing market and related subprime
mortgage defaults had developed in a full blown credit crisis that threatened to completely
unravel the U.S. economy.
By the end of 2008, major financial institutions such as Washington Mutual, Wachovia,
Countrywide, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch were either out of business or sold to
stronger banks, often with explicit support from the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury.
Twenty-five banks failed in 2008, roughly the total number of bank failures for the previous
seven years. The U.S. government responded to the emerging economic crisis during a
hard-fought primary and general presidential election.14 As the year wore on, the economic
crisis took priority over ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the minds of voters and
in the presidential campaigns. Congressional votes regarding “bailouts” to homeowners and
financial institutions were cast with an eye to the November ballot box. Indeed, voter interest
in the 2008 presidential election was at an unusually high level. Turnout in the November
presidential election was the highest in forty years. Table 7.1 summarizes the major financial
and political events of the 2008 financial crisis along with the corresponding value of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.15
14This was the first presidential election in 56 years with an “open seat” in which neither a sitting president
nor vice president contested the election.
15These are closing values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on that day. In the event the market was
closed that day, the value represents the closing value on the most recent market day.
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Table 7.1: Timeline of the 2008 financial crisis in the United States
Date Event Dow Jones
Industrial Average
1/3/08 Iowa caucuses 13,056.72
1/8/08 New Hampshire presidential primary 12,589.07
1/30-2/2/08 USA Today/Gallup poll 12,427.26
2/5/08 Super Tuesday presidential primaries in 24 states 12,265.13
3/10/08 Dow down 20% from peak 5 months earlier 11,740.15
3/16/08 JPMorgan Chase buys Bear Stearns at $2/share 11,972.25
3/28-4/2/08 CBS News/New York Times Poll 12,608.92
5/9/08 Third bank failure of the year 12,745.88
5/30/08 Fourth bank failure of the year 12,638.32
6/30/08 Over 252,000 properties in foreclosure, up 53% from year ago 11,350.01
7/11/08 IndyMac Bank seized by FDIC, 4th largest failure in U.S. history 11,100.54
7/24/08 Congress passes $300B housing bailout bill 11,632.38
8/28/08 Barack Obama accepts Democratic Party nomination for president 11,715.18
9/4/08 John McCain accepts Republican Party nomination for president 11,188.23
9/7/08 Government nationalizes Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae 11,510.74
9/14/08 Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America 11,421.99
9/15/08 Lehman Brothers declares bankruptcy; Dow drops 500 points 10,917.51
9/17/08 Government loans $85B to American Insurance Group 10,609.66
9/18/08 Treasury Secretary Paulson: “economy on Monday?” 11,019.69
9/19-9/22/08 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll 11,015.69
9/25/08 John McCain & Barack Obama meet with Pres. Bush on the crisis; 11,022.06
Washington Mutual seized by FDIC, largest failure in U.S. history
9/26/08 First presidential debate 11,143.13
9/29/08 Congress rejects financial bailout bill; Dow falls almost 800 points 10,365.45
10/2/08 Vice-presidential debate 10,831.07
10/3/08 Congress passes $700B financial bailout bill, creates TARP 10,325.38
10/7/08 Second presidential debate 9,447.11
10/11/08 Worst week ever for Dow, down 22% in 8 days 9,387.61
10/15/08 Third presidential debate 8,577.91
11/4/08 Barack Obama elected president, Democrats take control of the 9,625.28
U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate
11/15/08 G20 meets in Washington, DC on the global financial crisis 8,273.58
12/4-12/8/08 CBS Newspoll 8,934.18
12/11/08 Bernard Madoff arrested for purported $50B Ponzi scheme 8,565.09
12/12/08 Twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth bank failures of the year 8,629.68
12/12-12/14/08 USA Today/Gallup poll 8,629.68
1/6/09 111th U.S. Congress begins; stimulus bill introduced in U.S. Senate 9,015.10
1/11-1/15/09 CBS News/New York Times poll 8,212.49
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7.5 Role of government
Proponents of the investor class theory contend that stock market investments affect atti-
tudes toward the role of the government. In this section, I investigate whether ownership of
stock market investments had any effect on views about how the U.S. government should re-
spond to the 2008 financial crisis. A March 2008 survey jointly conducted by CBS News and
The New York Times inquired about whether respondents preferred a smaller government
providing fewer services or bigger government providing more services.16 Although Table
7.2 shows a slightly larger percentage of the treated group preferred a smaller government
than the control group, majorities of both groups clearly indicated a preference for smaller
government.
Table 7.2: Attitudes regarding preferred size of government in March 2008, weighted per-
centages
Treated Control
N=801 N=335
Prefer bigger government 35.0 39.5
Prefer smaller government 65.0 60.5
Source: CBS News and The New York Times.
Table 7.3 presents three models of the effect of investments on attitudes regarding the
role of government.17 In column one, I find investment had no effect on attitudes regarding
the preferred size of government. This result is unchanged when I control for home ownership
in column two. Column three includes a control for sociotropic view of the economy.18 In
each model the risk ratio is approximately one, indicating no difference between investors
and non-investors. Although I continue to find no effect of financial assets on attitudes
16“If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger
government providing more services?”
17The dependent variable is coded 1 for prefer smaller government, 0 for prefer larger government.
18The rating of the economy is a scale from 1 for very good to 4 for very bad.
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about the role of government, I do find that views about the national economy appears
to create greater support for an active government role. The more pessimistic people were
about the overall economic conditions, the less likely they were to express a desire for smaller
government.
Table 7.3: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic
regression of stock market investments on support for smaller government, March 2008
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.429 -0.059 2.488
(1.30)** (0.431) (0.577)**
Investments 0.191 -0.134 -0.149
(0.153) (0.507) (0.545)
Homeowner 0.536 0.497
(0.479) (0.513)
Investments x Homeowner 0.357 0.387
(0.553) (0.603)
Rating of economy -0.824
(0.112)**
RRa 1.077 1.075 1.08
RR 95% CIb (0.966,1.204) (0.963,1.202) (0.962,1.217)
N 1136 1136 1136
Source: CBS News and The New York Times.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
A September 2008 survey by NBC News and The Wall Street Journal asked respondents
about the proper role of government to solve problems.19 In the four days before this
survey was administered, the Dow Jones index fell 500 points on the day Lehman Brothers
collapsed, the government provided $85 billion in emergency loans to insurance giant AIG,
19“I’m going to read you two statements about the role of government, and I’d like to know which one
comes closer to your point of view. Statement A: Government should do more to solve problems and help
meet the needs of people, OR Statement B: Government is doing too many things better left to businesses
and individuals.”
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and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson openly mused about whether there would be a U.S.
economy on Monday. Despite the gravity of this situation, Table 7.4 finds similar proportions
of the treated and control group believed either the government was doing too much or too
little.
Table 7.4: Attitudes regarding role of government in solving problems, weighted percentages
Treated Control
N=660 N=221
Government is doing too many things 45.6 43.1
Government should do some of both 7.4 12.7
Government should do more 47.0 44.2
Source: NBC News and The Wall Street Journal.
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present the results of ordered logistic regressions attitudes about gov-
ernment actions on stock market investments. The coefficient on stock market investments
in Table 7.5 falls short of the 5% level. Table 7.6 shows the risk ratio is roughly one for
each possible response to this question. Financial asset ownership had no effect on attitudes
regarding the proper role of government in responding to the crisis.
Table 7.5: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stock market investments on attitudes regarding role of government, September 2008
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Independent variables Log odds Govt doing Govt should Some of both
too many things do more
Investments 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.149)
Source: NBC News and The Wall Street Journal.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01. Unweighted N = 881.
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Table 7.6: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression
of stock market investments on attitudes regarding role of government, September 2008
Attitude RRa RR 95% CIb
2.50% 97.50%
Doing too many things 1.001 0.8528 1.175
Some of both 1.003 0.994 1.02
Should do more 1.008 0.8616 1.181
Source: NBC News & The Wall Street Journal
Notes: Unweighted N = 881. aMean risk ratio
computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
By late 2008 the U.S. government had created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
to purchase assets and equity from financial institutions to strengthen the financial sector
burdened with non-performing subprime loans. Authorized by the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (enacted October 3, 2008), the U.S. Department of the Treasury
spent $247 billion of its allotted $700 billion by the end of the year. $178 billion of this
amount was used to purchase shares of preferred stock and warrants from 214 financial
institutions (Congressional Budget Office 2009). A December 2008 CBS News survey asked
respondents whether they believed the government’s actions helped or hurt the economy.20
As Table 7.7 shows, over 70% of both treatment groups believed the government’s efforts
had no effect on the economy.
20“Do you think the steps that the federal government has taken so far to assist banks and other financial
institutions have helped the national economy, have hurt the national economy, or have they made no
difference so far?”
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Table 7.7: Attitudes regarding the impact of government actions to assist the U.S. economy
in December 2008, weighted percentages
Treated Control
N=839 N=349
Hurt economy 12.1 13.8
Made no difference 71.4 73.5
Helped economy 16.5 12.8
Source: CBS News.
Table 7.8 shows that ownership of investments had no effect on views about the impact
of government actions to help the economy. The coefficient on investments falls well below
the 5% level. The risk ratios for possible responses to this question in Table 7.9 are roughly
one, indicating no difference between investors and non-investors. In summary, I find no
evidence that investors had different attitudes from non-investors regarding the role of the
government throughout the crisis in 2008.
Table 7.8: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stock market investments on attitudes regarding impact of government actions to assist
the U.S. economy, December 2008
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Independent variables Log odds Hurt economy Helped economy Made no difference
Investments 0.221 -0.026 0.027 -0.002
(0.156)
Source: CBS News
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01. Unweighted N = 1,188.
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Table 7.9: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from a logistic regression
of stock market investments on attitudes regarding impact of government actions to assist
the U.S. economy, December 2008
Attitude Risk Ratio 95% CI
2.50% 97.50%
Hurt 0.833 0.639 1.065
No difference 0.998 0.988 1.008
Helped 1.219 0.941 1.566
Source: CBS News.
Notes: Unweighted N = 1,188.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000
simulations of five multiply imputed data
sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
7.6 Economic stimulus
In this section I investigate whether investors had different attitudes regarding efforts to
stimulate the economy through government spending compared to non-investors. On Febru-
ary 7, 2008, the U.S. Congress passed the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, signed into law
by President George W. Bush six days later. The $152 billion package consisted mainly of
“tax rebate” checks mailed out to lower and middle income taxpayers in mid-2008. Almost
exactly one year later, the U.S. Congress on February 13, 2009 passed a second stimulus
measure, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed into law four days
later by President Barack Obama. The much larger $787 billion package included a mixture
of federal tax cuts, unemployment benefits, and government spending for education, health
care, and infrastructure projects. Support for both measures fell mostly along partisan lines.
The 2008 stimulus passed with a majority of Democratic lawmakers and a minority of Re-
publicans. The 2009 stimulus passed without any support from House Republicans and only
three Senate Republicans. If investors took their cues from the Republican Party, we should
see some difference in their support for economic stimulus by the government.
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A January 2008 survey by USA Today and the Gallup Organization queried respondents’
attitudes toward the proposed economic stimulus that year.21 A January 2009 survey by
CBS News and The New York Times asked the same question of respondents prior to passage
of the 2009 stimulus package. These two surveys provide bookends to the 2008 crisis. It is
possible that investors had different views before and after the calamitous events of 2008.
Table 7.10 summarizes the percentages of the treated and control groups who supported
and opposed the stimulus in both years. At both points in time, similarly sized majorities
of the treated and control groups favored an economic stimulus by the federal government.
Interestingly, the level of support for stimulus declined somewhat in both treatment groups
by early 2009 compared to a year earlier.
Table 7.10: Attitudes regarding economic stimulus by the government in January 2008 &
2009, weighted percentages
January 2008 January 2009
Treated Control Treated Control
N=1414 N=346 N=733 N=226
Favor 76.3 78.2 69.1 66.6
Oppose 23.7 21.8 30.9 33.4
Sources: USA Today and Gallup (2008) &
CBS News and The New York Times (2009).
Table 7.11 presents results of logistic regression of attitudes about government economic
stimulus on stock market investment ownership. In January 2008 and January 2009, invest-
ments had no effect on attitudes regarding economic stimulus (columns one and four). Home
ownership also had no effect on these views (columns two and five). Although views about
the state of the national economy did not affect support for economic stimulus in early 2008,
by January 2009 people who were more pessimistic about the economy were more likely
21“Do you favor or oppose the federal government passing a bill that would attempt to stimulate growth
in the economy?”
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to support the stimulus package.22 Table 7.11 shows that financial asset ownership played
no role in explaining support for economic stimulus either early in the crisis or after the
financial carnage of 2008.
22For the USA Today-Gallup survey, the sociotropic variable is a scale of rating of economic conditions in
the country. People who viewed the economy as “getting better” were coded as 1, people who viewed the
economy as “getting worse” were coded as 3. The coding for the CBS/New York Times survey is similar:
from “very good” coded as 1 to “very bad” coded as 4.
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Table 7.11: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from logistic regressions of stock market invest-
ments on support for economic stimulus by the government, January 2008 & 2009
January 2008 January 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 1.277 1.120 1.224 0.689 1.347 -0.225
(0.149)** (0.330)** (0.409)** (0.166)** (0.625)* (0.726)
Investments -0.111 0.338 0.334 0.116 -0.382 -0.561
(0.164) (0.388) (0.388) (0.189) (0.677) (0.698)
Homeowner 0.191 0.186 -0.746 -1.052
(0.348) (0.348) (0.645) (0.673)
Investments x Homeowner -0.529 -0.527 0.568 0.779
(0.406) (0.406) (0.689) (0.712)
Rating of economy -0.031 0.516
(0.075) (0.130)**
RRa 0.977 0.981 0.981 1.042 1.042 1.044
RR 95% CIb (0.914,1.05) (0.918,1.054) (0.917,1.053) (0.931,1.173) (0.930,1.173) (0.931,1.178)
N 1760 1760 1760 959 959 959
Sources: USA Today and Gallup (2008); CBS News and The New York Times (2009)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence
interval.
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7.7 Homeowner bailout
In this section, I investigate the effect of financial asset ownership on attitudes regarding
government responses to the housing crisis. The extent of the subprime mortgage crisis
became clearer as the year progressed. By the middle of 2008, a record 1.1 million homes
were in foreclosure. Roughly three million borrowers missed at least one mortgage payment
during the first five months of the year, of which about 737,000 were at least three months
past due but not yet in foreclosure (Isidore 2008). On June 24, 2008, the U.S. Congress
passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The law authorized the Federal
Housing Administration to guarantee up to $300 billion in new 30-year fixed rate mortgages
for subprime borrowers if lenders were willing to write down principal loan balances to ninety
percent of current appraised value. The law also included a first-time home buyer refundable
tax credit of up to $7,500.
Three news media surveys in March 2008, December 2008 and January 2009 asked re-
spondents about whether the government should help homeowners who were having trouble
paying their mortgages due to increases in interest rates.23 Table 7.12 appears to show clear
differences between treatment groups on this issue.
Table 7.12: Attitudes regarding homeowner bailouts in March 2008, December 2008 and
January 2009, weighted percentages
March 2008 December 2008 January 2009
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=801 N=335 N=839 N=349 N=733 N=226
Oppose 58.1 48.1 45.9 36.4 54.7 46.5
Support 41.9 51.9 54.1 63.6 45.3 53.5
Sources: CBS News and The New York Times (March), CBS News
(December), and CBS News and The New York Times (January).
23“Should the government help homeowners having trouble repaying mortgages because their rates went
up?”
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A majority of the control group consistently supported government aid for homeowners
for all three time periods. Moreover, a greater percentage of the control group expressed
support for homeowner bailouts than the treated group. Although a majority of the treated
group appeared to support the bailout in December 2008, this possibly is due to the lack of a
measure of homeownership in the CBS News survey. This means treated and control groups
are likely unbalanced on this important covariate. A majority of the treated group expressed
opposition to the “homeowner bailout” for the two surveys (March 2008 and January 2009)
which include measures of home ownership. Table 7.13 summarizes the results of regression
analysis of stock market investments on attitudes regarding “homeowner bailout” between
March 2008 and January 2009.24
In the base model in columns one, four and six in Table 7.13 the coefficient for stock
market investments reaches the 5% level for statistical significance. However, the coefficient
loses statistical significance when I control for home ownership (columns two and seven).
I also check for the effect of sociotropic views of the economy.25 Columns three, five and
eight of Table 7.13 show perspectives about the state of the economy had a significant effect
on views regarding homeowner bailouts. People who rated the economy more poorly were
more inclined to support policies to help struggling homeowners. In terms of relative risk,
however, the inclusion of additional controls had no effect. In each model the risk ratio falls
well short of the critical threshold of 0.500 needed for minimal evidence that investors were
more opposed to homeowner bailouts. Despite the lack of a covariate for homeownership in
the CBS News survey, columns four and five of Table 7.13 yield nearly identical risk ratios
to the other models. Financial assets had no causal effect on attitudes toward homeowner
bailouts during the crisis.
24The dependent variable is coded 1 for support of providing assistance to homeowners and 0 for opposition
to this action.
25The sociotropic variable is a scale rating of the national economy, from 1 (“very good”) through 4 “(very
bad”).
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Table 7.13: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from logistic regressions of stock market invest-
ments on support for homeowner bailout, March 2008, December 2008 and January 2009
March 2008 December 2008 January 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.076 1.148 -0.593 0.494 -1.439 0.140 0.801 -0.348
(0.141) (0.448)** (0.524) (0.141)** (0.331)** (0.144) (0.543) (0.605)
Investments -0.402 -0.720 -0.740 -0.329 -0.411 -0.327 -0.564 -0.729
(0.158)* (0.517) (0.528) (0.153)* (0.169)* (0.159)* (0.554) (0.568)
Homeowner -1.164 -1.144 -0.759 -0.969
(0.471)* (0.481)* (0.564) (0.587)
Investments x 0.340 0.343 0.328 0.474
Homeowner (0.550) (0.561) (0.580) (0.594)
Rating of economy 0.576 0.578 0.371
(0.096)** (0.106)** (0.120)**
RRa 0.811 0.808 0.803 0.874 0.849 0.852 0.858 0.857
RR 95% CIb (0.701,0.941) (0.698,0.938) (0.693,0.933) (0.783,0.983) (0.756,0.959) (0.735,0.989) (0.740,0.997) (0.737,0.999)
N 1136 1136 1136 1188 1188 959 959 959
Sources: CBS News and The New York Times (March), CBS News (December), and CBS News and The New York Times. (January)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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7.8 Banks bailout
In this section, I investigate whether investors had different views about how the government
should rspond to the financial industry crisis. The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank
played the leading roles in the government’s response to the unfolding financial crisis. Unlike
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which had an established protocol to
deal with bank failures, the government’s initial approach early in 2008 was to respond
to emerging crises on a case-by-case basis (Nocera and Andrews 2008). For example, in
mid-March 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke intervened to direct the sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase for $2 a share
to avert what they believed would be systemic losses in the global stock market due to that
firm’s heavy exposure to collateralized debt obligations.26
The government did not intervene, however, to prevent the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers on September 15, 2008. After the Bear Stearns deal, government leaders were concerned
about the “moral hazard” that would ensue if financial institutions believed that the govern-
ment would bail them out regardless of the riskiness of their actions (Nocera and Andrews
2008). In response, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 500 points at the close of
the market that day. Two days later, the government provided a $85 billion bailout to
the American Insurance Group (AIG), a large financial industry conglomerate with signifi-
cant involvement in credit default swaps world wide.27 The government finally moved to a
more systematic approach with the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in
October 2008.28
26On June 22, 2007, Bear Stearns pledged a collateralized loan of up to $3.2 billion to “bail out” one of
its hedge funds hurt by the collapse of the housing bubble and bad bets on subprime mortgage loans. At
the time it was the biggest rescue of a hedge fund since the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in
1998 (Creswell and Bajaj 2007).
27A downgrade in AIG’s credit rating required the company to post additional collateral with its counter-
parties. AIG did not have sufficient capital to meet this obligation, which resulted in a serious liquidity
crisis. The bailout gave the government nearly 80% equity of the company and the right to suspend dividend
payments to previously issued common and preferred stockholders.
28Johnson (2009) argued that the U.S. government failed to develop a transparent, systematic approach
to deal with the financial crisis. “The response so far is perhaps best described as ‘policy by deal’: when a
major financial institution gets into trouble, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve engineer a
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Over the course of the crisis, three surveys polled Americans about their attitudes regard-
ing bailout of the financial industry in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. A March
2008 survey by CBS News and The New York Times asked respondents about whether the
federal government should aid financial institutions that made bad loans.29 Table 7.14 shows
that large majorities of both treatment groups were opposed to a banks bailout.30
Table 7.14: Attitudes regarding bailout of financial institutions in March 2008, weighted
percentages
Treated Control
N=801 N=335
Opposed to bailout 75.1 73.6
In favor of bailout 24.9 26.4
Source: CBS News and The New York Times.
A September 2008 poll, however, found roughly equivalent proportions of attitudes among
treated and control groups concerning proposed legislation to help the financial institutions.31
Table 7.15 shows approximately forty percent of both treatment groups supported govern-
ment bailout of the banks, with the balance roughly split between opposition and undecided.
A December 2008 poll (Table 7.16) finds both treatment groups roughly evenly split about
the TARP.32 A simple majority of the treated group opposed the plan; an equally simple
majority of the control group supported the effort.
bailout over the weekend and announce on Monday that everything is fine...Treasury and the Fed did not act
according to any publicly articulated principles, but just worked out a transaction and claimed it was the
best that could be done under the circumstances. This was late-night, backroom dealing, pure and simple”
(page 52).
29“Should the federal govt help banks and mortgage companies that made loans to people who can’t afford
to pay them back?”
30This position did not change when the question was re-framed with the goal of providing financial
assistance to the banks to limit an economic recession.
31“Do you approve or disapprove of plan for government to take over bad mortgages and other troubled
investments from financial firms?” Only one half of the sample received this question.
32“Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to banks and other financial
institutions to try to help fix the economy?”
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Table 7.15: Attitudes regarding bailout of financial institutions in September 2008, weighted
percentages
Treated Control
N=318 N=113
Approve 41.2 46.4
Uncertain/no opinion 29.9 25.2
Disapprove 28.9 28.5
Source: NBC News and The Wall Street Journal.
Table 7.16: Attitudes regarding bailout of financial institutions in December 2008, weighted
percentages
Treated Control
N=839 N=349
Disapprove 52.7 48.5
Approve 47.3 51.5
Source: CBS News.
Tables 7.17 to 7.20 provide estimates of the causal effect of financial asset ownership on
attitudes regarding support to the financial industry by the federal government. For the
March (Table 7.17) and December (Table 7.20) surveys I estimate binary logistic regressions
of attitudes on the treatment indicator. For the September poll I estimate ordered logistic
regressions (Table 7.18) and summarize the risk ratios for the possible responses to the
survey question (Table 7.19). In each case, the coefficient on stock market investments falls
short of the 5% level for statistical significance and the risk ratios are approximately one.
I find no evidence of a causal effect of stock market investments on attitudes regarding
the government’s bailout of the financial industry. Although I find sociotropic views of the
economy had an effect in December 2008 (column two of Table 7.20), the losses investors
personally incurred over the course of 2008 were apparently not enough to overcome the
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general sense of malaise about the economy felt by investors and non-investors alike.
Table 7.17: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from logistic
regressions of stock market investments on support for banks bailout, March 2008
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -1.024 -0.4665 -0.872
(0.132)** (0.396) (0.587)
Investments -0.082 -0.493 -0.494
(0.157) (0.498) (0.500)
Homeowner -0.619 -0.605
(0.426) (0.428)
Investments x Homeowner 0.459 0.460
(0.526) (0.526)
Rating of economy 0.130
(0.131)
RRa 0.949 0.948 0.947
RR 95% CIb (0.756,1.183) (0.755,1.182) (0.753,1.182)
N 1136 1136 1136
Source: CBS News and The New York Times.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply
imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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Table 7.18: Log odds and change in predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions
of stock market investments on support for banks bailout, September 2008
Change in Predicted Probabilities
Independent variables Log odds Approve Disapprove Uncertain/no opinon
Investments 0.139 -0.034 0.027 0.007
(0.205)
Source: NBC News and The Wall Street Journal.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Unweighted N = 1,188.
Table 7.19: Simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from ordered logistic
regressions of stock market investments on support for banks bailout, September 2008
Attitude Risk Ratio 95% CI
2.50% 97.50%
Approve 0.9336 0.745 1.169
Uncertain/no opinion 1.0266 0.9704 1.119
Disapprove 1.1186 0.8315 1.493
Source: NBC News and The Wall Street Journal.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations
of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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Table 7.20: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from logistic
regressions of stock market investments on support for banks bailout, December 2008
(1) (2)
Intercept 0.058 -0.909
(0.120) (0.316)**
Investments -0.164 -0.197
(0.143) (0.145)
Rating of economy 0.286
(0.087)**
RRa 0.923 0.909
RR 95% CIb (0.808,1.056) (0.793,1.040)
N 1188 1188
Source: CBS News.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations
of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95%
confidence interval.
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7.9 Auto bailout
In this section, I investigate whether investors had different views than non-investors about
government support for the auto industry during the 2008 financial crisis. The automotive
industry was on life support by the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2008. The increase in
global oil prices in the previous years resulted in major drops in purchases of sports utility
vehicles and pickup trucks, which contributed significantly to the bottom line of the Big
Three automotive companies. Moreover, these companies were heavily burdened by legacy
retirement and employee health insurance expenses (New York Times Website 2009a). Auto
sales dropped as the recession took hold in 2008 and credit markets froze up. Sales in October
2008 dropped nearly 32% to their lowest level in twenty-five years. The auto makers idled
factories and closed dealerships as they burned through their cash reserves.
The potential collapse of the U.S. auto industry posed enormous economic and political
challenges for policymakers. The Big Three auto companies, their suppliers and dealers
collectively employed roughly 1.6 million people (Meyerson 2008). During an election year
the plight of auto industry workers was a potent political issue. The auto industry also
represented a significant portion of the American manufacturing base. Collapse of an entire
industry doubtless would create ripples throughout the rest of the U.S. economy. In Novem-
ber 2008, the Big Three auto companies (General Motors, Chrysler and Ford) indicated they
would need $25 billion to avoid bankruptcy. After an auto industry bailout bill failed to
pass in the U.S. Senate on December 11, President Bush on December 19 used his executive
authority to direct $13.4 billion in emergency loans from the TARP to General Motors and
Chrysler, with another $4 billion slated for February 2009.
Three surveys asked respondents about their attitudes regarding the “auto industry
bailout.” An early December 2008 survey by CBS News occurred while details of the legisla-
tion was being worked out between Congress and the White House.33 Table 7.21 shows that
33“Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to the Big Three U.S. auto
makers to prevent them from going out of business or bankruptcy?”
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majorities of both treatment groups opposed the auto bailout. The treated group, however,
is close to evenly split on the issue. An even greater proportion of the control group (by
eleven percentage points) opposed the bailout than the treated group.
Table 7.21: Attitudes regarding proposed auto bailout in early December 2008, weighted
percentages
Treated Control
N=839 N=349
Disapprove 51.1 62.6
Approve 48.9 37.4
Source: CBS News.
A mid-December poll by USA Today and the Gallup Organization occurred after the U.S.
Senate rejected the auto bailout bill but before executive action by President Bush. Table
7.22 shows that while roughly the same simple majority of the treated group was opposed
to the bailout of the Big Three, a majority of the control group now wished that the failed
legislation had passed.34 A January 2009 poll by CBS News and The New York Times,
however, found a large majority of both treatment groups resoundingly opposed additional
aid to the auto companies beyond the initial amount provided in December 2008 (Table
7.23).35
34“Would you rather have seen the auto legislation pass or fail?”
35“Should the federal government give major auto companies more money than $13 billion already provided
if they ask for more?”
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Table 7.22: Attitudes regarding failed auto bailout legislation in mid-December 2008,
weighted percentages
Treated Control
N=644 N=192
Preferred to see fail 53.8 42.1
Preferred to see pass 46.2 57.9
Source: USA Today and Gallup.
Table 7.23: Attitudes regarding additional aid to auto companies in January 2009, weighted
percentages
Treated Control
N=733 N=226
Opposed to more aid 78.9 72.7
In favor or more aid 21.1 27.3
Source: CBS News and The New York Times.
Table 7.24 reports the results of logistic regressions of attitudes regarding bailout of the
auto industry on financial asset ownership. The coefficients on investments for both surveys
in December are statistically significant at the 1% level (columns one and three). The coef-
ficients maintain statistical significance (at the 5% level) when I control for home ownership
and sociotropic views of the economy.36 At first glance, it appears that investors were ini-
tially in favor of an auto bailout when it was under consideration in Congress (columns one
and two), but were opposed to President Bush’s decision to support the auto companies out
of TARP funds (columns three through five). By January 2009, the coefficients for invest-
ments fail to reach the 5% level for any of the models (columns six through eight). A closer
examination of the risk ratio, the summary comparison between investors and non-investors,
36For the CBS News and CBS/NYT surveys, the sociotropic question is how respondents rate the national
economy. I create a scale ranging from 1 for “very good” to 4 for “ very bad.” For the USA Today/Gallup
survey, the question is how respondents would describe the current economic situation in the U.S. I create
a scale ranging from 1 for “not a major problem” to 4 for “the biggest crisis ever.”
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finds that none of the models clear the minimal threshold of 2 (or 0.500) in December or
January. There is no difference in the probability of support or opposition for auto bailout
between investors and non-investors. I find no evidence that financial asset ownership had
any causal effect on views about government support for the automotive industry.
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Table 7.24: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from logistic regressions of stock market invest-
ments on support for auto bailout, December 2008 and January 2009
Dec. 4-8, 2008 Dec. 12-14, 2008 January 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept -0.515 -2.096 0.320 1.072 0.375 -0.979 -2.072 -2.733
(0.134)** (0.346)** (0.149)* (0.462)* (0.539) (0.155)** (0.622)** (0.733)**
Investments 0.470 0.435 -0.474 -1.187 -1.214 -0.338 0.518 0.457
(0.163)** (0.168)* (0.170)** (0.518)* (0.521)* (0.190) (0.700) (0.706)
Homeowner -0.855 -0.921 1.220 1.120
(0.487) (0.491) (0.650) (0.663)
Investments x 0.810 0.832 -0.958 -0.887
Homeowner (0.546) (0.549) (0.735) (0.743)
Rating of economy 0.463 0.224 0.207
(0.093)** (0.087)** (0.149)
RRa 1.314 1.286 0.801 0.793 0.789 0.782 0.792 0.792
RR 95% CIb (1.101,1.57) (1.075,1.539) (0.691,0.931) (0.683,0.923) (0.680, 0.919) (0.594,1.019) (0.597,1.040) (0.596, 1.04)
N 1188 1188 836 836 836 959 959 959
Sources: CBS News (Early December), and USA Today and Gallup mid-December), and CBS News and The New York Times (January).
Note: Standard error in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets; bmean 95% confidence interval.
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7.10 The stock market
Despite the severity of the financial crisis of 2008, investors apparently did not differ in
their attitudes regarding government actions to rescue the economy. In this final section, I
investigate whether investors held different views about the stock market from non-investors.
2008 was one of the worst years ever for stock market investors. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average declined by nearly a third, and both the NASDAQ and Standard and Poor’s 500
indexes fell by roughly 40%. Compared to opening share values on January 1, 2008, over
90% of the five hundred public companies that comprised the S&P 500 declined in value
by the close of the stock market on December 31, 2008 (Krantz 2009). Although the stock
market decline had broad effects on the U.S. economy, investors arguably had greater vested
interest in matters concerning the stock market given their direct financial losses (Crano
1997a). To evaluate the effect of financial assets on attitudes regarding the stock market, I
use a question from three surveys affiliated with CBS News in March and December 2008
and January 2009. The surveys asked respondents whether they think investment in the
stock market generally is safe or risky.
Table 7.25 summarizes the responses of the treated and control groups. Across all three
time points in time I find large majorities of both treatment groups believe the stock market
generally is a risky place for investments. What’s interesting, however, is the change in
the percentage of both treatment groups that express the belief that the stock market is
generally a safe investment. In March 2008 roughly 40% of the treated group believed the
stock market is generally safe compared to nearly a quarter of the control group (columns 1
and 2). At the time this poll closed on April 2, 2008, the Dow Jones average was at roughly
12,600, down only about 400 points since the beginning of the year.
By the December poll, the Dow was down to just under 9,000 points—a decline of nearly
30% from the time of the March survey. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7.25 show the proportion
of the treated group who viewed the stock market as safe decreased by nine percentage points
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to just under thirty percent. By contrast, just over 7% of the control group saw the stock
market as safe by the end of 2008. This divergence continued in January 2009, as roughly
28% of the treated group viewed the stock market as generally safe while only three percent
of the control group expressed the same attitude.
Table 7.25: Attitudes regarding general riskiness of the stock market, weighted percentages
March 2008 December 2008 January 2009
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
N=801 N=335 N=839 N=349 N=733 N=226
Risky 61.1 75.96 70.12 92.54 72.54 96.84
Safe 38.9 24.04 29.88 7.46 27.46 3.16
Sources: CBS News and The New York Times (March), CBS News
(December), and CBS News and The New York Times (January).
In Table 7.26 I report the results of binary logistic regression of attitudes about the
riskiness of the stock market on ownership of stock market investments. Column one shows
that in March 2008 financial asset ownership had no causal effect on views about the stock
market. The risk ratio was only about 1.6—short of the minimum threshold of two. By
the end of the year, however, there was a clear divide between stock market investors and
non-investors. The risk ratio in column 3 of Table 7.26 shows that stock market investors in
December 2008 were four times as likely than non-investors to indicate they believed that
the stock market was a safe place for investments. The 95% confidence interval for the risk
ratio ranges from just below three to close to six. Column five in Table 7.26 shows that in
January 2009, by which time the Dow Jones had fallen another 1,000 points, investors were
almost ten times as likely to view the stock market as safe than non-investors. The 95%
confidence interval in this case spans from a low of approximately four to just over twenty.
In each case, inclusion of sociotropic views of the national economy actually increases the
risk ratio (columns two, four and six).37
37The sociotropic variable is a scale rating of the state of the national economy. “Very good” is coded as
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Table 7.26: Log odds, simulated risk ratio (RR) and 95% confidence interval from logistic regressions of stock market in-
vestments on attitude that the stock market generally is safe for investments in March 2008, December 2008 and January
2009
March 2008 December 2008 January 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -1.155 0.970 -2.521 -0.911 -3.446 -1.748
(0.212)** (0.312)** (0.212)** (0.384)* (0.462)** (0.609)**
Investments 0.702 0.756 1.667 1.775 2.474 2.508
(0.220)** (0.238)** (0.227)** (0.231)** (0.466)** (0.470)**
Rating of economy -0.738 -0.498 -0.488
(0.122)** (0.104)** (0.129)**
RRa 1.645 1.74 4.100 4.557 9.770 10.12
RR 95% CIb (1.233,2.151) (1.264,2.334) (2.72,5.983) (2.987,6.727) (3.97,20.66) (4.059,21.540)
N 1136 1136 1188 1188 959 959
Note: Standard error in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01.
Sources: CBS News and The New York Times (March), CBS News (December), and CBS News
and The New York Times (January).
aMean risk ratio computed from 100,000 simulations of five multiply imputed data sets;
bmean 95% confidence interval.
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One possible explanation for this finding is survivorship bias. Roughly one-fifth of Amer-
ican households reduced their exposure to stocks and five percent completely got out of the
stock market (Ameriks et al. 2009). In other words, the “bulls” stayed in the market as the
“bears” got out or reduced their exposure to the stock market as the crisis unfolded over
the course of the year. Indeed, Ameriks et al. (2009) found that roughly 17% of households
increased stock holdings during the crisis. I believe two factors mitigate against this ex-
planation. First, as Table 7.25 shows, the proportion of the treated group who believe the
stock market is generally risky increased by about 20% from March 2008 to January 2009.
This change is not consistent with a greater concentration of confident bulls over the course
of the year in the treated group. Second, the percentage of investors in the full samples of
these three surveys actually increased over this time period (58.6% in March 2008; 60.4%
in December 2008; 65.9% in January 2009). This means these findings are not the result
of fewer investors in the pool.38 Thus, although I find that investors did not have distinct
views about government policies and actions over the course of the 2008 financial crisis,
investors were more likely to take a favorable view of the riskiness of the market compared
to non-investors. These differences became more stark as the crisis unfolded.
7.11 Summary
I find no effect of stock market participation on attitudes during the unfolding financial
crisis in 2008. In many ways, the 2008 crisis was an ideal test of the investor class theory as
investors clearly had vested interests in the collapse of the U.S. stock market (Crano 1997a).
Moreover, government action in response to the crisis received heightened media attention
during the 2008 presidential election. The half dozen surveys used in this chapter provide
good coverage of the year as the crisis unfolded in different parts of the economy. Investors
1, “very bad” is coded as 4.
38Moreover, matching with replacement creates matched groups that are weighted to make them equivalent
in size in regression analyses.
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consistently failed to evince different attitudes from non-investors about the government’s
response to the unprecedented crisis in the housing, financial and auto sectors. This is not
to suggest that economic concerns did not shape political attitudes. People who rated the
economy more poorly were more likely to support government actions across the board to
respond to the economic crisis. Sociotropic views explained variance in support for economic
stimulus, homeowner bailout, banks bailout, auto bailout, and an active government role.
In order for individual financial interest to affect political behavior, however, investors
must see a clear connection between government action and their economic welfare. In other
words, investors have to hold the government accountable for what happens in the econ-
omy. A December 2008 poll by USA Today and the Gallup Organization asked respondents
whether under the best scenario (assuming political leaders made all of the right decisions)
government can improve the economy.39 As Table 7.27 below shows, over seventy percent
of both treatment groups did not believe the government could make much of an impact on
the economy. This arguably reflects the deep American values of economic individualism,
the belief that one’s success stems from one’s own efforts and not help from the government
(Sniderman and Brody 1977; Feldman 1984).
Table 7.27: Attitudes about how much the government can do to improve the economy,
weighted percentages
Treated Control
N=644 N=192
A great deal 5.4 2.2
A fair amount 17.4 25.0
Not much 43.3 38.6
Nothing at all 33.9 34.3
Source: USA Today and Gallup,
December 2008.
39Regardless of who is in power, if the leaders in the federal government make the right decisions, how
much do you think the government can do to improve the economy?
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My sole finding is a clear divergence of views regarding the riskiness of the stock market
between investors and non-investors. In the first quarter of 2008 there was no discernible
difference between investors and non-investors. By early December 2008 investors were four
times as likely than non-investors to view stock market as safe; this disparity grew to nearly
ten times by mid-January 2009. Clearly where it mattered, investors were able to make clear
distinctions about their financial interests. It just did not manifest in their attitudes about
economic policies developed in response to the financial crisis.
This poses a puzzle. If investors had divergent views about the stock market compared
to non-investors, why didn’t this spill over into attitudes about government policies? If
investors are more bullish than non-investors, should this attitude manifest regarding eco-
nomic stimulus or bailout of the financial industry? If it is not investments that explain this
difference, then is there some other unobserved variable such as risk tolerance that explains
this difference?
These questions can only be answered with more and better data than are currently
available. Despite this ambiguity, this chapter provides the clearest evidence of a divergence
between investors and non-investors in this dissertation. Data limitations prevent me from
making definitive judgments about investor attitudes during financial crises. A key challenge
is incomplete data on predictors of financial asset ownership. The analysis particularly would
be strengthened by the inclusion of data about financial loss and gain. At minimum, however,
the tentative results of this chapter invite more research on this understudied topic.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
“Theories on political behavior are best left to CNN, pollsters, pundits, historians, candi-
dates, political parties, and the voters.” United States Senator Tom Coburn.
8.1 Revisiting the argument
This dissertation critically examines claims about the effects of financial assets on politi-
cal behavior. The investor class and asset effect theories claim that after people acquire
stocks and mutual funds they become more interested and involved in the political process
to protect and enhance their economic interests. This in turn leads to changes in their parti-
sanship, participation and political attitudes. Campbell et al. (1960) refer to this mechanism
as “primitive self-interest.” This dissertation offers a more nuanced argument, namely that
stock market investments shape political behavior through three mechanisms: 1) creation of
a vested interest in political actions that may affect the investor’s economic welfare; 2) reduc-
tion of the cognitive capacity required to act rationally on this interest; and 3) an increase in
the “causal clarity” between individual economic well-being and specific government actions.
These mechanisms collectively help people to act rationally by making clear the connec-
tions between their individual economic welfare and the political process. I argue that the
structure of the market compels investors to be forward looking. Further, investors place
greater value on near-future returns than expected gains far out into distance. This suggests
that the effects of assets on behavior should occur in the near-term. However, there is one
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important caveat. I contend the effect of assets on behavior is conditionally triggered by
financial loss. Neuroscience research and psychological experiments show that people react
differently to loss and gain. People feel losses more acutely than equivalent gains. People fre-
quently reinterpret these losses, however, to subjectively improve their welfare (Thaler and
Johnson 1990). This asymmetry between gain and loss explains prior findings that investors
are more likely to attribute positive returns to their own prowess, but shirk blame for their
losses (Feldman 1982). I argue, however, that losses become politicized only when investors
believe that the playing field is somehow unfair. In most cases, people do not make the con-
nection between their individual economic welfare and government actions. The empirical
evidence in this dissertation supports this argument, finding that financial assets generally
did not shape political behavior in the United States or Britain from the early 1980s through
the late 2000s.
8.2 Contribution
This dissertation contributes to the self-interest literature, which until now had not con-
sidered the potential for “wealth effects” on self-interest. The theory of portfolio politics
developed in this dissertation builds upon and extends the self-interest literature to consider
the potential for stored-up assets to shape political behavior. This project is among the
first to consider financial assets in analysis of economic self-interest and political behavior.
This project also contributes to the political economy literature by offering what Kinder and
Kiewiet (1981) describe as “an inquiry into the political economy of individual citizens.”
Political science previously had not explored the potential impact of stock participation on
individual political behavior. This dissertation is an initial step in this direction and invites
more work on this topic.
This study also contributes to the participation literature by expanding the conceptual-
ization of resources to include financial assets. Research to date focuses on current income,
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which is not always correlated with saved-up assets. This project encourages the study of
wealth effects on engagement in the political process. Finally, this project contributes to
scholarship about the non-economic effects of asset ownership. It helps to further build this
literature by demarcating how specific types of assets—stocks and mutual funds—appear to
have little effect on specific types of behavior.
Empirically, this project offers a robust test of existing theories about the relationship be-
tween assets and politics. It employs a quasi-experimental research design with longitudinal
data covering over twenty-five years. The experimental approach used in this dissertation
is akin to a clinical drug trial. By comparison of the treatment effect on both treated and
control groups, I offer direct tests of the causal effects of acquisition of stocks or mutual
funds on partisanship, participation, or political attitudes. One of the cautionary tales of
this project concerns over-reliance on tests of the null hypothesis for causal inference. On
numerous occasions my parametric estimates yielded “statistically significant” results. But
for the methodological decision to focus on relative risk to ascertain the average treatment
effect of financial assets on political behavior, I would have “followed the stars” and claimed
causality where none in fact exists.
8.3 Relevance
The quotation at the beginning of this chapter by U.S. Senator Tom Coburn was made in
October 2009 to support his proposed amendment to eliminate funding for political science
from the National Science Foundation (Coburn 2009). Senator Coburn’s argument concerns
the relative value of political science to society. Senator Coburn singled out the American
National Election Studies at the University of Michigan for criticism. “The University of
Michigan may have some interesting theories about recent elections, but Americans who have
an interest in electoral politics can turn to CNN, FOX News, MSNBC, the print media, and
a seemingly endless number of political commentators on the internet who pour over this
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data and provide a myriad of viewpoints to answer the same questions. There is no shortage
of data or analysis in this field that would require the government to provide funding for
additional analysis.”
The investor class theory is just the type of theory Senator Coburn argues is better left to
pollsters and pundits. In December 2000, John O’Sullivan, Editor–at–large of the conserva-
tive opinion magazine National Review took credit for his publication’s role in promulgation
of the theory: “In recent years National Review has pioneered two of the most fruitful the-
ories of electoral behavior: namely, those based upon the “investor class” and the “impact
of immigration” (O’Sullivan 2000). The investor class theory was developed far away from
political science departments and peer-reviewed academic journals. It was hyped in political
opinion pages and think tank white papers until it reverberated within the halls of Congress
and the West Wing of the White House.
Muir (1999) argues that political science needs to weigh in on important policy issues
outside of the pages of academic journals. This is particularly important when non-peer
reviewed research is used as the basis for important social policy. Although the investor
class theory was not used publicly to make the case for Social Security privatization, it
clearly motivated for the Bush Administration and the Republican Party to action. The
findings of this dissertation reveal, however, that confidence in this theory was misplaced.
Contrary to the popular belief that “you become a conservative when you have something to
conserve,” this dissertation finds no evidence to support the belief that acquisition of stock
market investments has any effect on political actions or beliefs. Political scientists need to
shed light on these types of debates to not only demonstrate the value of our science, but
also to add expertise where it can make a valuable contribution to society.
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8.4 Future research
Although I find no evidence that financial assets play a role in shaping political behavior,
these findings are very limited in scope for several reasons. First, the data are limited to the
United States and Britain for very specific periods of time. The U.S. data in particular are
limited in duration. More robust data sets are needed to draw more definitive conclusions.
These findings of course are limited to the United States and Britain. Financial assets
may have different effects on behavior in less developed economies. It is also possible that
political context may mediate the effects of assets on politics. The U.S. and Britain are
both advanced democracies. Financial assets may shape behavior in different ways in other
political contexts.
Second, the effects of assets on behavior may vary for different sub-groups. For example,
researchers contend there are distinct processes through which gender interacts with socio-
economic factors. Due to the different roles of men and women in the home and work
place, it is possible that the social processes through which financial assets affect political
behavior may be different for men and women (Burns et al. 1997; Scholzman et al. 1999). By
extension, assets may also have distinct effects on the political behavior of ethnic, racial and
social subgroups. This is an important research question given the well-established finding
that women and minorities participate at lower levels in the political process. Finally, more
work is needed to fully investigate vested interest. Better data about asset types, asset
values, and investment motivations could help to disaggregate investors and define different
degrees of vesting.
8.5 An ideal survey
I conclude with an outline of an ideal survey instrument to investigate the effect of financial
assets on political behavior. The ideal survey instrument has three features: detailed data
about financial assets; a broad range of predictors of financial asset ownership and political
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behavior; and, good coverage of questions about political behavior (partisanship, partici-
pation and attitudes). Ideally, this survey would be administered to a panel that can be
tracked over time. An ideal candidate in the United States is the General Social Survey
(GSS), which already asks some political and personal finance questions. The GSS is part of
the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a collaborative international comparative
survey research project comprised of 43 countries. Inclusion of these survey questions in the
ISSP would provide a rich source of data for comparative analysis.
8.5.1 Financial investments
Stocks
• Do you directly own any stocks?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of stocks you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of stocks you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own domestic stocks, foreign stocks, or both?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of each?
• How many companies are represented by the stocks you directly own?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of each?
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• Do you own any small-cap stocks?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of small-cap stocks you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of small-cap stocks you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own any mid-cap stocks?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of mid-cap stocks you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of mid-cap stocks you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own any large-cap stocks?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of large-cap stocks you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of large-cap stocks you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own any “value” stocks?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of the “value” stocks you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of “value” stocks you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own any “growth” stocks?
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– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of “growth” stocks you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of “growth” stocks you own outside of retirement accounts?
Bonds
• Do you directly own any bonds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of bonds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of bonds you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own domestic bonds, foreign bonds, or both?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of each?
Stock Mutual Funds
• Do you directly own any stock mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of stock mutual funds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of stock mutual funds you own outside of retirement accounts?
• Do you own domestic stock mutual funds, foreign stock mutual funds, or both?
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– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of each?
• Are the foreign stock mutual funds that you own in developed markets, emerging
markets, or both?
– What is the value of emerging market foreign stock mutual funds that you own?
– What is the value of developed market foreign stock mutual funds that you own?
• Do you own any small-cap stock mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of small-cap stock mutual funds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of small-cap stock mutual funds you own outside of retirement
accounts?
• Do you own any mid-cap stock mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of mid-cap stock mutual funds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of mid-cap stock mutual funds you own outside of retirement
accounts?
• Do you own any large-cap stock mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
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– What is the value of large-cap stock mutual funds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of large-cap stock mutual funds you own outside of retirement
accounts?
• Do you own any “value” stock mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of the “value” stock mutual funds you own in retirement ac-
counts?
– What is the value of “value” stock mutual funds you own outside of retirement
accounts?
• Do you own any “growth” stock mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
– What is the value of “growth” stock mutual funds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of “growth” stock mutual funds you own outside of retirement
accounts?
• (Repeat questions for actively managed stock mutual funds and index stock mutual
funds.)
Bond Mutual Funds
• Do you directly own any bond mutual funds?
– In retirement accounts?
– Outside of retirement accounts?
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– What is the value of bond mutual funds you own in retirement accounts?
– What is the value of bond mutual funds you own outside of retirement accounts?
8.5.2 Politics
Partisanship
• Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?
• On a scale with strong Democrats on one end and strong Republicans on the other,
and with Independents in the middle, where would you place yourself (Strong Demo-
crat, Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent, Weak Republican, Republican, Strong
Republican)?
• Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat or Republican?
• No matter how you voted in the last couple of national elections or how you think
you might vote in the next national election, do you basically think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
• In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Inde-
pendent, or what?
• (These questions should be interspersed throughout the survey.)
Participation
• Did you vote in the most recent presidential election?
• Did you vote in the most recent congressional election?
• In the last 12 months, have you had contact with a public official in writing or by
telephone?
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• In the last 12 months, have you had contact with a public official in person?
• In the last 12 months, have you made a financial contribution to a political candidate?
• In the last 12 months, have you made a financial contribution to a political party?
• In the last 12 months, have you made a financial contribution to a political action
group?
• In the last 12 months, have you volunteered for a political candidate?
• In the last 12 months, have you volunteered for a political party?
• In the last 12 months, have you participated in political protest?
• In the last 12 months, how would you describe your activity in a political party (a lot,
some, a little, none)?
• In the last 12 months, how many hours per month have you spent in activity with a
political party?
• Are you a registered member of a political party?
– Which political party?
– Length of membership in political party?
Attitudes
• Level of interest in politics (very interested, fairly interested, not very interested, not
at all interested)?
• The free market can handle complex economic problems without government help
(strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
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• Private enterprise solves economic problems (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor
disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• Public services ought to be state-owned (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor dis-
agree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• The government should redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor (strongly
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• Ordinary people don’t get a fair share of the nation’s wealth (strongly agree, agree,
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers (strongly agree, agree, neither
agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• Society do whatever is necessary to make sure an equal opportunity for all to succeed
(strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• The government should guarantee jobs and standard of living (strongly agree, agree,
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
• The government ought to set a limit on earnings (strongly agree, agree, neither agree
nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)?
8.5.3 Demographics
• What is your gender?
• What is your age?
• What is your annual household income?
• What is your education level (less than high school, high school, some college and/or
technical training, undergraduate degree, advanced degree)?
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• What is your race or ethnic background?
• What is your occupation?
• What is your employment status (part-time, full-time, unemployed, student, home-
maker, retired)?
• On average, how many hours a week are you employed?
• What is your marital status (single, married, separated, divorced, widowed)?
• How many children do you have under the age of 18 years?
• Do you own or rent your home (or neither)?
– If homeowner: What is the value of your home?
• Do you own your own business? If so, how many employees do you have?
– If business owner: What is the value of your business?
• Do you have a mortgage?
– If so, how much do you owe on your mortgage?
• What is your total non-mortgage debt?
• Do you have any serious health problems?
– If married: Does your spouse have any serious health problems?
– If dependent children: Do your children have any serious health problems?
• What is your estimated net worth (financial and real assets less debt)?
• How much do you know about investment options (a great deal, some, not much,
nothing)?
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• How would you describe your interest in personal finance and investing (a great deal,
some, not much, none)?
• Were your parents invested in the stock market when you were a child?
• On a scale of one to ten, how many of your friends and family are also invested in the
stock market?
• How often do you discuss the stock market with your friends and family (a great deal,
some, not much, never)?
• How often do you attend religious services (more than once a week, once a week, more
than once a month, once a month, a few times a year, never)?
• Which level of risk are you willing to take when saving or making investments: sub-
stantial risk expecting to earn substantial returns, above average risk to earn above
average returns, average risk expecting to earn average returns, or not willing to take
any financial risks?
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